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ITALY AND THE RUINS OF POLITICAL LIBERTY.

THE day on which we write will be memorable in the history of Italy—that is to say, of the Italy which was said to have been redeemed from tyranny and was united into one glorious kingdom by the forces of the Revolution. The Italian chambers meet to-day after a protracted vacation, for which they never asked, but by means of which they were kept duly silent by the prime minister, who falls from power on this day. His fall may be only a piece of trifling to save appearances for the present; but what he falls for is no trifle. The latest of the dictatorial speculations and operations of Francesco Crispi is the battle of Adua, fought in Abyssinia four days ago, on the 1st of March, 1896. It has entailed the loss of an entire army, some 15,000 to 20,000 men, with sixty cannons and ammunition, and consequently the fort of Adigrat and all the munitions of war. King Menelik has suddenly become a more prominent military power, with a better equipment of modern arms, than the whole of this Garibaldian United Italy. The feats of arms which had preceded this last were the loss of an entire column at Amba Alagi, of a fort at Makalle, and the precipitate evacuation of a vast territory, coolly invaded, as Rome had been, without asking permission of its owners. The minister's feats of dictatorial administration, executed without the authority of Parliament, and during the enforced vacation, had been in the line of expenses thrown upon a bankrupt exchequer by despatching 20,000 men in December, then 10,000 more afterwards, and attempting two days ago to reinforce the number of victims for the slaughter by ordering new brigades to be sent. No doubt he knew his majority. He had bought them all in; and he had bought their places for them last June, always with the

money of the impoverished nation. But it suits them to join now in the hue and cry, to save themselves till the storm blows over, and to recover him, when the short-lived spirit of mutiny shall have expired.

Viewed with a philosophical eye, the scene presents one redeeming feature. It is that the wholesale disaster abroad is not this time at the expense of the Church. It is United Italy, as a political power in Europe, that goes out of existence on this occasion, confessedly by an act of suicide. The revolvers, bayonets and swords, which ornament on this happy day the streets and piazzas at home, for once at least are not directed against nuns, priests and the Pope. Nor even are they directed against the Catholic citizens in the first instance. Now, as also on the glorious 20th of September last, when the "Liberation of Rome" from the "tyranny" of the Popes was laboriously celebrated on its twenty-fifth anniversary, the bayonets and the swords are bristling and the revolvers are ready to jump out of their cases against the children of the Revolution itself, who are investing the present régime pretty much like the Abyssinians, though not quite in Abyssinian style.

Those Scioans fought honestly for their hearths and their homes, with lances of their own make and with Remington rifles, which had once been the property of the Pope. Their spirited and Christian behavior throughout has not only vindicated their rights as a nation to own their own soil and to be left alone, but it seems to have answered also the prayer of His Holiness uttered with such deep and aggrieved feeling during the September feasts: *Ut inimicos Sanctæ Ecclesiæ humiliare digneris, Te rogamus audi nos*. In fact, this government, which appropriated the rifles of the zouaves from the Papal casernas, has seen its own military shot down with those same Papal arms. It had disposed of them evidently to good purpose. And the good people of the Trastevere are just now saying: *I fucili del Papa sparano ancora*—"The Pope's rifles are firing still!"

It is not in this style that the children of the Revolution are felt to be swarming around to-day; though it will come to the same result eventually, of avenging the Pope somehow. They swarm in the same way as their parent grew—a fungous growth spreading over the body which they are about to destroy, a putrefactive organism into which the carcass is breaking up, to be followed in steady succession by lower and lower types of socialistic and anarchistic microbes, until, having transmuted the body politic into their own vile substance and disposed of all the fibre, they will leave behind them only a residue of their own impalpable dust and escaping gases.

The army itself, which is really the sole implement of a government like this, consists of conscripts, who are practically convicts for a certain term of years, and who are made fit for the penitentiary by the time they leave the service, however innocent they may have been before. It consists of lads torn from their families, who had to be chosen by lot each time, for despatching into Africa, as if they were mutineers being decimated. Men and boys alike, the greatest part of them had never felt the slightest attraction to a life of arms. And, as the regiments go drilling and marching and countermarching, and mounting guard at the palace and returning to those quarters which were once monasteries and convents, they remind one of nothing so much as that of the chain-gangs in America breaking stones on the highways, all for the public good. The patriotism of the two denominations reaches about the same level. So martial are the poor conscripts, except when a splendid band is tripping along at their head, making them trip along too, that, according to the latest news about Adua—news that is absolutely certain—the troops that broke ranks and scattered and fled for their lives, when as yet scarcely touched by fire, were not the black soldiers of the foremost battalions, but the white troops fresh from Italy, who were to support the van. No wonder! For they should have been at their ploughs or their books or their counters, not running against the point of a Scioan's lance.

This machinery of arms, no matter who bears them, is the power by which certain free governments at present, notably the Italians and the French, impose the sacred bond of fear upon the nation. Every soldier is himself terrorized by the military law over him. The freemason lodges terrify the men who apply the law. And every man in the lodges is under the spell of holy fright imposed by all the rest. Here we have the practical working of the newest form of "free" constitution. This is the most advanced type of political liberty. Italy and France have gone this way. Spain and Hungary are going the same way. Others are following. And yet we are just at the close of our most glorious epoch, the age of ages for liberty and enlightenment, the magnificent nineteenth century, which inspires so many a triumphal ode on the "spirit of the age."

When the age pipes, why some dance; and, as the Greek comedian said, we have a right to be merry on a merry subject. The age is light and frisky; there is no doubt of it. And lightest and friskiest of all men are they who dance to it. A critical sense shall at least keep us sober, if we can just escape the grip of a higher criticism, which would make us positively melancholy. But "out upon thee, Melancholy," when we mean to speak of the spirit of the age.

I.

Rome and its recent ruins gave us some food for reflection in a former article of this REVIEW. We meant, of course, the ruins of recent structures in Rome—the pieces into which a new house goes when it will not stand. The science of architecture, which deals with statics, has nothing to learn from things that go up only to come down. Recent ruins have no past nor future. Their function is transitory—to offend the eye for a moment in the flitting present. Religion, indeed, has a footing in the contemplation of some recent ruins, if the anathema of the Pope had entered into the composition of the mortar. We shall leave it to the reflection of our readers to determine whether, in the collapse of some recent political liberties, called constitutions, the same element entered as accelerating the catastrophe.

The mention of religion here furnishes us with a striking contrast as set over against the ruins of political enterprises. Religion too seems to be in a state of ruin. Christianity, as forming part of the organization of modern nations, seems to be no more. The Christendom which consisted in the formation of nations by Christianity, and in an organic life animated by its principles and laws, would appear to be standing forth in the moral and social world of the day as a great antique pile, with its foundations still there, its old walls standing, its pillars still erect, its roof more or less extended over all, but the structure reft with fissures, with the sunlight penetrating only to reveal decay, and the moon tracing pensively its shadows in place of Christianity's past glories. The united Christendom which was, scarcely seems to be. It knows no longer the Pontiff's throne. Grass grows over the laws of the decalogue. And, as to the beatitudes of peace, and mercy, and charity, and joy, and thirsting for justice, or that long suffering for justice's sake, whereby mankind in its highest stage rose towards the vestibule of heaven, what a wreck we have come to in the history of the world! Historians make excursions to it, as an interesting pile. Philosophers go out to study it as possibly suggesting some ideas. Poets delight in it, for the moonlight is there. But what nation belongs to it any more, or sighs, "I have loved the glory of Thy house, O Lord!"

Verily, if a ruin it is, it is one under the shadow of which the reflective soul may well gather its thoughts, and luxuriate in the associations woven there by forty generations gone before. Raised above the narrow hollow of our fleeting time and dusty place, we may enter here into the accumulated life of centuries, and feel hearts still beating, and voices still ringing, and hopes throbbing still, memories which gather and flock around, where the surviving heir of the ages stands. He may well stand there and think

and pray, conscious happily that the same God is present to him, who disposed the destinies of all gone before; feeling the same stream of humanity coursing in his veins as in theirs; alive to the identical mystery of Providence which is now wrapping himself around, and counting his own thoughts and sentiments, too subtle for aught but music to express, to add them to the sum of all that humanity yielded before. All is being gathered into one divine bosom. All is being reserved for the revelation of the future. Not only the noise of multitudes without and the confusion of wars abroad, not only the dust and the smoke where men have pitched their tents, but his own silent footfall, his inquiring gaze into the ways of God with man, and his wondering surprise at the strange and devious ways of man with God, all is being set in place for the one great tableau, when mankind shall for the first and last time be set face to face with itself, and the nations that have perished shall see why they did so. If Christendom is a ruin, it is so only because the nations that need help come not where they may find it. And God, who made the nations for peace and health, and love and worship, will leave that structure there, for them to renew it, if they will choose to do so, to fill in the old walls, to reinforce those pillars, to recap those vaults, and bid Christendom stand forth again, as gorgeous as the basilica of St. Peter on the Vatican—if only they choose to do so.

Aside of it, and around it, extends the waste of modern things. Notably, there lie the broken-down piles of modern liberties. It was because of liberty that men broke forth from Christianity. And what has become of the liberty which they chose instead of Christ?

It is accepted as a first principle of the time, that political liberty consists in a certain form of constitution, called emphatically "free." Whether the constitution is capped by an hereditary head, styled a monarch, or by an elective head named a president, it is the one form specifically free. Yet, as this constitutional form with its political liberties does now appear either in the republic of France or in the monarchy of Italy, never could it have been made clearer that liberty does not consist in a constitution; for here we have constitutions without liberty. These paper instruments were themselves drawn up not for liberty, but for other purposes. They are the charters of certain associations, which styled them national constitutions, but which knew perfectly well that they were mere articles of conveyance, putting the nation into the pockets of a few. Having invented the instrument and copy-righted it by a process called a *plebiscite*, they work the machinery accordingly, and then legislate henceforth to supplement it. The legislation is prospective, retrospective, elastic, adjustable to every

possible purpose, except that of ousting the association out of power, or enabling their public crimes to be brought to justice. Like their *plebs*, which they feed at the door, their benches of justice too, both high and low, they feed with themselves. And, when even such a judiciary could not support laws of their own making if challenged in the courts, they pass over it and leave it out, inventing the new device of executing laws "by way of administration," as in the case of the present confiscation going on against the religious orders in France. The laws already prepared in the lodges are passed without the jarring war of words; for where the speaking is all on the side of a helpless minority, as is the case in Italy, there can clearly be no contention. In France there is generally more show of debate; but there is reason to doubt, whether the show is not as carefully prepared as the law which is meant to pass. The show of debate serves in part to disguise what the law-making power is doing. Then, if anything remains too plain for the intelligence of the bewildered multitude, the reptile press, which is the parliament of the crowd, makes a suitable decoction of that. In any case, the law thenceforth is law; and there is an end of it. It represents the will of that awful thing—whatever may be meant by it—that awful thing, called the State. Whatever it is, or is meant by it, it comes towering with a mighty mien, robbing, expatriating, shooting, shouting, and the people cowering go like a flock of sheep where this awful thing bids. This "State" generally appears in the scarf of an official, or in his moustache—a simple outsider does not see precisely where the awful thing reveals itself—also with a vague suspicion of bayonets somewhere, if you do not walk through the right door, or do not go into the right car, if you pretend that your house is your own, or that you are not dangerous to the "State." The "way of administration" will settle that for you in twenty-four hours. Meanwhile, it is the people that has made its laws, of course; and is obeying them freely. For we are under a free constitution; yea, a republic.

II.

In any meeting of the Italian chambers, during these last eight months, one might witness the very peculiar scene of a government measure being attacked by radicals, like Cavallotti and Imbriani, by moderates of the type of Di Rudini, by half-a-dozen other speakers, able, fiery, even ferocious. Not a word comes in reply from the members of an immense majority. There is no discussion, except in the sense of criticism and condemnation. The debate, such as it is, comes to a close when assailants desist. The vote is taken. And the measure, condemned by all the ora-

tory which has been heard in the house, passes with the usual overwhelming majority. In the special conventions of the dominant party, a similar scene might be witnessed. The prime minister held a very important meeting some little while ago. He spoke and spoke, and there was no end of his speaking, about himself and his policy. Then he asked for contributions from the enlightenment of the statesmen present to the general fund of wisdom. There was no reply. He expressed himself singularly comforted by this spectacle of their perfect unanimity; and, assuring them in turn of his own devotion, he said: "I am ready to go to hell with you." The sincerity of the sentiment is sufficiently guaranteed by the ordinary life and worship of the lodges. But the sympathetic extension of it does not stop short with the members. It embraces the whole country, now that the people are free.

The cabinet of a mighty modern state should scarcely be expected to conduct the municipal affairs of a town; no more, in fact, than it need manage a sacristy. But, like sacristies, so towns are administered, when occasion invites, by a free government of this kind. It can sweep away a municipal council and substitute a royal commissary for mayor, aldermen, councilmen and all the rest. It is simply the principle of dictatorship carried down to the last unit of the general body politic.

Thus the other day a royal commissary took charge of the city of Turin. The Catholic majority in the communal council had voted a reduction of appropriations for the national feast days of the Statute and birthdays of king and queen. Strictly speaking, there is no need of any appropriations whatever for legal holidays. It is enough if the banks and public schools and the public offices close for the day. The action of the Catholic majority was a step towards purifying city administration of general politics, which the liberals are always and everywhere intruding into every function of life. The vote stood 34 against 25. The reduction was passed. Immediately there was tumult and uproar from the minority of liberals. The mayor and his giunta felt constrained to resign, and the council had to proceed to a new election. Now, the liberals could hope for nothing from the majority, but everything from a royal commissary; and, as without the liberal votes, the requisite number could not be mustered for the election of a new mayor, the minority returned blank papers in three ballots, which gave respectively 37, 38 and 36 votes for the new Catholic candidate. There was a dead-lock; and the royal commissary appeared, taking the city in charge.

Here was a technical and perhaps grave emergency, created by the liberals. But neither gravity of circumstance nor technicality of law is at all necessary for the intervention of the dictatorial

power, in disfranchising a city for a time of its municipal government, in dismissing a mayor for "unpatriotic" conduct, in doing just what it likes. The syndic of Rome, Prince Torlonia, was turned out of his office on a former occasion. His offence was that of undertaking to present the compliments of the city of Rome to the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, on the occasion of his sacerdotal jubilee.

The case of Turin was particularly instructive. It opened the eyes of Catholics, not only to more extensive resources of liberalism than they had thought of, but to the utter inadequacy also of a certain policy, which they had been following pretty generally. As to Parliament, the good Catholics keep out of it altogether, and they cast no votes for candidates, observing in this the express instructions of the Holy Father. But they have been studiously exhorted to enter the municipal councils and put some check on the de-christianizing of schools, asylums, hospitals and other institutions. Now, they were met here with the serious difficulty that, if they took charge of the communal councils as a majority and meant to act as conscientious Catholics, they would run the risk at every turn of encountering the central government and of being turned out at any moment by a royal commissary. They considered, therefore, that by keeping studiously in a minority they could serve as a drag at least on the infidel majority, and, when occasions arose to compromise them, they had only to cast their conscientious votes and then abstain from active participation in political demonstrations or whatever else might be demanded of the council. The syndic and the majority might march as it liked to the tune of the central government, which, being thus satisfied with the city's "patriotism," would meddle no farther. It was a half-measure, rendered excusable by the nature of the liberties they enjoy under this free constitution. But the vigorous populations of northern Italy, whence these usurpers themselves came, could not long remain cowering down under the freemason whip; and the general revival of Catholic life, which had taken its start precisely in Piedmont and in Lombardy, has led to bolder measures. So they have taken charge of things with fine majorities. Venice has made its schools Christian again. Milan is radiating its ecclesiastical influence, and two days ago it looked as if a revolution was beginning there; and just at present it is uncertain whether the military is not about to mutiny. Turin had its majority in the council, and now that a new election has just taken place its majority is Catholic as before. But the instructive feature of the incident of last January was that even a majority can be checkmated, and the council dissolved, on a liberal issue most remote from a question of general politics.

In this crisis the glorious free people figured as usual—that free people of the plebiscites, which endorses the public robberies, which shouts itself hoarse around the new statues of revolutionary heroes and fills its pockets with pay for votes at the political elections. During the days of the contention a fair specimen of this sovereign people had gathered about the town-hall. It pressed against the doors with the customary declarations of its sublime disagreement with the Catholic counsellors. When the council was dissolved, the Assessor Dumontel tried in vain to make his way out and pass through the mob. Two liberal colleagues begged him to desist and make his escape by another door. The gentleman replied: “I have always come in by this door during the thirteen years that I have been a member of the council, and I mean to go out of it to-day.” And he did pass out; and so did all the Catholic members, holding their heads high, calm and serene, while the sovereign people of the free constitution hissed and yelled and threatened in the expression of its high displeasure. If the free people came near killing the councillor Radicati, that was, no doubt, because he was so helpless. He was dragging himself along on his crutches.

This is the constitutional *plebs* which, under the process of general corruption, is becoming stronger every day. Reinforced each year by the generations of cultured lads who are poured out of the government schools, it is at present the strength, as it is also the canker and will be the ruin, of the power which engenders it, and, first and foremost, of this glorious house of Savoy. It corresponds exactly to that noble Roman people of the decaying Roman empire, who lived on the largesses of pence thrown out to it, on the bits of bread doled out to it, and chiefly on the feast of blood shed in the amphitheater to amuse it. Again, it looks very much as if the staple article which constitutes this people of the plebiscite were the identical stuff which filled Italy with hordes of brigands in former ages. Many of these, who would have been brigands in other days, have possessed themselves now of so much power in the shape of money that they are sitting in the chambers as senators and deputies. Economists tell us that coal is only vegetable fibre which has stored up the rays of the sun and yields them up again as radiant heat. Just like economic coal these statesmen have stored up their money—better not inquire where—and are disengaging it now as constitutional power; but, unlike coal, they lay in new stores as they go. However, they are legislators now, and they have privileges; and they must not be called brigands. Said one of them to another, long before Rome was seized: “Had we done such things as we have done for any other cause than the redemption of Italy, we should be great blackguards.” His words

are on record, and they seem to mean just what they say, that the redeemers of Italy are blackguards, but they should not be called so. Their proper name now is honorable ministers, honorable senators, honorable deputies. But, to do them justice, we are not quite sure whether all of them would have been brigands in other times for the sake of foul lucre. Some thinkers are prone to believe that many among them would have been ecclesiastics in other ages for the sake of ecclesiastical revenues. And now that they are "honorables" instead of "reverend," and that brave young sparks wear epaulettes with grace instead of vestments with sacrilege, these reflective old heads are inclined to bless God and His Providence for deriving an unqualified good out of what seemed to be an unqualified evil.

Another excellent turn which, purblind as we are, we may still discern in the actual course of events is that, as there is no Protestantism nor hypocrisy in the Italian nation, so these apostates entertain no indifference in matters of religion. They know no application of the principle, "Live and let live," and consequently, before they have finished their present operations, they will have stimulated into life every latent ember of true religious sentiment in the drowsy carelessness of so many good people, who would otherwise let well-enough alone and let things go on to perdition. There is little need of hypocrisy in present circumstances. On the contrary, as in many social matters Italians give a shock to our varnished sensibilities, so in matters of religion they exhibit any amount of nature, pure and unvarnished. Good people show this in many ways of most simple and natural devotion. The others show it too just in the way that Christ our Lord described, when He said that if people will not love God and hate the devil they will put up with the devil and hate God. And thence arises that singular feature in these Catholic countries where, instead of taking things quietly and being what they like, they are all loving God or adoring the devil and, *vice versa*, fighting with the devil or fighting with God. They are demonstratively so. In short, they are natural. They are neither Protestants nor hypocrites. The things beyond this world are too real to their sense to be ignored with indifference; and, in the present breaking up of society, there is no inducement for the wolves to put on the fleece of the lamb. The lambs are lambs, and the wolves are wolves. And that we consider natural. It is a pity nature is not more widely spread over the world.

Here is an entertaining illustration just at hand of what we are endeavoring to express. Alongside of the glorious Church of the Gesù there runs a narrow street called the *Via del Gesù*. One could feel the fragrance of the Church and of Christ's sacred name envel-

oping the Altieri palace opposite with the name *Via del Gesù* affixed to it. Now, alas! the name is gone, and it is the *Via del Plebiscito*. The constitutional *plebs* that did not want the Church begrudged the name of Christ to the palace opposite. And now it runs its plebeian course from the new "Corso of Victor Emmanuel" through its narrow *Via del Plebiscito* up into the new "Street of the Nation." A pretty laborious ascent they have made of it from a certain creature once called Victor Emmanuel II. through a plebiscite up to a nation. There was a method in their madness, and there is an art in their memory of it. But in all alike they are eminently natural. They take care to run over the name of Christ.

III.

Having given some illustrations of the working of a free constitution in the chambers, in the municipalities, in the piazzas and the streets, we may add a few more to illustrate the personal liberty of thinking, speaking, and even of living, and also a peculiar formation now given to personal character.

When the political elections were the subject of agitation last year, a certain Dr. Poletti, who was attached to the militia, delivered some public addresses, in which he inculcated obedience to the Pope, who had forbidden Catholics to take part in the elections. He was brought before the military authorities for doing so, and was required to explain. He did so with admirable clearness. The first article of the Statute, he said, recognized the Catholic religion as that of the state; and the Pope, as head of the Church, has the right of governing the faithful in matters of morals and discipline. Wherefore, as he commanded abstention from the political elections, the doctor maintained that it belonged to us to obey and to recommend obedience. In the course of his argument there had been no occasion for speaking of the temporal power; but he had spoken of the necessity, under which the government lay, of coming to an agreement with the Holy See, and thereby removing the cause of nearly all the moral and physical evils which are afflicting poor Italy. He had not animadverted on the national institutions. On the contrary, in keeping with the spirit of his military oath, he hoped that an end would be put at last to a system of persons and things which only heaped ruin on the country from the epoch of its unification till the present day. "And, again, with regard to the abstention from the elections, there was another reason besides that of obedience, mentioned before, which was, that Catholics were bound, by abstaining at present, to get themselves ready for entering the political arena at the right moment; and, having kept their hands clean so far, they could repair all these material and moral evils which the dominant

liberalism has accumulated on their country." In answer to this satisfactory explanation, the ministry sent word that he should resign his post of officer. Poletti did so, adding what the ministry insisted he should not add—the reasons for his resignation. Poletti answered that such silence was repugnant to his conscience, and so he gave the reasons, which were simply his obedience to the Pope's command. Whereupon the ministry, by a decree bearing the king's signature, approved of the proposal already made by the court-martial of Brescia, and degraded Poletti to the rank of a private soldier. The decree stated the motives for passing the sentence. These were: "The public manifestation of opinions hostile to the constitutional monarchy and to the fundamental institutions of the state." Poletti then sent his epaulettes as an offering to the Holy Father, accompanied with a statement of the whole incident. A journal which published this statement was sequestered by the government. That is what constitutional liberty comes to, in freedom of thought, speech and press. And it shows too, that, if personal hypocrisy in religion and life is not indigenous in a population like this, it does not follow that political hypocrisy is not an essential part of the programme for those who work the machinery of state and for those who are ground down to be worked by it.

The most fundamental of all liberties is that of the human being in his private life, to think, to speak, to act, if he remains within the legitimate sphere of the laws imposed by God on human nature, and of the just laws added by social authority for the evident public good. But, if that is most fundamental, there is a form of it most intimate and absolutely sacred. It is his right to deal with God, and consecrate himself, if he chooses, to the special service of his Creator. How this constitutional form of political liberty has dealt with religious and the orders they belong to, we sketched on a former occasion. We need add now only some illustrations of the present theme.

Individual nuns, especially in the cloistered orders, brought with them a dowry for their maintenance in the convent, the dowry thenceforth forming part of the common fund. All was swept away, some twenty-three years ago; and, in lieu of their property, a pittance of ten cents a day was assigned to professed nuns, until they should die out. The pittance is paid four times a year, that is, nine dollars at the close of each quarter—not in advance. If the nun dies in the interval between one payment and another, she is not counted. So the expenses incurred by her sickness and burial fall upon the remainder of the community, most of whom are now old, many of them always sick, and every one exposed to manifold hardships entirely foreign to their secluded and

holy life. For they had been driven out of their cloisters, which were wanted for barracks, post-offices, police stations. Sometimes they were allowed to huddle themselves into a corner of their old monastery, until the race should have expired; but generally they were provided for in any out-house or barn that could be made to wear the appearance of a habitation; and, as to roof, windows and doors, they could pay thenceforth the running expenses of repair out of their few centimes a day. The poor victims have been entirely at the mercy of local officials, who, like their masters, simply want to get rid of them, and feel justly aggrieved that the holy souls do not die quick enough. At the commencement of the prosecution, kind rich friends, and also the simple peasantry, were of assistance to them; though such an arrangement is not in the form of life projected by cloistered nuns, whose dowries are their fixed fund for support. Now the rich are few; and such as remain are trying to balance themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. The simple peasantry are so poor that their houses are sold by the government over their heads, and they emigrate to South America, to North America, anywhere to get out of the claws of the harpies. And the poor nuns, always in debt for bread, and patching their habits as best they can, for there are no means to buy new cloth, are thrown more directly than ever on the divine providence of Him, to whom they gave themselves, and who feeds and clothes the sparrow. One Review has 390 such destitute convents regularly on its list of charitable beneficence, and makes special appeals for them twice a year, at Christmas and Easter, under the title of *L'Obolo per le Povere Monache*, "The Mite for the Poor Nuns."¹

The active orders of religious women, and the orders of men, whether active or contemplative, were treated in the same way. But men are supposed to be able to take care of themselves. One solitary instance of liberality was afforded by this liberal government of the freshest, newest type in our golden age. It exempted the "generalitital" houses from immediate confiscation, that is, the houses in which resided the General Superiors of institutions having branches in other parts of the world. But, as soon as the actual Superior General died, the property should go, like all the rest, to its owner, the nation. This feat of liberality was altogether characteristic, not as a mark of respect for personal freedom, but for the motives which rendered it commendable. The motives were very simple. These houses had an international character; and the noble government feared the raising of a little finger on the part of some foreign government, and, therefore, practised

¹ *The Civiltà Cattolica.*

diplomatic deference in this generous style. But its own citizens, suggesting as they did no diplomatic relations, nor the raising of any little finger on the part of Austria or Germany, of England or of the United States, were entirely at its paternal mercy, and were stripped accordingly; and the desks, chairs and cupboards, the washstands, hat-racks, the dishes and plates, were sold at auction. Even in its liberality it made one reserve; for, no doubt, it conceived no fear that any mortal government would stir that finger on behalf of the Jesuits. The *Gesù*, the generalitital house of the Society of Jesus, was excepted from the right of immunity; and the general himself was excepted from the law of compensation, which waited on the other Superiors-General during their natural lifetime.

And the books, and the archives? You have only to go into the old Roman College, or into the different *Archivii di Stato*, to see what became of them in the city of Rome. You can see in Florence, Naples, Turin, Milan, yes, and in every insignificant communal town, what became of the treasures of books and manuscripts, and the most secret and sacred archives, gathered in the course of centuries, by the men who wrote them, who transcribed them, who transacted their own private business, and kept the records; never imagining, good simple souls! that the world was to slide backwards, and the civilization of Christendom was to vanish into the barbarism of this age.

About forty-five libraries of religious houses have been "pooled" into the Victor Emmanuel Library, which fills the Jesuit refectory, parlors, community rooms, and private rooms, besides the old corridors, of the Roman College. The archives, housed in the private rooms upstairs, are catalogued in large folios on a table in the reserved students' room downstairs, the ancient parlor of the community. One huge volume describes the *fondo gesuitico* of documents; others smaller, the *fondi* of single houses, or of several thrown together. The statues, inscriptions, and other memories of the Roman College, founded by Gregory XIII., all remain ostentatiously in their places. Inscriptions taken from the other suppressed houses are inserted in the walls, to preserve the history of the founders of libraries, with a special inscription inserted under each, "Taken from the Convent of Ara Coeli," etc. The nation is ostentatiously grateful to the bees who have built their hives so industriously during centuries, and have left it sole relict to eat the honey. Such archives as are not supposed to be historical—for it is wondrously little this modern enlightenment understands of what it has stolen—are so far scattered about in the Archives of State throughout the city. But now, the *Gesù*, since the Jesuits will not buy it back, is waiting for an occupation; and all these

archives are to go there. The Director-General is so grateful to the Jesuits in particular for their magnificent legacies, that he has already put back into the identical cupboards of the general's old private archives the identical volumes which the nation, in its first fervor of gratitude, had carried elsewhere—partly, however, because the Gesù was first to be a barracks. But, as what was good enough for a community did not suit the soldiers, the director of the stolen archives is to have his chance; and as a mark of gratitude, he said, he would use the same cupboards, which still happened to remain in those repositories, for the same folios to which the destinies of the nation had made it the happy heir. Nor is their cup of happiness as yet quite full. A simple lay brother in a certain religious institute dropped the remark, that at the top of the church there was a great number of boxes, apparently of books. The hounds are at once on the scent. They wait on the Superior, demanding the delivery of certain archives not yet handed over. He has none. They tell him where they can be found. He never heard of them. A search is made; and there they are. They belong to the state; and off they go.

About one hundred millions of dollars were realized by these people on the sale of the property of the religious. Thenceforward, no religious congregations existed any more. At once, with that spirit of zeal and charity which is the spirit of Christ, the busy religious began to act as citizens; they obtained means to buy again, to build again; but only as individual citizens, using the ordinary rights of any private person. After the wholesale devastation of 1873 and 1874, Rome seems to have become again as rich as ever in religious houses. Now Crispi engaged in the African war, and, instead of spending only the thirty millions of lire (six million dollars) appropriated for the purpose by the chambers, he spent one hundred and fifty millions. This looked inconvenient, so he said he would make the religious, or, as he calls them, the *Frati*, "pay for the war in Abyssinia." That is to say, he would confiscate all a second time. But the religious congregations no longer exist; the law does not recognize them. That makes no difference. They seem to conceive that a law can be made any day, retrospective, retroactive, reaching as far back as the days of Noe. For, in the last analysis, there would appear to be only one thing an Italian law cannot reach; that is, the pockets of the deputies.

One thing the minister did not include in his reckonings when he stated his policy. That was the prayers of the religious, who thought they had a friend in heaven powerful enough to save them from another confiscation. And just when one-half of the time had elapsed that was to determine their fate, Crispi was hissed

out of office in the chambers and reviled in effigy all over the country.

IV.

Quite a new formation of personal character is the inevitable result of such new circumstances. People have to struggle for existence, and, to survive, they must have conformed to the environment. Many have thought quite naturally that conformity with the environment meant the adoption of liberal principles. Or rather they have not thought at all. When people want bread they have not time to think; and when they have time, and have bread, few think anyhow. The press pretends to do the thinking, the spirit of the age does the piping, the folks go marching; and those who do not march must simply stay behind. It is the age of all ages for the *parvenus*—*per pervenire*, say the Italians, *pour arriver*, say the French, "to get there," we should say. To get there we must, though we walk over the shoulders of the crowd, as was done in the crush on Brooklyn Bridge, though we walk over our fathers and mothers, though we walk over our teachers and pastors, though we walk over religion, the Church and the Ten Commandments. "Move on!" cry the policemen to the passengers as they tumble out and block the way; "move on and keep to the right!" That is the progress of the age. If you do not move on and keep to the side of the powers that be; if you are "contemptibly inert," as Tertullian tells us the pagans of the primitive times considered the primitive Christians to be; if you will stick to old notions about obeying God rather than men, why you are contemptibly stationary, you are fit for a monastery, and you are just prime for a modern government to send you out and about your business. You will learn sense when you have seen others get there instead of you; and you will know how to eat honey when you see others have got into your hive. You will then go and do likewise, and eat other people's honey, and, however late and sorry, you will be inspired at length with the spirit of this age.

A cultured proletariat is being educated in the government lyceums, and it is already stalking about to educate this unsophisticated and benighted Italian people. It is looking and waiting for places, and it gets its bread meanwhile as best it may. Its moral structure, to the surprise and bewilderment of its fathers and grandfathers, is of a kind they never, even under a nightmare, caught a glimpse of before. But that is only because they have never been in America to see the yearly output of certain universities in our blest republic. Now they see it without going to America. It is a cultured aggregation to the *plebs* of their consti-

tution; the affiliation of education to the patriotism of the piazzas. It is splendid material to jostle priests with or to turn out nuns with at home, or, if sent to Africa, to throw down its muskets and run away. It is really the very best culture of the age.

The general meekness of a Christian population, and particularly that of a paternal and affectionate clergy, is a grand foil for the spirit of young Italy, as of young France, and other youthful products. In these places the militant character of Christianity, which knows what is due to it from others, which expects that others know it too, or else will prick their sleeping consciousness into a becoming state of attention, the spirit of walking through the advanced world of the day with decorous humility, but also with one's head moderately high, has never been developed in these Christian parts, where all heretofore has been so home-like and patriarchal. Folks are taken aback and give way, where we should see reason for a slight push of the elbow to keep things straight. And, quite accustomed to such clerical meekness, which has reposed heretofore on uniform respect and affection, a set of beardless youths coming along a sidewalk not only do not make way for a venerable ecclesiastic to pass, but seem to expect that he will go out into the dirty street and let the coming man pass. So he does. If an American or English ecclesiastic, not used to devious ways but always moving straight on, seems to be running into them, it is quite marvelous how quickly the brave youths make way, as if the Africans were coming. It is a cultured poltroonery, which will fawn on the freemasons for a daily penny, and to get it will blaspheme Christianity, but, when caught sooner or later on a death-bed, will beg for absolution from the friar whom it had flouted while it danced to the spirit of the age.

Nor are those young women, who have been caught in the State machinery of schools, of a kind to excite special comment in the minds of those who are accustomed to this hybrid creature in other lands. But here the shock, which the sight of her gives to the general Catholic sentiment, serves as quite an awakening to our torpid judgments of what is becoming, beautiful and right in the gentler and more upright sex. Callous, indeed, people are becoming to the sights and exhibitions which women make of themselves, especially in centres like Rome and Florence, where their sisters from other lands bring their manners with them. Nevertheless, the judgments passed in conversation, the articles in daily Catholic papers, the reviews in periodicals, all breathe an atmosphere of thought, in which mental and moral diseases of the commonest occurrence amongst us have not yet become naturalized. When this devotee of a queen, who lives with that husband of hers in a palace of the popes, was busy with her devotions one

Holy Week, and as usual was ostentatiously so, the question arose, in a company of learned and experienced men, whether the person in question was sincere in her belief. One of them, a professor, called by the Pope from the north of Italy to lecture on Dante in the University of the Apollinare, delivered his opinion with some warmth and even indignation. We thought it extremely interesting and charming, not so much for the thing said, as for the more general frame of mind which his remark betrayed. "If," said he, "we are to doubt whether a woman is a Christian and approaches the Sacraments, we may as well begin to doubt about everything!"

In spite of all the imported liberalism, and the incrustation of vices which it so rapidly deposits where it has full play, there is one thing which we have failed to discern. Nay, there are many things; we have never seen a case of intoxication, for instance. But one thing there is which may afflict you in other parts of the world, though you happen to be in the most select company, and which one misses here in every company, no matter how simple. It is vulgarity. Both in city and country the people seem to be polite by nature. Their phrases and salutations in every-day life breathe an aroma of charity and reverence that is delicious. The Christian fragrance of grace, which has enveloped the generations for fifteen centuries, does not seem to be dissipated even when infidelity is already in the heart. It is, indeed, a natural endowment of a Catholic people. Twice only have instances of vulgarity met our eye—once in a railway train and once in a tramway at Florence. They were American tourists in the one case, and, apparently, English artists in the other. In both cases they were parties of women.

V.

The tourists who go travelling through Italy under charge of a Cook's agent form their precious judgments of what Italy is, without having spoken a word in Italian to any mortal being; and, when they go home, give off their stored-up wisdom to the general public without being able sometimes to compose a decent paragraph in their mother tongue. The English-speaking colonies, which live in the centres here, are substantially Protestant, and absorb the few Catholics, who covet the privilege of speaking their native language; and the run of their thought flows smoothly from its sources, anti-papal, bigoted, fastidious and pharisaical. The correspondents of the general press abroad either come from abroad and do not belie their origin; or, if they are Italians chosen by New York papers, they owe their selection to qualifications which recommend them from the newspaper's point of view, not

from the side of Catholicity or truth. The result is that Dickens or Mr. Stead could write a juster account of America or Chicago than the correspondents or politicians afford of Italy to the American reading public. The same is true of Mexico, France, Spain. An article of Castellar in the *Forum*, on the politics of Spain, would lead one to surmise that the eminent statesman had never thought it worth his while to credit a living American with any knowledge of Christian and European history.

To explain the political condition of Italy, it will be enough, we believe, to take note of two causes and of two circumstances. The two causes are: first, the secret sects, culminating in the dominant freemasonry; secondly, treachery, sometimes gross, at other times subtle, in some cases conscious, and perhaps in other cases unconscious. Of the two circumstances, one belongs to an order of policy higher than the Italian or any national diplomacy, and higher than all political diplomacy combined; it is the necessary attitude of the Sovereign Pontiff, face to face with the usurpation of his temporal power. The other circumstance is incidental to a nation unaccustomed to the working of a constitutional form of government, and saddled with one in spite of itself, and that such a one! In any case, a harness suits only when it fits, and when such a fraud as this is perpetrated at a people's expense, no wonder they show themselves inert under it, either stolidly or contemptuously so. The contempt expressed extends freely to all so-called constitutional governments, and rightly so if this were a fair specimen of them. Meanwhile, inertness, even in the most legitimate spheres of activity, is a circumstantial evil of the day. It is the evil of the dead weight.

As to the first cause—the sects—their original plan of action had been in harmony with their nature—underhand and intensely secret. When this reached a sufficient degree of maturity for public and political policy, their second plan of action was also in keeping with their nature—mendacious and contagious. Theirs was the political principle, "A Free Church in a Free State," to catch the Church in the toils of whatever they meant by the State, to subjugate the Church and get rid of its head. Theirs, too, was the diplomatic principle of "non-intervention," to prevent any Catholic power from interposing, and arresting them in the progress of their future robberies. Theirs, again, was the catch about the "Unification of Italy," which, once united, was to become one of the greatest powers of the world—a Roman empire renewed in the latter times—a British colonial empire, to begin at home, to extend into African colonization, and then to stop—who knows where? This last device was to catch the eyes and fancies of the light heads, and they succeeded admirably in every class of society,

ecclesiastical and lay ; people lost their heads over the unity of a redeemed Italy. It was the political *influenza* of thirty or forty years ago, and the contagion remains in the system as political liberalism to-day.

When their work was over, and the last burglary had been accomplished in the liberation of Rome, the veil of secrecy could be largely dispensed with. Their worship of Satan has become public and open. The banner of Lucifer heads their legal processions. Their processions are always legal, while that of a priest carrying the Blessed Sacrament to the dying, with an acolyte ringing a bell before him, is a procession unlawful and against the security of public order. Their blasphemous orations, and their dedications of marble statues to blasphemers, are invested with the pomp of state, while an episcopal pastoral or the singing of a Pater Noster outside of the precincts of a church would expose a bishop to prosecution. They call for hymns to Satan, and pay for them, as national anthems, out of the public treasury. To corrupt and be corrupted, which was always an incidental eddy in the current of human affairs, is now the current itself of public policy. In education, it does not mean any watery solution of secularism or laicisation—not mere theories of Rousseau, or the incipient materialism of Pestalozzianism. It is an acrid concentration of educational villany to soften the sinews of a nation's morality by macerating the moral fibre of the young, by applying corrosive elements to the plastic student, to the shrinking school-girl, to the unprotected orphan, and even to infants. For this reason, among twenty others, it was necessary to annihilate the insinuating grace of sisters and of all religious. For the same reason, all the young manhood of the country, including seminarians, was to be driven into the barracks like a drove of cattle, and be made valiant warriors against the Scioans and the world generally, after they should have graduated in vice. Of course, the patient in the hospital does not escape them any more than the patient public, which receives through the press, through placards and illustrations, and through all the arteries and veins of modern communication, a daily and hourly infusion of the virus which circulates. A crowning circumstance, which at the end of the chapter appeals to the infected fancies of the light heads, as the unity of Italy caught them at the beginning, is that the many varieties of public and private immorality, however enormous, are strictly connected with the possession of money, place and power. For the spirit of the age, having had fair play for once, not only in Italy and in France, but in other countries too, has endowed with its money and its power a brood of the most venomous reptiles that ever crawled over a social body.

What they meant by a free church is plain enough ; but they were anxious to show what they meant by the liberty of a free state. They went off into another continent and into the perfectly free state of another people, and thought to put it in their pockets as a token ever at hand of what they meant by national freedom. Moreover, they illustrated what they meant by non-intervention ; for in a country where there was no war, no opposing interests fighting with one another, and no creature on earth calling for their intervention, they went uncalled, and interposed their glorious *bandiera* of United Italy and their valiant lads of the barracks. And what Divine Providence meant in allowing all this redemption and unification of the new grand kingdom of Savoy, and in permitting the twenty-fifth anniversary to come round of the burglary committed on the 20th of September, 1870, has been made clear, step by step, in this little African side-play of the last six months. On the 20th of September last, when the Pope prayed that God would humble the enemies of Holy Church, King Menelik signed his call to the tribes and their chiefs, summoning them as the "friends of Mary." The first Sunday of October, the feast of the Holy Rosary, when the Church was praying to Mary for the same intention, appears to have been the day for the assembling of the tribes. The sanguinary deeds which had marked the track of the revolution during twenty-three years, till Rome was taken, received their offset from King Menelik in a series of sanguinary defeats, during two months and a half, till the rout and massacre of March the first. And when, two mornings later, the news arrived in Rome, the Holy Father, who was on his way in solemn pomp to celebrate in the Sistine Chapel the nineteenth anniversary of his coronation, received from his Cardinals the information that the glorious kingdom of Italy had sunk out of sight from among the respectable powers of the world.

While giving to the secret sects the very first place in the political drama of Italy's decline and fall, we cannot in justice assign them all the place and every part which has been enacted. The worship and profession of evil, which is their life, did not come into existence with them. There has been no age of the Church in which a succession of errors and heresies has not kept up the tradition of evil worshipped as good, and of good assaulted as evil—the tradition not merely of virtue being on the cross and vice being on a throne, but of virtue and truth being pronounced worthy of death, and vice and error proclaimed worthy of redemption. A long series of errors and heresies, from Manicheism down, have maintained that uniform principle of internal doctrine, while they have preserved, likewise, a uniform foreign policy of hatred for the Church and for all parts of Christian civilization founded on

the Church. Distinguished among themselves by the mark, whereby we may know whose disciples they are, that they heartily hate one another, they have also been distinguished by that other mark which Christ set upon their brow when, sending them forth, like Cain, from the face of the Lord and of His Church, He turned and said to her: "The world hates you, because it hated Me before you."

The second cause, then, which played into the hands of the first, was treachery under various shapes and forms—a painful subject, of which we note only the main species. It has played so fast and loose, and it has been so enterprising under a paternal government like that of the Popes, who do not rule with a rod of iron nor delight in shedding blood, that ecclesiastical rulers have not merely been uncertain at what turn they may light upon a traitor, but whether the man at their elbow was not himself a freemason.

The other day a marquis died, meeting his death at the hands of a lunatic in an asylum of which he was the beneficent founder. The brother of an eminent dignitary in the Church, he had possessed himself, under Pius IX., of important secrets regarding the movements of the Papal troops. He passed on the secrets promptly to the enemy, as fast as the post of confidence he occupied allowed him to gather them in, and—he was caught in the act. Reprieved from the sentence of death, he lived to become a great man and a senator in the new kingdom of Italy. He died like so many others of his kind, who expect that, when the shades of evening gather, the dew will begin to fall, and when the heyday of their life is over, the sweet absolution of the Church will descend upon their heads; and night will be no night to them, nor death have its merited sting. How it is, who knows? The rest is mystery, as the life of the false is mystery—dark, gloomy and hard.

It was treachery like this that made Rome a tributary of the sects, long before they effected an entrance. The streets of the city became unsafe to Italians and foreigners alike. The police, supposed to be Papal, were round about; and burglars or highwaymen, red-handed, were brought to the police for arrest. But the officers were not there for that purpose. They and other parts of the machinery were working for another object, to show the world at large the misgovernment of the Pope, and that Rome must be redeemed. How had the sectaries got into the police?

Well-known chiefs of the sects moved about the streets of Rome. Kegs of powder were stored in the heart of the city. A common cab was hired and one of the kegs was placed by the side of the cabman, for there was not room enough inside. They drive to the Papal barracks hard by the Vatican, and in five min-

utes the whole building is blown into the air. When everybody knew that strange things were brewing, the guardians of public security alone were ignorant. And that the mines were well laid that great and good man, Napoleon III., was a witness not to be despised, for he had his own specific preferences regarding persons and things in Rome, and he let the Pope know them. Pius IX. had to conform to the wishes of his great and good friend. A letter from the empress, just received and read by Pius IX., and carefully laid by in a secret place, finds its way back on the spot to the emperor, compromising the empress with him. Napoleon signalized the success of his policy by tumbling at Sedan, and forthwith Rome was occupied. The occupants have just signalized the success of their quarter-century of government by tumbling at Adua; and who will come next? It is all a mystery of Providence governed by the law of justice. If the punishments inflicted for a national sin have not brought people to their senses, neither are the evils as yet at their height. When God is very angry with human ingratitude He inflicts the greatest chastisement of all: He allows it to triumph in its iniquity.

Though the laity at large might feel no single incentive left to practice hypocrisy, there remained that other state, more elevated than the secular, and by its condition of sanctity never free from the approaches of the insidious foe. There were some ecclesiastics rich in intellectual gifts, clever at the pen; yes, intellectual enough to lead philosophical thought and pious enough to be made to pose after death for the honors of the altar. Yet, during life, men of this type were on terms of intimacy with the chief figures of the party hostile to the Church, and, either during life or after death, their works or their gifts alike went into the Hades of condemned and prohibited goods. They were men secularized at heart, though wearing the ecclesiastical garb. They had never added to the blessings of their state that distinct grace of studying deeply and knowing profoundly the things of divine science, the sacred deposit left as the appanage of their own vocation. Whole schools of residuary Jansenism and Gallicanism have occupied parts of Italy even to our day, and Tuscany was noted for the growth of both these errors and the parallel growth of freemasonry and other sects far back in the past century. In such an atmosphere neither Christian divinity nor Christian virtue nor ecclesiastical policy could survive. While they and their gifts, such as they were, formed the best part of the conquest which the masonic hordes made in the country, it was through such as these that the same hordes got their best purchase on the general thought of the nation. Delusions were spread, fallacies disguised, imaginations exalted, and truth sat by to mourn. For, if there is

one thing which has always distinguished the Pharisee whose interests forbid him to become an apostate, it is that matters of plain Christian doctrine, of plain Christian duty, of the commonest disinterestedness in the works of mercy and charity are things not in his line. If there be an unmixed interest of Christ, he is not in it.

This was the school of ecclesiastical liberals, who, in Italy and France, knew enough of ecclesiastical doctrine to guide the movements of the enemy without. And hence appears a remarkable feature in the war against religious congregations. That war has not proceeded on the lines of political policy only. It has shown the strategy and has advanced the reasons of a domestic foe. If one will consult the pages of a modern canonist, Bouix, for instance, to see the principles and methods of domestic enemies against the whole religious state and will compare therewith the policy, the line of reasoning, the fallacies of a Jules Ferry, a Paul Bert, a Bourgeois, or of the Victor Emmanuel government, ushering the religious orders outside of the pale of the Catholic Church as useless, as superfluous, as a *superfétation*, which, in the interests of Catholicity pure and undefiled, it is time to get rid of, he will not fail to see the identity between the two, the purest "spirit of the age" inside having supplied the masonic spirit of the age outside with munitions of war. Perhaps they did not always mean it, as the Italians did not quite mean it, when they robbed the Papal casernas of the Remington rifles and then found themselves shot down at Adua with the same rifles in the hands of the Abyssinians. Still less did liberals mean that, when masonry should have despatched the religious congregations, it should then wheel round and despatch themselves. Yet this is what has happened before.

We must hurry to a conclusion, and so we cannot tarry on those two circumstances, however interesting, which have given the enemies of the Church an accumulated advantage from the very excess of their iniquity.

One is the attitude of protest adopted and maintained by the Sovereign Pontiff in the face of such stupendous public immorality. His duty, his place, the interests of the Church universal, in America, France, Germany, India, China, Japan, in the islands of the southern seas, as well in Alaska by the north pole, rendered imperative on him the one ecclesiastical line of policy, which Pius IX. promptly adopted and which Leo XIII. has unswervingly followed. Good men and thinking men, who thought in their earlier wisdom that some allowance should be made for the spirit of the times, now believe and say in their later wisdom that "Pius IX. was a providential man" in yielding not an inch to the spirit of the age. *Cunctando restituit rem*. An instance will explain this. A reconstruction has to take place. Whether by a revolution or

through a republic or through half a score of republics or some other way reserved to the secrets of Divine Providence, there is going to be a distribution of spoils, that is, of the spoils which the robbers have thrown into the heap of their United Italy. But there will have to be a distribution of debts, which are a much more portentous pile than all the spoils together. Had the Holy Father indulged in a word, a look, a glance, which could have been interpreted as the remotest acceptance of the *statu quo*, he would now stand committed to the liabilities incident to the changes in the *statu quo*, and his own share brought back to him would come, not as intact and privileged, but as merely a part of a mortgaged fund, smothered in debts for all time to come. Now he can treat independently, as a proprietor atrociously injured and outraged during more than a quarter of a century past. And the advantage he possesses is becoming more and more evident as time goes on. The marauders have invented the term "intangible Rome" to give expression to their feelings. They stand in the doorway, they run to the windows, they climb to the housetop to tell all the passers-by that Rome is "intangible." Whereat the passers-by wonderingly reflect: These men are in a house not their own, and they are going to lose it for sure! So their own press reflected on the "intangibility" celebrated on the 20th of September last.

The last circumstance is the inertness of the Italian people, in neglecting such means of agitation as are quite within their competency, such as the Pope exhorts them to adopt, and as the Archbishop of Milan has lately propounded in a masterly letter. The points of Cardinal Ferrari's theme in this letter, on the public action of Catholics for the religious and civil restoration of Italy, were such as the following: Action is necessary; the persecution proceeds from masonry and allied sects; where there is a will there is a way; antecedent success shows how much good can be done; heretofore the confraternities sufficed, now there must also be committees and congresses; the clergy are citizens who have to bear the taxes and other burdens of citizenship, and "it is very strange to pretend that they have not the correlative rights of citizenship," and must never have anything to do with committees for the social good.

No doubt, a Catholic people suffer from two disadvantages, when they have to contend with the spirit of the age, organized as a brand-new constitution can organize it. The first disadvantage is, that they cannot lie, they cannot steal, they cannot perjure themselves, they cannot disobey the lawful powers, and they are encumbered in their every movement by the orphan, the poor, the innocent, the helpless, who, first and last, are always their por-

tion. The second disadvantage is, that the children of the age know all this, that their enemy cannot lie, while they themselves can; that they cannot steal, cannot evade a just law or make a bad one; cannot turn their backs on the destitute, whom they themselves throw about as they march along, like the treasures which Mithridates left scattered in Pontus, to dissipate the forces of Lucullus. Nevertheless, if the forces of good in the world are always thus helpless and simple, it only proves that, as God's little children here are theirs, so they are God's portion and his heritage; and "fear not," He says, "for I have overcome the world."

VI.

And what conclusions follow from this imperfect sketch of the times? As far as we can see, the thoughtful reader can gather two, corresponding respectively to the recent ruins, the *débris*, of modern liberty, and to the magnificent ancient ruins of Christendom.

The unsightly ruins of modern liberties are conspicuous for the dust that rises all about them, and for the noise that fills the air above them. As far as we can distinguish aught intelligible in the clamor, we imagine it is the word "liberty." And, as to the thing designated by the word, we are sure it is that heap which lies there. We are cozened to believe that liberty is man's perfection; that liberty is the glory of the century; that we have mounted to the law of liberty; and a free people makes the law. And whatever is, is right, when a free people makes it. This law of liberty, which used to mean that liberty, straitened and drilled and trimmed by the thousand laws of virtue, could become so virtuous as never to move out of the line of law, now means that, without any virtue, and without any training or supporting that way, whatever it does is right. And if two men equally vicious do it together, it is more right still. But if five hundred men in a legislature, pooling their vices all in one, distill them into a concentrated essence, called a bill first, and then a law, why that is the voice of God, of the state, of the people! *Vox populi, Vox Dei*.

Then, just while we are regarding the spectacle, some one touches us on the shoulder, and whispers: "Don't you know, the Church too has entered on the law of liberty? The law of the commandments and of the counsels have undergone a change, among a free people, in a free state; and the Beatitudes live elsewhere now. When the whole spirit of the age moved towards personal liberty and independence, so that whatever you did was sure to be right, the Church did well in going along too. The evangelical counsels, for instance, were antiquated; and the vows—Pshaw! You

understand me! A free church in a free state!" "Why, my friend, what do you mean? Has the Church done away with the vows and the counsels, and is making a detour on the commandments? I had not really heard of it." "Not—not quite—quite yet," he replies; "but, you know, it comes to that. Free men don't need any incentives to virtue. They are a law to themselves. And what I mean is this; the Church has approved of the absence of vows! You see!" "Oh! yes," we answer; "there have always been laymen."

So much for the *débris*. Now for the ancient ruin.

As the substitution of personal whims for the rules of virtue, the substitution of individual instincts for the rhythmical laws of wisdom, is the easiest of all frauds for any man to perpetrate, and the most expeditious factory of ruins, religious, political, social, and individual; so the construction of natural and divine law into a living edifice of men, communities, nations, into living stones, not put together by hand, nor circumscribed by time, is a work worthy of One only, the Spirit who first moulded the world, and moulded it to receive such a structure of Christianity. This edifice was the Catholic Church in Christian society. All the customs of life, founded on the law of God and reaching unto the beatitude of peace, all the conditions of private and public existence, the order of social justice, the avenues of national commerce, business in all its phases, along with the countless relations of the beautiful domestic circle, all were conceived in the heart of religion, a social world embosomed in religion, crowning the terrestrial world which God had made worthy of it, and leading to the divine, whither God directed it. This was Christendom. It was the spirit of order and subordination, of obedience and respect; of personal quiet and of peace in the family; of mercy towards the suffering and of resignation under suffering. It was just what we see about us in the midst of a Catholic people, though sadly ravaged by an anti-Catholic government—a spirit of cheerfulness, cordiality, of instinctive and genuine courtesy, which makes a people polite in manner and delicate in sentiment, without the training of art or the factitious veneering of schools. Its merriness can find room for expansion anywhere; for the world is fair, and souls are good, and God is best and is everywhere. Its recreations are extremely simple, and without other turmoil than the vivacity of lively intercourse. So is it in Italy. In Ireland, its sweetness is tinged with mournfulness, but it is melodious and pleasant withal. In Belgium or in Germany, it is calculating and systematic, and under the friction of contention will thrust back approaching liberalism or obtain the balance of power in a frowning empire. With it, war is for the sake of peace; and, whether

it levies troops or levies tariff, the income it expects is security for all and stability.

In countries not Catholic, this Christian structure, though largely dismantled, retains still the tracery of a great and noble architecture. The habits, thoughts, literature of such people evince a humanity of feeling, a consciousness of right and duty, which never belonged to the natural man before he was purified and sanctified in the Catholic Church of Christendom. And, when the nations retain these qualities, three centuries after having left the Catholic Church of Christendom; when under the moss, in the torn lines, in the crevices and open rifts, of education without God, of marriage without fidelity, of policy without honesty, of might instead of right, and successful cupidity posing as patriotic virtue, when, in spite of all this, there can still stand forth the framework of Christian character, the beneficence of institutions, and the justice of legal codes; it is quite clear that God is bearing witness to Himself in the person of fallen man, and is justifying the Christendom which He had made amid the nations by the magnificence of the ruins which the nations make of themselves.

THOS. HUGHES, S.J.

ROME, March 14, 1896.

ROME OR NATURALISM.

PART II.

THE Catholic Church is the continuation and extension of the Incarnation. The Eternal Word became Man, not merely that He might make a transitory stay on the earth, that He might do transient works, undergo transient sufferings, and then withdraw into the eternal silence of His Divine beatitude, but chiefly that He might draw in a special manner all the elect and in due proportion all the creation to Himself in God as final cause. In Him the supernatural revelation and religion of God were personified and completed. He came on earth to stay until the end of the world, to carry on the work begun in His conception, birth, life, death and resurrection, until its consummation in the kingdom of the heavens.

Having ascended into heaven, He could not carry on the work of redemption in His visible form and presence. It was therefore necessary to do this through some visible medium, through an apostolate. Accordingly, He commissioned the Apostles and communicated to them the authority which he had received from the Father. They were not clothed with this power singly and separately, but as one college, one moral person. They were made one by being united under one head and prince, St. Peter. The apostleship was committed to him in all its plenitude, and in an eminent, primary sense. It was given to the others in a secondary and dependent mode, not by subtraction or diminution of his supremacy, but by participation in his apostolic authority. When the Lord ascended into heaven, the Christian faith, law and sacraments were actually and exclusively in the hands of the Apostles, as witnesses, keepers, teachers and ministers of the truth and grace which were brought from heaven by the Incarnate Word. The Mosaic dispensation was abrogated. The new law was given to the Apostles. They were the teaching and ruling hierarchy in the One, Holy, Apostolic Church, destined to become Catholic, and entirely constituted in themselves and their disciples.

The principle of organic unity was the principality of St. Peter. The apostolic office was committed to him in all its fulness. It was committed to him, not as a mere individual, and for a time, but as the first of a line of successors in a permanent, perpetual, world-wide supremacy over the spiritual kingdom of Christ. He

was as it were multiplied in his associate Apostles. After the death of St. Peter, his successors in the Apostolic See of Rome inherited his primacy, and the other bishops, who succeeded to the ordinary powers of the other Apostles after their death, became his assessors and colleagues in the government of the Church, subordinate princes under the one Sovereign Pontiff. Patriarchates and other minor provinces were not autonomous or voluntary confederations of suffragan bishops. They were parts and provinces of one kingdom. Metropolitans were superior to other bishops, not by any divine right, but as representatives of the Roman Pontiff, and by virtue of an appointment emanating from St. Peter and the other Apostles.

The apostolic writings, and those of the fathers of the second and following centuries, are full of the idea of Catholic unity. The notion of branch-churches, of national churches, of independent, local hierarchies, is wholly foreign to them. A difference of doctrine from the doctrine of the universal church is for them a heresy. Division of communion from the Catholic communion is schism. Separated societies, however numerous, are sects of perdition. Nothing can be stronger than their language on the deadly nature of heresy and schism, and their assertion of the axiom that out of the Church there is no salvation.

This stringent doctrine of the necessity of Catholic faith and communion to salvation, and the deadly guilt of heresy and schism, was founded on the dogma of the supreme, infallible authority of the Church.

The Eternal Word became man, in order to make the final and perfect revelation of himself as the one object of faith to men, and of the supreme love which sanctifies and finally glorifies the true believers. Faith is the radical principle of justification; faith in the Person of Christ, the Son of God; which includes faith in the Blessed Trinity, in all the mysteries of the raised humanity of Christ, in all the truths revealed by Him; and it is the operative principle of obedience to His law. Objective religion is, therefore, primarily, a revealed doctrine and law of life, a way of salvation by grace. When Jesus Christ made the Church the medium of communicating the grace of the Incarnation to men, He necessarily communicated first of all His own divine authority to teach the faith.

Christianity is essentially a supernatural, divine revelation. As such, it does not demand and effect the assent of the mind by the intrinsic evidence or demonstration of the truth proposed, but by authority. The authority must necessarily be infallible, or otherwise it is not authority capable of commanding a firm, undoubting assent. The motive of credibility in a divine revelation is the in-

fallible divine veracity. If the revelation be made through a medium, the transmission must be secured from error, in order that the motive of credibility may come into contact with the mind and move it to assent. Our Blessed Lord, being divine, was the Eternal Word of God in His Person; He not only possessed the truth in its infinite plenitude, He *was* the truth. His human mind, and His human voice, were the medium of revealing this truth to His disciples. No Christian can doubt that it was an infallible medium. 'He was God revealed and speaking to men through all the ages until the consummation of the world; and since in his bodily form and presence He is no longer visible and audible on the earth, He must continue His presence and speech in a mode which is equivalent, through an infallible medium.

When the Lord had ascended into Heaven, there was no authority left on the earth to proclaim the Gospel, the New Law, the Faith and Religion of Christ, in its final and perfect form as He had revealed it, except that which He had committed to the Apostles. Their oral teaching was the only Rule of Faith. All Christians confess that they were infallible. Those who have abjured the authority of the Roman Church ascribe to the Apostles all the infallibility it has ever claimed for the Catholic Episcopate under the supreme headship of the Roman Pontiff, as distinct from the Apostolic College under the principedom of St. Peter. They ascribe to the Apostolate, in common with Catholics, even more than this. That is, authority to make the original promulgation of the Christian Faith and Law; and also inspiration, when they recorded their teaching in written documents, historical, doctrinal and prophetic. Therefore, the only controversy relates to the mode in which the infallible authority of the Apostles was made continuous and perpetual after their death. All admit that the divine revelation made perfect in Jesus Christ is proposed to the faith of all men in all ages by the infallible authority of the Apostles. The Catholic Church teaches that the Apostles confided this revelation to their successors, who are in their corporate capacity under their head, an indefectible and infallible organ of Jesus Christ, through the Holy Spirit, given to the Apostolic Church on the day of Pentecost.

Those who call themselves *par excellence*, the "Evangelical Christians," hold that the Apostolic office was confined to the original Apostles. They had no successors, but remained as the sole and immediate authority in the Christian Church, during all ages, by their writings, which they bequeathed as the rule to all true believers, until the end of the world. The Church is an invisible society, composed of these true believers, who re-

ceive their faith directly and individually from this Apostolic teaching and a personal, private illumination of the Holy Spirit. This Church is one by a spiritual communion of all its members in faith and grace. It is holy, because composed of members who are all in the state of sanctifying grace. It is catholic, because it embraces all the elect in all ages and all countries. It is apostolic, because it originated from the preaching of the Apostles and has preserved the doctrine which they taught. Those who are ostensibly true believers, by uniting in the profession of the faith, and in the exercise of the worship of the Christian religion, form visible churches; and the whole aggregate of professing Christians belonging to these particular churches may be called the Visible Universal Church. The theory is incoherent and inconsistent. Those who hold it sometimes use language pre-supposing that the Church is visible; at other times, that it is invisible: but however ambiguous their language, they are compelled to assert the unity of the true Church, whatever it is; to assert that there is one society of true believers, subsisting from the day of the Apostles until the end of the world, and that this society is holy, is catholic and apostolic.

They are, in consequence, obliged to hold that it is indefectible and infallible.

They must, of course, assert that there is an infallible rule of faith. True believers receive and profess the faith proposed by this rule with unerring certainty, being illuminated by the Holy Spirit. Their concurrent confession of this same faith must therefore be infallible. And in their assemblies, where they promulgate formularies and confessions, although they disclaim official infallibility, they assume a tone of authority which implies that the Holy Spirit speaks through their mouth. They declare categorically and dogmatically what are the doctrines of divine revelation, and they demand full assent to them, as a term of Christian fellowship and a condition of salvation. When they have had civil and coercive power, they have fined, exiled, imprisoned, tortured and executed dissenters, not only Catholics, but Protestants, in Germany, Scotland, England and New England.

There is, therefore, according to this theory, an environment of sensible phenomena around the invisible Church of the elect, which mimetically represents its ideal qualities. Its inward spiritual unity and catholicity must necessarily be manifested by a unanimous and universal profession of one creed, always, everywhere, and by all. This outward sign must denote, though it does not make visible, the presence of the mystical body of Christ, as the eucharistic accidents denote, though they do not make visible the presence of His real body. The same outward and visible sign must be, there-

fore, a note of the true Church, unmistakable and unique, belonging to it alone, and to no false pretender. So then, if the Apostles gave the divine revelation immediately to all the faithful in the New Testament which they bequeathed to them as their only rule of faith, the Christians of the first and second centuries must have known this, and this fundamental principle of faith must have left its ineffaceable mark upon that first age of Christianity.

There is, however, not the faintest trace of the kind to be found in history. The best Protestant historians and scholars, Harnack, Lightfoot, Fisher, admit, that at a very early period, somewhere between A.D. 100 and A.D. 300, an organized hierarchy, in which bishops held the first place, was in universal and undisputed possession of the place of the Apostles, as their successors by a right which they claimed to be of Apostolic and divine origin. Those who ascribe this hierarchical order to a purely human origin are driven to conjecture that it grew up gradually during the second and third centuries; but they cannot find a scintilla of evidence for such an extraordinary transformation of Christianity. The ideal church of Lutherans and Calvinists cannot and does not have a trace of the notes of unity, catholicity and apostolicity; and it is a contradiction in terms to suppose that such attributes, which by their nature must have existed in indefectible continuity from the beginning, can be evolved at this late day from the heterogeneous atoms of Protestantism.

It is evident that one must look for an Apostolic Succession in an unbroken line of bishops as the only chain which can bind the Church of the present in an organic unity with the Church of the past, and reunite all links which are now broken off and separate in the Church of the future.

The High Church divines of the Protestant Episcopal denomination have proven with abundant learning and logic that the theory of Christianity, which may be called the sacramental and sacerdotal, is the only one which has any foundation either in Scripture or tradition. As for the Calvinistic theory and the vague, variable evangelicalism which is its shadow, they are nowhere and deserve no attention. The only serious alternative in a wide view of the present state and future destinies of Christianity is between Catholicism and Rationalism, *i.e.*, Pure Naturalism.

The idea of Catholicism is in opposition to the idea of individualism and of an invisible Church composed of a multitude united only by invisible bonds. It is the idea of a visible Church, having an organic constitution and regimen, a Church which is universal *as a unit*, in opposition to the idea of a universal including a plurality of equal and similar units. The organic constitu-

tion and regimen of the Catholic Church is episcopal. It is a hierarchical order composed of bishops who are not isolated heads of particular, single churches, or colleagues in the government of particular groups of churches; but members of a *universal* episcopate; a consolidated hierarchy, in which each bishop has a judicial and legislative authority for the whole world, as well as for his particular diocese.

The root of the hierarchy is in the Apostolic Succession. And it is primarily their teaching office which the Apostles have transmitted to their successors.

Certain Anglicans, professing themselves Catholics, have appropriated one part of the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, viz., that which teaches the transmission of the sacerdotal character by ordination, to the neglect of that which is still more important, the transmission of the Catholic faith. Our Blessed Lord commissioned His Apostles primarily and chiefly to continue his own chief and primary work as Mediator between God and men. It was for this that He became incarnate, that is, to make the revelation of God to His rational creatures. His work of redemption was accomplished in order to remove an obstacle which impeded the fulfillment of God's gracious purpose of bringing the human race to a beatified union with Himself. The obstacle, that is sin, being removed by the atoning sacrifice of the cross, the chief purpose of the incarnation is carried out by bringing men through faith into union with God in Christ. The Church was the medium of effecting this union, and was, therefore, animated by a spirit and principle producing first of all unity in faith. The offering of sacrifice, and the administration of sacraments, presuppose the Church already constituted in unity of faith and order. The transmission of sacerdotal power in a hierarchy through Apostolic Succession is, therefore, subordinate to an authority to make known the supernatural revelation of God through Christ, on which the Church is founded. This authority was communicated by Jesus Christ to the apostolate, and together with it all the sacerdotal powers necessary to the founding and perpetual stability of the Catholic Church. It is the very idea of Apostolic Succession that this commission was not transient, but permanent in a Catholic episcopate inheriting authority and power from the apostolate.

During the Apostolic age, the one Catholic Church was plainly manifest as a society in strict and perfect unity of faith and communion with the Apostles, subject to their teaching and government. During the second and third centuries it is universally admitted that the Catholic Church was a society of Christians united in faith and communion under an episcopate whose centre and chief bishop was in Rome. The same society persisted in the

fourth century, celebrated two general councils at Nicæa and Constantinople, still persisted during the fifth and sixth centuries, celebrating four other general councils; and has persisted until the present moment, having celebrated during these last thirteen centuries fourteen other general councils. In the east there are several other collections of bishops, entirely separated from the communion of the Roman Church. Some of these sects acknowledge two general councils, others three, others seven. In the west there is the Episcopal Church of England, having several offshoots, for whose bishops Apostolic Succession is claimed. These may be said to acknowledge, in a general and informal way, six general councils.

How many of these collections of bishops can be included in the Catholic episcopate, and what is the extension of the Catholic communion? The Roman Church makes a positive and exclusive claim for her own bishops and her own communion. No one of the sects makes a similar claim officially, whatever their own individual champions may say on the subject. For a Greek or an Anglican, professing to stand on the broad foundation of the Catholicism of the early centuries, to deny that the Roman Church is a part of the Catholic Church would be futile. It is a favorite Anglican theory that the Catholic Church subsists in three great branches, Roman, Greek and Anglican. The division of the hierarchy into separate bodies is acknowledged and lamented as a great disaster and an abnormal state. Reunion is desired and hoped for as a restorative of the harmony in mutual intercommunion between the Roman Church with all the churches of the western patriarchate, and the great patriarchates of the east, which continued with some interruption for a thousand years. Since the eleventh century, two great disruptions have occurred, tearing away from the communion of the Roman Church Constantinople and Canterbury. Plainly, all those who regard Catholic unity as still subsisting between these divisions must place the principle and the bond of unity in the episcopate, prescinding from the Roman supremacy. The Apostolic Succession of bishops from an episcopal ancestry, going back to the founders of the Church, is the golden chain binding all in a mystic, sacramental fellowship and brotherhood in Christ. Wherever there is a duly consecrated bishop, there is a true priesthood, a true sacrifice, sacramental grace, the true Church in all essentials, in spite of accidental defects and imperfections.

So far as relates to that aggregate of societies which may be classed together under the generic term of the Protestant Episcopal Church, there are two pleas in bar of a hearing of the claim of its advocates that it is a branch of the Catholic Church

by reason of the Apostolic Succession of its episcopate. The first is, that the sort of general Catholicism professed by these advocates is only a theory of individuals and sections of the great body, but not the formal, official doctrine of any episcopal synods, general or particular.

The second plea in bar is that the consecration of the bishops in question is not acknowledged either by Rome or Constantinople.

It is much more satisfactory to test the theory of a purely episcopal constitution of the Catholic hierarchy by an examination of some church having bishops whose consecration is universally acknowledged, and having an official doctrine including all the ideal Catholicism of the highest Anglicans. Such a church is *really* what the Church of England is *ideally* on the poetical and eloquent pages of some of her apologists.

It is among the remnants of the ancient eastern patriarchates that we must look for such a church. The church of the great Russian Empire is by far the most important among the several ecclesiastical corporations existing in the east, separated from the communion of the Roman Church. The succession of its bishops is undoubted, its liturgy is Catholic, and it professes to retain unchanged the faith of the universal church during the first eight centuries. If the claim of the Russian bishops to make a part of the Catholic episcopate can be maintained, those of other groups of bishops may have some *prima facie* title to examination. Whereas, if this church can be proved to be a mere schism they are put out of court, as a matter of course.

The cause of the Russian Church depends on that of the Church of Constantinople, by which it was drawn into revolt against Roman supremacy.

If the Byzantine patriarchs were justified in their revolt, the so-called Greek or Orthodox Church has remained as it was until the middle of the eleventh century, a constituent part of the Catholic Church. In that case, the blame of the division between the east and the west would rest on the Roman Church, for having usurped supremacy over the eastern patriarchates. The Greek Church would then be, on the branch theory, the best and purest branch of the Catholic Church. The true way of reunion among all divisions of Christians would be for all to conform themselves in doctrine and discipline to the Greek Church. An ecumenical council, in which all bishops would have a right to sit, might determine all questions relating to dogma and ecclesiastical order, and the ideal Catholic Church, as some high Anglicans have conceived it, would become a reality.

The Byzantine patriarchate has done itself no honor since it fell

under Moslem domination. The patriarch preserves a nominal primacy over the other patriarchs and metropolitans who are in communion with him, but he has no real jurisdiction outside of the dominions of the sultan.

The Russian Church is by far the most respectable representative of the old eastern Christianity in the whole group of sects classed under the name of the Orthodox Church. The czar, who is the actual governing head of this church, by his descent from the Greek princess Zoe, is the heir of Constantine, the last emperor. He is the protector of the Christian sects in the east. If, as seems probable, he becomes the master of Constantinople, the Byzantine patriarchate will be subject to him, and he will be the *summus episcopus* over all bishops who acknowledge its primacy. If we suppose the Nestorian and Jacobite bishops to become absorbed into the Russian Church, and a union of the Church of England with the same to be accomplished, the czar would certainly confront the Pope as a most formidable rival, and his church, nearly or quite equal the Roman Church in extent and grandeur. This would not, however, fulfill the dream of the unification of Christendom according to the Anglican ideal. Two great and equal divisions of Christendom cannot make one Catholic Church, unless they are brought together by a bond of union. This can be effected only by one submitting to the other. Either the Russian Church with all its confederates must bow to the supremacy of the Pope, and to the authority of all the councils from the eighth to the twentieth, or the Roman Church must abandon its claim to supremacy, and all these councils be classed among particular synods.

We may inquire, now, what claim the Russian Church can make to stand upon the foundation of ancient and genuine Catholicism, and to invite all Christians to come and stand upon the same.

The foundation of Catholicism, exclusive of the papacy, can only be the Catholic episcopate. Neither Greeks nor Anglicans can contend that this episcopate is constituted purely and simply by succession in the line of ordination from the Apostles, without contradicting themselves. Arians had this Apostolic Succession, the remnants of the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies still retain it; yet all these are universally regarded as aliens to the Church. It is necessary, therefore, not only to have succession of orders from the Apostles in order that a bishop may belong to the Catholic episcopate, and his church to Catholic communion; they must also have the Apostolic faith.

Those who rebelled against legitimate discipline and government in the Church, like the Donatists, were regarded, from the beginning, as equally cut off from Catholic unity. It is necessary,

therefore, to be united with the Catholic episcopate by a bond of external regimen and order, as well as by a profession of the common faith.

The eastern patriarchates, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople, together with the exarchates and other great metropolitan churches, were in full communion with the Roman Church during several centuries. All bishops who abjured her communion and were excommunicated by the Roman Pontiff during this long period were likewise condemned as schismatics and heretics by the patriarchs of Constantinople, and the remnants of these ancient sects are to this day excluded from the communion of the so-called "Orthodox Eastern Church." The Byzantine claim demands, therefore, the recognition of the universal church in the east and west, before the division, as the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, and of its doctrine and order as the genuine and pure Catholicism. The patriarch Photius, who usurped the throne of St. Ignatius, was deposed and expelled in accordance with the sentence of Rome, and after his restitution, when the see was canonically vacant, with the consent of Rome, was again and finally expelled and exiled by the emperor and his own suffragans. The patriarch Ignatius is canonized by the Greek as well as by the Roman Church, and, although Photius was the principal author of the Byzantine schism, and the alienation of the episcopate of the eastern empire from Rome and the west continued after his downfall, it was not finally consummated until A.D. 1054, when Michael Cerularius sat on the patriarchal throne.

The real cause of the revolt of Photius and Michael was the Byzantine ambition to make the new Rome the rival of the old Rome. Doctrinal pretexts were an after-thought. The only dogmatic controversy of any real importance related to the Procession of the Holy Spirit and the addition of "Filioque" to the Creed.

This dogmatic question was thoroughly ventilated and discussed by Latin and Greek theologians at the Council of Florence, where Constantinople was fully represented and reconciled to Rome. There is doubtless a great deal of heresy among those prelates of the eastern churches who are the most violently anti-Roman. Still, there is no formal heresy promulgated by any official decree of the "Orthodox" Church. The Nestorians and Monophysites, even, although they retain formulas which are verbally heretical, may perhaps be regarded as holding implicitly the same Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation which was defined at Ephesus and Chalcedon.

Cardinal Vanutelli, who resided for many years in the east, says: "The religion which the dissenting Christians profess does

not substantially oppose or deny the Catholic faith. The difference in belief is, on the whole, only a difference in words."¹

It is the Byzantine claim that the "Orthodox" Church stands on the foundation of the first seven councils and has never changed its doctrines and discipline. Its cause of separation from Rome must, therefore, be that Rome has changed, by departing from the genuine, pure Catholicism of antiquity, usurping supremacy over the Catholic episcopate, and unjustly excommunicating a great number of eastern bishops and churches.

In what principle consists the right of the first seven councils to demand universal and exclusive homage as a supreme and final authority, dogmatic and legislative? Their supreme and final dogmatic authority can be derived from no other principle than the infallibility of the Catholic Church residing in the episcopate, whose judgment was pronounced in those councils. Their *exclusive* authority can be maintained only on the ground that there can be or actually have been only seven ecumenical councils. The notion that there can be only seven councils is too trivial and futile to be worthy of notice. The infallibility of the teaching Church is continuous and perpetual. If it could exercise its infallible office through a council in the fourth century, it could repeat the act at any subsequent period as often as it became necessary or opportune to do so. There is as much reason for recognizing the Eighth Council, chiefly composed of oriental prelates, as there is for the Seventh; and the same is true of the Council of Florence.

The Church of Russia, as the principal representative of eastern orthodoxy, a completely independent ecclesiastical corporation, allied with several other distinct bodies in the east, but completely separate from the Roman Pontiff and all bishops in his communion, can make no pretension to be, exclusively, the Catholic Church. It can only pretend to be a National Church, making a part of the universal church, isolated and separate from the communion of all western Christendom, not through its own fault, but through the fault of the Roman Church.

If this be a just pretension, the Muscovite patriarchate, which is in commission and administered by the Czar through his subordinate officers, stands on the same foundation of pure Catholicism with the patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch in the third, fourth and fifth centuries, during the period of the first six councils. Of course, this theory demands that the Roman Pontiff should be regarded as a mere patriarch, holding a primacy of honor only, and deriving all his prerogatives over and above his simple epis-

¹ Quoted by Rev. Joseph Yasbeck, *Eucharistic Congress*, p. 58.

copate, like the other patriarchs and metropolitans, from ecclesiastical, but not from divine, right.

This idea of Catholicism contains no principle of Catholic unity except the Apostolic Succession of bishops and the profession of a common faith. Organization in provinces and patriarchates is a confederation by voluntary agreement among episcopal churches, producing union but not unity. In fact, the idea of unity, in the sense of the visible, organic unity of one universal church, one as a kingdom, as a body, indivisible, containing its parts as a whole, distinct but inseparable from each other, and not a mere aggregation; such an idea is entirely wanting. And this lack is fatal to the pretensions of an unchanged tradition of genuine Catholicism from primitive antiquity. Primitive antiquity knew nothing of any such Catholicism, of any kind of church of abstract unity, which, as Catholic, is invisible, as visible in concrete reality is a singular, particular entity numerically multiplied into a multitude of churches. Primitive antiquity knew only of one church visible in its Catholicity and organic unity. It knew nothing of autonomous national or provincial churches, or of a divided church, subsisting in branches having no intercommunion with each other.

The pretension of the Russian Church to stand on the foundation of the ancient Catholicism and an unchanged orthodoxy is, therefore, false, and its claim to be a Catholic church untenable.

The first seven councils stood on the same foundation upon which rest the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, viz., the infallibility of the universal episcopate with and under its supreme head, the Roman Pontiff. The Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, in particular, bear unequivocal testimony to the papal supremacy. The eastern patriarchates and the bishops who ruled them were always subject to this supremacy, which was repeatedly acknowledged in the most formal manner even by the Byzantine emperors and patriarchs, until the time of Photius and afterwards. Those who revolted, like Nestorius of Constantinople, and Dioscorus of Alexandria, were deposed and excommunicated. The Seventh Council, which condemned and suppressed the iconoclastic heresy, did nothing but apply and carry out the action of the Holy See in contending against the imperial and ecclesiastical power which had sustained with violence and obstinacy that heresy during a long period.

The revolt against Rome in the ninth and eleventh centuries was the outcome of the persistent ambitious efforts of the Byzantine emperors and bishops from the fourth century on, to make New Rome the rival of Old Rome. The See of Constantinople, originally suffragan, was first elevated to the metropolitan rank, then to the patriarchal, then to a priority of honor over the other

patriarchal sees of the eastern empire, finally to a governing primacy. Photius, the worst among the wicked prelates who have disgraced Christianity, abjured the supremacy and even the communion of the Roman Church. No doubt he aspired to win for Constantinople the universal primacy, as certain emperors aspired to extend their sway over the territories of the old Roman Empire of the West. However, even their feeble hold upon the Italian exarchate relaxed, and by degrees their eastern empire decayed and dwindled, until at length it fell altogether before the Moslem invaders. Schism and heresy have blighted the once fair and flourishing Christianity of those regions. Even the perverted energy which broke forth into heresy and rebellion died out and was succeeded by a dull apathy, a comatose state between life and death, in which the separated portions of the Catholic Church have preserved all the orthodoxy which they brought away with them at their departure from the centre of unity.

Russia was converted by Greek missionaries before the formal division of the east from the west had been consummated. By reason of its close connection with Constantinople, the Russian Church was drawn by its influence into schism. It has since become completely independent and has hardened into a purely national church, subject to an absolute imperial domination.

I have no wish to echo and repeat all the evil spoken of the great Russian empire, especially by English writers. Neither do I desire to draw a dark picture of the Russian hierarchy, clergy, and the people in their religious aspect. It is impossible to deny, however, that intellectual life, science and spiritual vitality have been at a low ebb in this very numerous body, although I hope and am willing to believe that there is a great deal of genuine Christian piety and virtue among its members.

When we come to inquire how far the Russian Church possesses those principles which can insure stability and perpetuity to that amount of Catholicism which they have inherited, we cannot find that there is any secure foundation on which their Byzantine orthodoxy can rest.

The seven councils, isolated and alone, rest on a foundation of sand. The perpetual, inviolable authority and infallibility of the Catholic Church is denied, when it is asserted that it lost its power of speech in the eighth century. Every argument against the ecumenical character and infallible authority of the Fourth Council of Constantinople or the Council of Florence is equally valid against those other councils which are rejected by Anglicans, Jacobites and Nestorians. The persistence of eastern orthodoxy is due to oriental immobility in traditional habits, and to intellectual stagnation. There is very little theology, ecclesiastical history or sci-

ence to be found in that quarter. When the time of awakening comes the antiquated orthodoxy will have no more power over thinking and studious minds than the old Calvinism has in Switzerland or the old Lutheranism in Germany.

When one makes the further inquiry whether the Russian Church can become a nucleus for a great crystal of Catholic unity in Christendom, the case is still worse. Does any reasonable man fancy that the Pope is going to abjure all the councils of the last thousand years, and make an *amende honorable* to the successor of Photius? If he did, where would be Catholicism, where infallible authority, where a band strong enough to unite a sphere which had once burst asunder, broken into fragments and kept on rolling through space like a group of asteroids, the *débris* of a wrecked planet?

There is no disposition among Russians or other Greeks to make their church universal. All the aspirations for Catholic unity among them are longings for reunion with the Roman Church. A group of illustrious converts, such as Leo Allatius and Bessarion in the past, Tondini, Schouvaloff, the Gallitzins, Natalie Narischkin in the present century, like those who went from Oxford to Rome, have given testimony to the fact that their experience was like that of a Siberian exile returning to his country and his home.

These intelligent and devout Russians had everything which makes the ideal of Catholicism for the ritualists of England and the United States. Nevertheless, they were convinced that the Russian and the entire so-called Greek Church was not *the* Catholic Church, or even *a* Catholic Church. If they would be genuine Catholics and members of the one Catholic Church, they must leave the communion in which they were brought up and be received into the flock of the successor of St. Peter.

Anglicans have much less reason to confide in their so-called branch of the Church Universal than these Russians had to confide in their own. Leaving aside the question of the validity of their orders, Apostolic Succession in the episcopate, the priestly character, the sacrifice and sacraments, ceremonies, vestments, a doctrine approaching very closely to that of the Catholic Church, do not suffice to give these material constituents of Catholicism the vital form which makes its specific difference from Protestantism. Anglicans make a fatal blunder when they fancy that they are Catholics because they hold certain doctrines and practice certain rites appertaining to the Catholic system, which the majority of Protestants have rejected. They embrace these things on Protestant principles. Their Catholicism is a counterfeit. Any one who understands what was the Catholicism of St. Athanasius, of St. Cyprian, of St. Augustine, of all the early fathers and doctors, must

perceive its essential difference from that high churchism which emanated from Oxford, and has developed into ritualism. It was the doctrine of antiquity that the unity of the Church is indefectible and indivisible, her supreme and infallible jurisdiction and authority self-evident in her external, visible notes, and even in her exclusive possession of the name "Catholic." There was only one preamble to faith, viz., a reason to believe her testimony to Jesus Christ and to His doctrine and law. After that first preliminary was settled, there was but one proximate rule of faith, the teaching of the Church, every deviation from which was a heresy.

The note which distinguishes heresy from infidelity is some kind of belief in Christ and Christianity. It is distinguished from Catholic faith by the principle of selection, through the exercise of private judgment, of dogmas, as credible, in disregard of the authority of the Church. Heresiarchs may found sects, in which the dictates of their individual judgment on the contents of Scripture or tradition are consolidated into a collective judgment.

Those who are born and brought up in these sects may not exercise their individual judgment in matters of belief, but may receive passively what they are taught by their parents and instructors. But all the authority of this teaching, in so far as it is erroneous, goes back to the private opinions and judgments of the founders of the sect. Those who think and inquire for themselves cannot find any reasonable motive of obedience to this authority. They must search in all accessible sources of knowledge, in Scripture, tradition and rational theology, for the truth and the way of salvation. No matter how intelligent, sincere, and diligent they may be, they are at a great disadvantage as compared with Catholics who, in all things essential, have only to receive the instructions of an infallible teacher. If they earnestly desire to walk in the way of salvation, Catholics can have no hesitation as to what they must believe, and what they must do.

Now, those Anglicans who wished to be Catholics, and yet to remain in the Church of England, were in a worse predicament than ordinary Protestants who have no Catholic glimmerings. They were tossed, often for years, on a sea of doubt and perplexity, afraid to stay and afraid to go. Let any one peruse the history of converts, like the two cardinals, Manning and Newman, compare their mental state before and after conversion, and then say honestly whether they could have been Catholics both before and after this conversion. Let any one read Mr. Keble's and Dr. Pusey's reasons for remaining in the Church of England, and then judge if there is any likeness between such views and those of St. Irenæus and St. Augustine. Let one peruse the history of the Greek schism and of the Reformation, and then judge whether

parties between whom such warfare was waged were equally belonging to the same religion and the same church.

That idea of Catholicism which embraces Rome, Moscow, and Canterbury in the same category, fails altogether by the absence of the true conception of Catholic unity.

The language of Dr. Pusey in respect to Newman's conversion is a striking proof of this :

"As each, by God's grace, grows in holiness, *each church* will recognize more and more the presence of God's Holy Spirit in *the other*; and what now hinders the union of the western church will fall off. It is perhaps the greatest event which has happened since the *communion of the churches* has been interrupted, that such a one, so formed in *our church*, and the work of God's spirit as *dwelling in her*, should be translated to theirs."¹

Here we have the Roman, the English, the Western, and by implication the Eastern and the Universal Churches, not one *de facto* or *de jure*, capable of union and communion which *de facto* have ceased to exist, but *de jure* ought to be restored, and are all that can be desired to constitute the genuine, normal, and perfect Catholicism which is the ideal Christianity.

In this loose and incoherent system, no better and less consistent than Congregationalism, the conception of any kind of universal church founded on apostolic institution and Apostolic Succession is absent. The pivot of the whole scheme is the doctrine of Apostolic Succession in the line of bishops, the transmission of the sacerdotal office in its fulness. With this sacerdotal doctrine is the sacramental doctrine, and whatever else pertains to what we may call high church orthodoxy. All these doctrinal and actual elements suffice to furnish the materials for constituting an organized, ecclesiastical society, a diocese, a province, a patriarchate, an ecumenical union of episcopal churches. But there must be some act of authority to give any of these a legal constitution.

If the Apostolic Succession is limited to the transmission of the ordinary episcopate of the Apostles equally to all bishops, it is only a particular diocese which can claim to be a church *jure divino et apostolico*.

Supposing the preliminary difficulty of assigning to each bishop the limits of his jurisdiction surmounted, and dioceses established in every country where there is a considerable multitude of Christians, each one of these churches will have a complete apostolic constitution—a bishop, priests, clergy, and faithful, the sacrifice, the baptismal creed, all the sacraments, except when a new bishop must receive his consecration from some other bishop. A more

¹ Liddon, *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii., p. 461.

extensive organization can only be effected by a voluntary confederation of bishops and churches, united under some ecclesiastical legislation, or, when the Christian religion has been adopted by the State, by the legislation of the sovereign power in the nation. An ecclesiastical society of this kind may be called a church, but it is a purely human institution, even though the right and power to establish such organized associations may be supposed to have been conferred on the hierarchy by apostolic and divine authority. These provinces, patriarchates, national and international confederations being established, and preserving mutual intercommunion all over the world, what is the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church of the creed? Let there be no heresies, schisms, divisions, but a perfect unanimity in teaching the same faith, in administering the same sacraments, in keeping the same essential order and discipline; this unanimity is the result of the agreement of all bishops and all the faithful. This universal collection and congregation of the faithful is one, by professing the same faith, by having a priesthood, a liturgy, and certain religious customs which have one ideal plan, and by mutual charity. It is holy in its common rule of morals, in the means of sanctification which it possesses, in the personal holiness of many of the clergy and laity, especially martyrs and saints. It is catholic by being multiplied in a vast number of bishoprics all through many of the principal regions of the world. It is apostolic, because of the origin of its faith, priesthood and constitutive laws from the Apostles.

This is the Catholicism of the High Church theory, the theory of all those who regard the Apostolic Succession of the universal episcopate as the sole and sufficient foundation of the Church, to the exclusion of the succession of the bishops of the Apostolic See to the universal supremacy of the Prince of the Apostles, St. Peter.

The Catholicism of this theory is unhistorical. It never existed and never could have existed. The theory is an after-thought, invented to justify rebellion against the supreme authority of the Church and to cloak schism with a plausible pretext.

Let us go back to the statement made at the beginning of this article. Jesus Christ came to be the Mediator between God and man. He began His mediation by His visible presence among men, His personal teaching and action, and He has continued it since His ascension by the extension and continuation of His Incarnation in the Church through the illuminating, vivifying, sanctifying presence of the Holy Spirit in His Mystical Body. While the Lord was present during His human life with the group of His disciples, the inchoate church was one under one supreme

head: holy, by union with the source of sanctity, infallible by faith in the Divine Master, potentially catholic, apostolic, as called and governed by the Supreme Apostle and High Priest, sent into the world and consecrated by the Father. After the ascension, and the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles, the Church was fully constituted in organic unity, under the supreme jurisdiction and authority of the Apostles, who received their mission from Jesus Christ, as He received His mission from the Father, a mission universal and perpetual, and, therefore, transmissible to successors. The apostolate was bound in unity by subordination under the Prince of the Apostles; the entire collection of the faithful was one, as the flock of St. Peter, to whom the Lord gave the charge, to feed, guide and govern all his sheep and all his lambs. The Apostles transmitted all their ordinary episcopal power and magistracy to the Catholic episcopate. St. Peter transmitted all his ordinary apostolic power and authority as chief pastor and head of the Church to his successors in the Apostolic See. This is an essential and a principal part of the Apostolic Succession. Chiefly through this supremacy the hierarchy, together with the whole collection of the faithful, dispersed through the world and gathered in particular episcopal churches, were made One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. So it has continued during all ages, and the Unity and Catholicity of the Church governed by the successor of St. Peter were never more splendidly manifest than they are at the present moment.

It is neither necessary nor opportune to repeat here the proofs of the Primacy of St. Peter and its transmission to his successors in the Roman See. They have been given in this REVIEW and elsewhere frequently and fully, and they are only strengthened by the attempted refutations of adversaries. In fact, the force of truth often extorts from them important admissions.

Grotius has said that "if there were no primacy in the Church, controversies would be interminable, as they now are in Protestantism."¹ But a primacy not including a supreme dogmatic magistracy would be useless for terminating disputes. It is a common view among rationalists that there is no logical alternative to Catholicism, except a denial of all supernatural religion. If we do not take pure, natural reason as our only criterion of truth, we must take, without any prejudice to the legitimate rights of reason, authority as a criterion. Authority in matters of dogmatic faith is insufficient if it be not infallible. When Christ gave the magistracy to the Teaching Church, *i.e.*, to the Catholic episcopate composed of the Apostles and their successors under the supremacy

¹ *Via ad Pacem*, ed Basil, t. iv., titul. 7, p. 658.

of His own vicar and vice-gerent, He endowed it with infallibility. This endowment was perpetual, and, therefore, the Church is indestructible. If it could be broken into fragments, it could never be restored to unity. A sword-blade broken into two parts cannot be restored by being stuck together with glue. A shattered planet cannot regain unity by a coalescing of its fragments. If the Catholic Church has become divided, there cannot be a new Catholicism created by an agreement among Roman, Greek and Anglican bishops, and if there could it would be only a human organization.

Catholic unity needs not to be restored; for it has never been lost. It exists perfect and unbroken. Multitudes of men have wandered away from the fold; but the flock is more numerous than ever. All the baptized belong to the flock of St. Peter until they lose the gift of faith, even though they have got lost in the devious paths of the surrounding desert. His voice still reaches the ears and hearts of millions who do not know whence it comes.

St. Peter, in the Council of Jerusalem, spoke to his associates in the sacred ministry of Christ, and said: "*Men, brethren, ye know how, from the days of old, God chose among us, that BY MY MOUTH, the nations should hear the word of the Gospel and believe.*" (Acts xv.)

St. Leo the First, repeating the declaration of the Prince of the Apostles, as his successor, says as follows:

"When, as it is disclosed in the Lesson from the Gospel, the Lord had asked His disciples, Whom (while many held different opinions) they believed Him to be, and Blessed Peter had answered, saying: Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God: the Lord saith: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona, because flesh and blood have not revealed this to thee, but My Father, who is in heaven: and I say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and to thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon the earth, shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon the earth, shall be loosed also in heaven.

"This emplacement of the truth therefore remaineth, and Blessed Peter, persevering in the strength of a Rock which he received, has not abandoned the government of the Church committed to him.

"For, Peter daily declares in the universal church, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God, and every tongue which confesseth the Lord has imbibed the teaching of this voice. This faith subdueth the devil, and looseth the chains of his captives. This faith transplanteth those who have been uprooted from the earth in heaven and the gates of hell cannot prevail against it. For it is divinely endowed with such a great firmness that heretical pravity has never been able to corrupt it or pagan perfidy to overcome it. Wherefore, well beloved, let the festival of this day (the anniversary of Leo's enthronization) be celebrated by a reasonable observance in such wise, that in my humble person he may be revered and honored in whom both the care over all pastors and the guard over all the sheep committed to them perseveres, and whose dignity fails not in an unworthy heir.

"Wherefore, while we address our admonitions to your holy ears, believe that he in whose place we officiate is speaking, because we admonish you with his affection and speak to you nothing else than what he taught, beseeching you, that girding up

the loins of your mind you lead a chaste and sober life in the fear of God. Ye are my crown and my joy as saith the Apostle, if your faith, which from the beginning of the Gospel was proclaimed in the whole world, shall continue steadfast in love and holiness. For although every church throughout the entire terrestrial globe ought to flourish in all the virtues, it is especially incumbent on you among other peoples, to excel in the merits of piety, because your foundation is that very citadel of the Apostolic Rock, and while our Lord Jesus Christ has redeemed you together with all other peoples, the Blessed Apostle Peter has taught you above all others."¹

In like manner with the first Leo, the thirteenth Leo, with the voice and in the person of Peter, lovingly exhorts all his estranged children to re-enter the one fold, and to let him lead them into the green pastures and by the still waters of those meadows, where his flocks are feeding under the guard of his shepherd's crook. It will be a happy day when all the bishops of the east shall come, followed by their flocks, to pay due allegiance to the Vicar of Christ. May this day soon come. And may all the scattered sheep throughout the world, and all the children of Abraham, whether through Jacob, Ishmael or Esau, and all the offspring of Noah and Adam be gathered into the Church of God, and worship the Redeemer of the world, the expectation of nations.

We think we have fulfilled the promise to show that Rome is the only alternative to pure naturalism. Pure naturalism can explain nothing and promise nothing. It makes of the universe a chaos. There is no explanation of the origin and destiny of humanity, and no way of attaining this destiny except in supernatural religion. The supernatural is raised to its summit and personified in the incarnation of the Eternal Word. He has spoken the Word of God by His own mouth in the creation of the Church and the mission of His Vicar, through whose voice he has continued to speak. This voice calls all nominal Christians and all men into the one only way of temporal and eternal salvation, into the unity of the Catholic Church. The only hope of salvation for every individual man, and for mankind, is in obeying the voice of the Vicar of Christ.

AUGUSTINE F. HEWIT.

¹ Assumpt., Sermon, 2, in Anniv.

THE BAPTISM OF FRANCE.

IT has been said that when God erases, He is about to write again. In the fifth century of our era God made use of the barbarians to destroy the Roman Empire in the west, and on the resulting *tabula rasa* He traced the future annals of a new civilization, in which the instruments of His justice and of his loving wisdom, transformed by His Church, were to play a prominent part. These barbarians—these “conscripts of God,” as Chateaubriand happily styled them—were the blind accomplishers of an eternal design. The new religion, recently issued from the Catacombs, had need of new peoples. “The innocence of the Gospel needed the innocence of savages; a simple faith needed hearts which were as simple as that faith.” The need was satisfied; for twenty years after Odoacer the Herulan had reduced the Eternal City and had put an end to the Western Empire, there occurred in Gaul an event which initiated that marvellous series of events which mediæval writers gratefully described as the *Gesta Dei per Francos*—the wondrous deeds which God performed through the arms of the French, and which are discerned in even more modern times by such historians as grasp the truth that there can be no true philosophy of history for him who ignores the directing power of the Most High in the affairs of nations. This year will witness the celebration of the fourteenth centennial of the Baptism of France; for as such Christian historians have rightly designated the sacred function performed by St. Remy on the Christmas Day of A. D. 496, in the Baptistery of Rheims. It may be that God will tolerate an interference on the part of infidel—that is, Masonic—France to prevent an external and befitting manifestation of that gratitude to God which fills the great heart of the real and Catholic France as it reflects on the foundation of all the glories of *la grande nation*; but the emotions of that heart will be beyond the control of the agents of God’s arch-enemy, and they will be shared by all the children of that Church whom Catholic France has so well served.

I.

There are two theories concerning the origin of the Franks. One holds that they were a Germanic people, and that Tacitus mentions them when he speaks of the Isteuoni—a league of the Cherusci, Sicambri, Cauci, Catti and Brutteri. According to this idea, the Cherusci became weak after the days of Arminius, and

were for some time protected by the Catti; then recovering some of their olden strength, and acquiring a preponderance in the league, they assumed the names of Salic or River (*Ripuarii*) Franks, according as they dwelled near to the Saal or to the Rhine. However, some historians contend that the Franks were distinct from the Germans, and that originally they inhabited what are now Denmark and the duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg. During the reign of Gallienus the Franks crossed the Rhine and advanced even into Spain, and at Tarragona they embarked for Mauritania; then loading themselves with booty, they returned to their own land. In the middle of the fourth century they became nominal subjects of Rome, and defended the Rhenish frontier against the other barbarians. Many poets, and some historians, speak of a Frankish king, Pharamond, whose reign they ascribe to the neighborhood of the year A.D. 420; and authentic history tells of King Clodion, under whom the Salic Franks, about 440, advanced as far as the Somme. Meroveus, the founder of the Merovingian dynasty, was one of the victors at the battle of Chalons, in 451. Childeric, son of Meroveus, ascended the throne in 458; but his immoralities disgusted the nation, and he was forced to flee to Thuringia, whereupon the Franks chose as chief, probably not as king, the Roman Count of Soissons, general of the Roman forces in that part of Gaul. This nobleman, Egidius, was faithful to the Emperor Majorian, and therefore hostile to Ricimer, the Warwick of that day; consequently, he found himself deposed in favor of Gundioc, king of the Burgundians, and he saw the Visigoth, Theodoric II., with the connivance of Ricimer, occupy the Narbonnaise, his line of communication with Italy. Then Egidius invited the banished Childeric, whom the Franks now yearned for, to return to his throne. Childeric bade farewell to his host, the Thuringian monarch, but took with him the queen, Basina, who had become infatuated with the gallant Frank, and rushed to his embraces, declaring that if she knew of any man more robust than he, she would accord the preference to that man. Childeric expelled from Gaul the Alani, whom Theodoric II. had pushed as far as the Loire, and he consolidated his power over the Salic Franks. He died in 481, and the Franks lifted on their bucklers, in token of their submission to his rule, the young Clodoveus (Chlodowig or Clovis), the issue of the late king's adulterous union with Basina.

At this time five different peoples occupied Gaul. In the centre were the Romans; but we must remember that this term was then applied to such of the olden Gauls as had not imitated the Armoricans (Bretons) in proclaiming their independence, or had not recognized the sway of some barbarian monarch. Although the

western Empire had been dead for five years, the Roman authority was still represented by Syagrius, a son of the famous Egidius, who ruled over the cities of Beauvais, Soissons, Amiens, Troyes, Rheims and their dependent territories. The Armoricans were in the west, the Alemanni in the northeast, the Burgundians in the east and the Visigoths in the south. The Romans, Gallo-Romans and Armoricans were Catholics; the Burgundians and Visigoths were Arians, while the Franks and Alemanni were pagans. The power exercised by Count Syagrius was regarded as the sole legitimate authority in Gaul, having a duration of five centuries for its sanction, whereas the barbarian and Armorican governments relied only on the sword. Hence it was understood that if the Gauls were ever to resolve on a conquest of their national independence, they certainly would fight in the name of the Roman Empire. Therefore the destruction of that remnant of Roman domination, to which the Gauls still avowed an honorable fidelity, would naturally be the aim of any enterprising individual who would essay the formation of one state out of all the discordant elements which confronted his ambition. Clovis perceived this truth, and when the eastern emperor, bent on a restoration of the western empire, appointed the Frankish king general of the Roman armies in Gaul, the young monarch felt that the time for action had arrived. In virtue of his new title, he demanded obedience from Syagrius, and when the proud Roman refused to abdicate his rank, 5000 Franks advanced on Soissons. The count led his few soldiers to the open field, and having been defeated, he fled to Toulouse, the capital of Alaric II., king of the Visigoths. Soissons opened its gates to the conqueror, and in less than a year he was master of all the territories which the Romans had possessed between the Loire and the Rhine. Then, fearing that Syagrius would incite the neighboring princes to combine against the Franks, Clovis menaced Alaric with war unless the Roman general were delivered to him. The Visigoth dared not refuse, and the unfortunate was put to death. Clovis now sought for a bride, and his choice of Clotilda, a Burgundian princess and a Catholic, although she had been raised in an Arian court, gained for him the hearts of the Gallo-Romans. From the day of her marriage every Catholic eye in Gaul was turned toward Clotilda as to one who was to be the divine instrument for the conversion of the great Clovis to the true religion and a humane policy. In 496 the Alemanni, burning to emulate the Franks, advanced as far as Cologne and attacked Sigebert, king of the Ripuarii; whereupon Clovis, being a nephew of Sigebert, led his Salic Franks to the rescue. The hostile forces met at Tolbiac; the Alemanni were routed, and Clovis annexed to his dominions all the Alemannic conquests between the Mo-

selle and the Rhine, together with a large district on the right of the latter river. All of these Frankish conquests now received the name of *Francia Rhenana*—Rhenish France. The remaining Alemannic territories, Vindelicia alone excepted, were accorded to a duke of Alemania, who swore to be a vassal of the Frank monarch. Vindelicia was given to the Ostrogothic sovereign, Theodoric, who had acted as a mediator in effecting peace. This victory of Tolbiac was the occasion of the conversion of Clovis. In the beginning of the action the Franks, greatly outnumbered, were on the point of retreating, when their king thought of the God of Clotilda. He vowed that if he conquered the adorers of Odin he would become a Christian, and on the ensuing Christmas Day he was baptized by St. Remy in that baptistery at Rheims which still remains as a monument of one of the most important revolutions which the world has seen. The entire Frankish nation soon followed their monarch into the Fold of Christ, and from that date they became the most efficient constituent, after the Catholic Church the informing spirit, of the new civilization. Pope Anastasius II. granted to the Frankish kings the title of "Most Christian," and styled them the "Eldest Sons of the Church"—qualifications which were historically correct, since at that time the eastern emperor was a Eutychian heretic, and all the western Christian princes of any importance were Arians.¹

Here we must be guilty of a digression which is, nevertheless, quite apposite to our subject.

The antiquity of the title "Most Christian King," borne by the French kings, has been the subject of much discussion; many contending that the first monarch to bear the title as a special prerogative was Louis XI., to whom it was accorded by Pope Paul II. in 1459. This opinion was held by the great Benedictine writer Mabillon in his *Diplomatics* (y. 1704); by the Jesuit historian Daniel, in his *History of France* (y. 1713), and by Henault in his *Chronology* (y. 1744). Daniel seems to have proved his side of the question quite conclusively; but in 1720 the Abbé de Camps showed that the famous title had been borne by all the

¹ About the year 377 the Goths asked the Emperor Valens, an Arian, for permission to settle in Roman territory, and the request was granted on condition that they embraced Arianism. One of their deputies, a bishop named Ulphilas—a man of talent, who had shown much orthodox zeal at the Council of Nice—yielded sufficiently to the imperial wiles to permit his nation to obey the sovereign's behest, although he himself continued to preach the Catholic doctrine, at least in its substantial integrity. Very soon the pest was communicated to all the allies of the Goths, such as the Gepidi, the Ostrogoths, the Vandals, the Alani, etc. Genseric led his Vandals into Arianism in 428. Gondebald did the same for his Burgundians in 430. The Anglo-Saxons in Britain were still idolators.—Tillemont, *Hist. Eccles.*, at y. 377; Ceiller, art "Ulphilas."

French monarchs since the days of Clovis. Griffet gave a new edition of Daniel's work in 1755, and, profiting by the researches of De Camps, assigned the origin of the title to the reign of Charles V. (1337-80). In 1760, the learned Bonamy demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Academy of Inscriptions that the title was accorded to King Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. After a careful consideration of all these arguments, it appears to us that the title of Most Christian King was not only recognized by the Popes as a special prerogative of the French kings, long before the days of Louis XI., but was transmitted by the first Christian king of the Franks as part of that inheritance of faith and devotion to the Church which was guarded by his successors, almost without exception, as their most precious possession. In the first place, Pope Paul II., who is represented as according, for the first time, the title of Most Christian King to Louis XI., acknowledged in a letter to Charles VII., the father of Louis XI. (*Epist.* 385), that the French sovereigns held the famous title by heredity, and because of their constant defence of the Holy See. And Louis XI., himself, in his *Institution* drawn up at Amboise in 1482 for the guidance of his successor, declares the same fact: "Considering that God our Creator has given to us such great graces; that He has been pleased to constitute us the king of the most notable nation an earth, this kingdom of France, many of whose sovereigns, our predecessors, have been so great, virtuous, and valiant that they have acquired the name of Most Christian Kings, etc." Secondly, St. Avitus, a contemporary of Clovis, tells us (see Ruinart's *Preface to St. Greg. Tur.*, No. 18) that there was no province in the West that did not owe its safety to the Franks; alluding, of course, to the combats of the first successors of Clovis against the Arians and the pagans. When Clovis was baptized he was the sole veritable Catholic king in Europe, and hence would properly be addressed as Most Christian. Therefore it is that we find Romanus, general of the Roman armies in Italy, addressing King Childebert as "your Christianity—*Christianitas vestra*," in the same sense as that of our phrase "your Majesty." Therefore also we find the same language in the letters of the emperor Mauritius, to Childebert, and in those of Pope St. Gregory I. to the kings Thierry and Theodebert, sons of Childebert II. Thirdly, even in the time of Charles V. of France, to whose reign rather than that of Louis XI. Griffet would ascribe the origin of the glorious title, we find Raoul de Presles (in his *Prologue to St. Augustine's City of God*) saying to Charles V.: "You are and ought to be the sole chief protector of the Church, just as your predecessors were; and this is held by the Holy See of Rome, which has been accustomed to address you *and your predecessors* as Most Christian Princes."

Fourthly, when the emperor Frederick III. wrote to Charles VII. about a projected Crusade, he admitted that the title belonged to the French monarchs as an inheritance, at least from the time of the first Holy Wars. Fifthly, Pius II., predecessor of Paul II., writes to Charles VII., that the monarch "has inherited the name of Most Christian from his ancestors" (see the *Glossary* of Ducange, at word *Christianitas*). And the same Pontiff says that this title has been an ornament of the French monarchs *per longissimam temporum seriem*; and that it has been accorded *consensu populorum, gentium, nationumque*. It is true, and also very strange, that in spite of these declarations of his immediate predecessor, Paul II. at first told Cousinot, the ambassador of Louis XI., that the Popes were not accustomed to term the French monarchs Most Christian Kings; but we must remember that the Pontiff was just then very angry with Louis on account of that prince's severity toward the traitor, Cardinal de la Balue. However, Paul II. did agree to style the monarch in the usual fashion; though he gave no Bull confirmatory of the long possessed title. Griffet seems to imply that this Bull was expedited, when he says that "we must regard this decision of Pope Paul II. as marking the remarkable epoch when the title of Most Christian was assured to our kings by a judicial act which undoubtedly gave to the already established usage a degree of authenticity which it had not yet possessed." If there had been any formal Bull issued in the premises by Paul II., Alexander VI. would scarcely have tried to deprive Charles VIII. of the title, in order to confer it upon Ferdinand of Spain; instead of it, he afterward gave the style of Catholic to the Spanish sovereign, only because the Sacred College protested against the innovation.¹

The consequences of the conversion of Clovis were immediate and supremely important. All the cities of Brittany submitted to the Frankish sceptre; all the Gallo-Romans regarded Clovis as their liberator from the yoke, either actual or threatened, of the Arian Visigoths and Burgundians; all the Roman legions which were still stationed between the Seine and the Loire entered the service of him whom the Vicar of Christ had blessed; and the Roman eagles and *Labarum* shed some of their ancient splendor over the warriors of the new Christian nation. Gallo-Romans and Franks were soon amalgamated by the force of their common Christianity; the first barbaric nation to embrace the faith of Christ had laid the foundations of France.

In his last will and testament St. Remy thus speaks of the family of Clovis: "I raised it to the supreme rank of royal

¹ See the *Memoires* of Commynes, b. viii., ch. 17.

majesty ; I baptized them all in the waters of salvation ; I gave to them the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and I consecrated their head as king with the Holy Chrism." But on that Christmas Day of 496 it was not only the family of Clovis, not only those 3000 of his warriors who were baptized with him, whom Christendom acclaimed as they issued from the Baptistery of Rheims ; then all France was assigned by the hand of God to a pre-eminent place in the destinies of the world. " Nearly two hundred years after Constantine," says Lacordaire, " there was, as yet, no Christian nation in the world.¹ The empire was formed of twenty different races, united indeed in administration, but separated by their traditions and customs ; and a new germ of division had been planted by Arianism, a most active and fruitful heresy. Then the empire was beset by barbarous populations whose greed was ever increasing, and who were either given to idolatry or subjugated by Arianism. But now behold the work of God ! Not far from the banks of the Rhine, a barbarian chieftain was engaged in battle with other barbarians. His followers were giving way ; and in his peril he bethought him of the God whom his wife adored, and whose power she had often lauded. He invokes that God ; and victory having declared for him, he prostrates himself at the feet of the God of Clotilda. That God was Christ ; that king, that queen, that bishop, that victory, were the French nation ; and the French nation was the first Catholic nation which God gave to His Church."²

If it had been given to St. Remy to see through the veil of the future, he would have known that a national birth was effected by the regenerating waters which he poured on the head of Clovis. " Forth from the Baptistery of Rheims issued France and all her destinies ; the age of Charlemagne, the freedom of the communes, the genius of scholasticism, the glories of the crusades, the days of St. Louis, the heroism of Joan of Arc, the valor of Henry IV., the splendor of Louis XIV., the eloquence of Bossuet, the great modern movement, and we ourselves. Yes, from that Baptistery

¹ This sentence is misleading, if one does not remember that the illustrious Dominican uses the word " nation " in its strict sense ; that is, applying it only to a politically-organized, united, and independent people. At the time of the baptism of Clovis, there were very many peoples who were entirely Catholic in Western Europe ; and in the East very far from all had succumbed to heresy. In Europe, the Italians were not the only ones who rejected Arianism ; the Gauls and the Britons (the latter then relegated to Cambria) were Catholics. And for half a century the Scots, whom we now know as " the Irish," had been Catholics, and they were then propagating the faith in Caledonia. The term " barbarian " was then applied pre-eminently to the various hordes of Teutonic origin ; and therefore it was said that the Franks were the first " barbaric " nation to receive the faith.

² *Discours sur la Vocation de la Nation Francaise*, delivered in Notre Dame, Paris, February 14, 1841.

we also came; we who are Catholics, despite the scandals of the Great Schism, despite the seductions of the Reformation, despite the diabolic reign of Voltaire, despite the bloody persecutions of the Revolution. Despite all these terrible trials, we are Catholics. Long and magnificent is that history which has been termed the *Gesta Dei per Francos*; for on its every page the grandeur of God and our national greatness stand forth in indissoluble unity."¹

II.

The spirit of the world affects to regard as insincere nearly every conversion to the Catholic faith, although it finds no difficulty in awarding the praise of sincerity to any perversion from that faith. It is quite natural, therefore, that heterodox and rationalistic historians should represent Clovis as being influenced by ambition when he threw himself at the feet of St. Remy; but one would suppose that a writer of the calibre of Augustin Thierry, even though he was not a professing Christian when he penned the observation, would not have fallen into this error.² Thierry wrote: "Among the French kings of the first race Clovis was the politician. With the view of founding an empire, he trampled on the worship of the gods of the north, and he associated himself with the orthodox bishops for the destruction of the two Arian kingdoms. But he was the tool rather than the director of this league. . . . He continued to be influenced by the customs and ideas of his people. . . . The torch and rapine did not spare the churches when he made his incursions toward the Saone and to the south of the Loire.³ . . . The ceremony (his baptism) was performed at Rheims, and the most splendid arts of the Romans were adopted with profusion to celebrate the triumph of the bishops."⁴ Gorini well remarks that if Clovis received baptism in order to found an empire, it was his policy that triumphed, and not the bishops or their faith, especially as, according to Thierry, the Christian Clovis was no more reverend towards the churches than the pagan Clovis had

¹ Henri Perreye, *Panegyrique de Sainte Clotilde*.

² Gorini, in his admirable *Défense de l'Église* (1853) took occasion to refute a number of Thierry's assertions made in the *Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands* and in the *Lettres sur l'Histoire de France*. It is a pleasure to note that Thierry most handsomely admitted the justice of Gorini's animadversions, and in all posterior editions (while he lived) the crimated passages were either corrected or omitted. But the great historian had then become a devout and uncompromising Catholic. M. Henri Martin, the head of the Druidical school, imitated Thierry's example to some extent. Guizot granted the accuracy of Gorini's judgments, but he allowed the errors to appear in his later editions.

³ *Lettre vi. sur l'Histoire de France*.

⁴ *Conquête*, etc. In later editions, also published before his conversion, Thierry modified the last sentence so as to read: "to celebrate the triumph of the Catholic faith," thus presenting the prelates in a less odious fashion.

been. But how is it that the policy of Clovis had never shown itself during his fifteen years of reign on both banks of the Somme, in the midst of Christian populations, during his ten years of intimacy with St. Remy, and of acquaintance with other clergymen, and during the three years of entreaty on the part of Clotilda that he would abandon paganism? It was not until he found that the God of the Christians had heard his prayer at Tolbiac that he abandoned his false deities. And if conversion to Christianity was to strengthen his power, is it not strange that other barbarian princes of the day, equally ambitious, never made such a discovery? But, humanly speaking, Clovis did not need to embrace Christianity in order to attain the objects of his royal ambition. As a pagan he had subjugated Central Gaul, and all the other Gallo-Roman populations, still subject to other barbarians, were calling on him to deliver them. And what had he to hope, if fortune abandoned him, from the power of the orthodox clergy? They had been unable to save the orthodox Syagrius, put to death by him at Soissons; or the orthodox Childeric, murdered by the Burgundian Gondebald. Let us, therefore, say with Nicetus, bishop of Treves, addressing Chlodosinda, a granddaughter of the Frankish king: "Being a man of extreme prudence, Clovis did not embrace our faith until he found that it was the true one."¹ As for the remark of Thierry that Clovis and his Franks retained, after their conversion, an affection for their olden habits, it is certain that no people, newly converted, are at once metamorphosed. As Gorini expressed the idea, Clovis could scarcely become a St. Louis.

Among the heterodox there are some fortunate souls who are able to appreciate to some extent the intervention of God, the Creator and Sustainer, in the affairs of human life; but the arrogant rationalist, of the earth earthy, would fain perceive the workings of priestcraft in this intervention. Hence we are told that the marriage of Clovis to St. Clotilda was an affair of episcopal policy, that the bishops, who are said to have then held the destinies of Gaul in their hands, projected this union as a means for the conversion of the Franks, to whom they intended to subject the whole of Gaul, having realized that the Arian barbarians would be less easily converted than the idolatrous ones. But St. Gregory of Tours (b. 539), the father of French history, upon whom we must chiefly rely for all knowledge concerning the Franks of this period, assigns the charms and virtue of Clotilda as the cause of the demand of Clovis for her hand; the historian utters not one word which would indicate that the clergy had any part in the affair. "Clovis often sent ambassadors to the Burgundians; and these messengers hav-

¹ Sirmond, *Conc. Ant. Gall*, vol. i., p. 324.

ing seen the young Clotilda, were impressed by her beauty and graciousness. Having learned that she was of royal blood,¹ they told Clovis about her. He immediately sent a special embassy to demand her hand, and Gondebald, not daring to refuse, delivered the maiden to the messengers. When Clovis received her, he was so enraptured that he made her his wife."²

As for the assertion that the Gallo-Roman bishops had devised the plan of subjecting all Gaul to the Franks, because of the greater probability of the future conversion of those idolators, it is certain that the orthodox clergy had no reason to despair of the conversion of the Arian Burgundians and Visigoths. They had already attained great success, and very little perspicacity was needed to foresee that soon their apostolic labors would be fully rewarded. In Burgundy the Catholic faith had been openly professed by King Chilperic, and Gondebald had proposed to profess it in secret. The daughter and grandchildren of the latter prince abjured their heresy, and Sigismund, the King of Geneva, made St. Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, his intimate friend and adviser. As to the Visigoths, in the previous century, before they had entered into any relations with the Arians of Constantinople, they had been Catholics; and even in Gaul it is very probable that Frederick, the brother of Theodoric II., was orthodox, for we find him informing Pope Hilarius of the intrusion of Hermes at Narbonne, and we hear the pontiff styling him "my son."³ Certainly these and many similar facts must have encouraged the Gallo-Roman clergy in the belief that the conversion of the Burgundians and the Visigoths was not improbable; and in the face of such a belief

¹ Through her father Clotilda descended from King Gondicarius, who perished while defending his subjects from the invading Huns of Attila, leaving his dominions to be divided by his sons, Gondemar, Godeghesil, Gondebald and Chilperic. The last-named prince was the father of Clotilda. On the death of Godeghesil, Gondebald made war on his other two brothers. Gondemar fell amid the flames of his last fortress; while Chilperic, taken on the field of battle, was conveyed to Geneva, then the capital of the Burgundians. He was there massacred, together with his wife and all his children, excepting Clotilda and one sister. Although a fervent Arian, Gondebald allowed full liberty to his nieces to practice the Catholic religion, in which they had been trained by their mother. Frequently Clotilda heard the voice of nature crying for vengeance on the murderer of her family; but she heeded the promptings of divine grace to forgive him. Many historians have painted Clotilda as a virulent fury; and in accordance with that idea they have represented her as taking revenge on Gondebald as soon as opportunity offered. For refutations of this calumny, see the disquisition of M. de l'Épinois on the value of the works of St. Gregory of Tours in the *Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne* for February, 1862; the *Examen du Célèbre Texte de St. Grégoire de Tours sur la Guerre contre Sigismond*, by Baral in the same *Annales* for December, 1862; and our article on the subject in the *Ave Maria*, vol. xxxv., No. 12.

² *Historia Ecclesiastica Francorum*, bk. ii., ch. 28. *Epitomata*, ch. 18.

³ *Epist. Hilarii ad Leontium*, in Sirmond, vol. i.

they would scarcely have devised the expedient of fettering themselves and their entire nation under the domination of those idolatrous Franks who, if we are to credit Guizot, were "more German, more barbarous," than the other barbarians. But, by the way, were the Franks more barbarous than the Burgundians and Visigoths? Guizot says: "There were notable differences between these peoples. The Franks were more foreign, more German, more barbarous than the Burgundians and the Goths. Before entering Gaul, the last had long held relations with the Romans, had lived in Italy and in the Eastern Empire, had become familiar with Roman manners, and very nearly the same may be said of the Burgundians. And what is more, these two peoples had been Christians for a long time, whereas the Franks came from Germany as yet pagans and enemies."¹ In the first place, we must observe that Clovis did not bring his Franks from Germany, but from Tournai, in the ancient Roman province of Belgium. When Clovis became King of the Franks, they had resided on the Roman side of the Rhine for more than a hundred and fifty years, having established themselves there in 337; and we may well say with Michelet that during this long residence in Celtic Belgium, they must have necessarily become, through intermarriage, Celtic to a great extent.² But the relations between the Franks and the Romans were of a date more ancient than that of the Frankish occupation of Belgium. From the year 288, when the Emperor Maximian hurled the Franks and other Germanic invaders across the Rhine, great numbers of the former entered the military service of Rome, and thus came in contact, at least, with Roman refinement. St. Sidonius, a contemporary of Clovis, gives pictures of luxurious display on the part of Frankish warriors which are incompatible with utter barbarism. According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the Emperor Constantine the Great considered the blood of the Franks so noble that he issued a decree permitting imperial princes to marry Frankish women.³ Before the time of Clovis, the Franks had given to Rome nine commanders-in-chief for her armies, five tribunes, a prefect of the city, a prime minister (Arbogastes), and an Empress (Eudoxia). Ammianus Marcellinus, writing in 370, tells us that for a long time past young Franks had frequented the schools of Rome, Ravenna, Milan, Narbonne and Autun; that so fine were the dwellings and so careful the cultivation on the right or Frankish side of the Rhine, that a stranger had to inquire as to which bank was the Roman.⁴ If the reader now reflects that

¹ *Histoire de la Civilisation en France*, vol. i., lesson 8.

² *Histoire de France*, vol. i., p. 195.

³ Chateaubriand, *Analyse Raisonnée de l'Histoire de France*.

⁴ *Rerum Gestarum*, bk. xv.

the Visigothic chief, Ataulphus, said that the sole reason why he abandoned his design of founding a Gothic empire on the ruins of the Roman was, that "long experience had taught him the absolute impossibility of subjecting the unrestrained barbarism of the Goths to any kind of law,"¹ he will not agree with Guizot in the assertion that the Visigoths were more cultured than the Franks. There is no need of dilating on the barbarism of the Burgundians, since all historians agree that they were inferior to the Visigoths in every respect. Gorini assigns a very probable reason for the frequently accepted notion that the Visigoths were more cultured than the Franks. "As narrator of his life, the Frank monarch had only St. Gregory of Tours, the barbarian historian of barbarism; whereas, at the court of the Visigoths, there was, both as courtier and as suppliant, that personage whom M. Augustin Thierry terms 'the grandest poet of the fifth century,' St. Sidonius Apollinaris. This writer, a sensible man, and one of imagination, addicted to a highly-colored style, was led by many circumstances to describe the habits of Theodoric; his efforts to raise to the empire the father-in-law of Sidonius; the solemn receptions of his successor, Euric; the pleasures of his Gallo-Roman subjects, who lived in the retirement of their villas exchanging verses with each other, or carelessly promenading along the banks of the Garonne, or preparing magnificent presents for their sovereigns. The brilliant periods of the poet form a setting amid which the Visigoth kings lose their barbarism, and such a setting did not fall to the lot of Clovis. But the description of the prayers, labors, games and public audiences of Theodoric are no more interesting than would have been, if executed by an able pen, a picture of Clovis, surrounded by Clotilda, the lords of his court and the leaders of his army, the artists who had been brought from Italy, the Gallo-Romans of the East and South begging him to enrol them among his subjects, ambassadors imploring the freedom of the prisoners of Tolbiac, other ambassadors handing to him the insignia of the Consulate which they have brought from Constantinople, and St. Remy discoursing on the duties of a Christian ruler or recalling the pomp and splendor of the baptism at Rheims. There was no such painter for Clovis; only St. Gregory of Tours was to illustrate his career. Would Theodoric affect our imagination more strongly than Clovis, if no one had spoken of him but Jornandes or St. Isidore? . . . That superior refinement which Thierry discerns in the Visigoths must be ascribed less to any merit of the conquerors than to the Gallo-Roman nobles of the court and to the descriptions of Sidonius. As Thierry him-

¹ Orosius, *Historia*, bk. vii., ch. 43.

self says, 'the German appeared in the Visigoths as soon as they took the field,' and they took the field very frequently."¹

III.

"Hail! O Christ, who lovest the Franks!

"Preserve their kingdom; enlighten their leaders with Thy grace; protect their army; strengthen their faith!

"May Jesus Christ, the Sovereign Master of the masters of the earth, give to the Franks all the joys of peace!

"Hail! O Christ, who lovest the Franks!

"By means of its courage and its strength the Frankish race threw off the heavy yoke of the Romans; and having received the grace of baptism, covered with gold and precious stones the bodies of the holy martyrs which the pagans had burnt with fire, lacerated with the sword, and given as prey to wild beasts!"

These words, quaint at once and sublime, form the prelude to the new Salic Law, which Clovis, immediately after his baptism, assigned to his Franks as the basis of their future jurisprudence. Does the reader discern in them the spirit of a murderer—of a murderer of his own kindred? And yet we are told by certain historians that Clovis the Christian was a foul assassin of his own flesh and blood. In the year 1873 the educational superintendents ("Conseil de l'instruction publique") of the third French Republic authorized and "crowned" a text-book on the history of France, written by one Mad. de Saint-Ouen, in which we read: "Clovis I. would occupy a distinguished place in history, if he had not soiled his reign by his cruelties towards the chiefs of the various Frankish tribes, most of whom were related to him. Some of them he caused to be massacred, others he killed with his own hand." Then the good woman, undoubtedly sincere, since she follows, at a distance, in the footsteps of such pioneers as Guizot and Henry Martin, devotes twenty-five modest pages to the presumedly easy task of trying and condemning, for the instruction and edification of French youth, the entire series of Merovingian monarchs: "It is necessary to give only a rapid glance at these barbarous times." Can it be possible that the charge of murder is deserved by a prince whom Pope Anastasius lauded as a just man, and as the Eldest Son of the Church; by a prince whose most intimate counsellor was the grand St. Remy? But what evidence sustains the hideous accusation? Merely an alleged passage of St. Gregory of Tours, who wrote toward the end of the sixth century; that is nearly a century after the death of Clovis. And it is to be noted that St. Gregory, in this short passage, if indeed he was its author, used the word "*fertur*—it is said" no less than four times. Again, if this passage is authentic, how are we

¹ *Ubi supra*, Paris edit., 1864, vol. i., p. 319.

to account for the following language of the saint, uttered immediately after it? "Every day God caused the augmentation of the kingdom of Clovis, *because he walked before Him with a pure heart*, and did what was pleasing in His eyes."¹ And in the prologue to his fifth book, St. Gregory offers the example of Clovis to the sovereigns of the sixth century: "Remember the deeds of the first author of your victories; of him who put to death so many hostile kings, who crushed so many wicked peoples, who subjugated those who now are our countrymen (*patrias gentes*), and who left to you an authority over them which is stainless and uncontested." In the Council held at Orleans in 511, immediately after the alleged crimes of Clovis, the synodals placed at the head of their Acts a letter to Clovis in which they lauded his pious zeal and his *humanity*. Were these bishops hypocrites? Finally, we would draw attention to the characters and deeds of the petty princes who are supposed to have been the victims of the rage and greed of Clovis. In the Life of St. Maximin (Mesmin, abbot of Mici, near Orleans), written in the early part of the sixth century; in the Chronicle of Aimoin, written in the tenth century; in the Chronicle of Balderic, written in the eleventh; and above all, in the Life of St. Remy which Hincmar (b. 806) reproduced from a biography composed by a contemporary of Clovis, we find some pertinent particulars regarding these personages, all of which indicate that the Frank monarch was an inflexible punisher of revolt,² like Dagobert, if you will, or Charlemagne, or Louis XI., or Richelieu; but not an assassin. Much stress is laid upon the killing of Ragnacarius, a relative of Clovis. But Balderic, who tells us that he drew his narrative from the text of St. Gregory of Tours, plainly evinces that he did not read, in his copy of the alleged criminating "History," the passages which are adduced to show the wickedness of Clovis and the culpable subservience of the saint to royal power. Balderic says: "Clovis had assigned the custody of Cambrai to Ragnacarius, his cousin or his nephew When the king returned, this Ragnacarius, inflated by criminal pride, violated his pledges, and refused entrance into the city to his sovereign. The insolence and obscenities of Ragnacarius had already procured for him the hatred of the Franks, and now they resolved to bring about his death, and they informed the king of their intention." The rebel was delivered to his sovereign, and his execution was an act of justice. As to the murder of Sigebert by his son Chloderic, and the killing of the latter by order of Clovis, there is nothing in

¹ "Deus augebat regnum ejus, eo quod ambularet recto corde coram eo, et faceret quæ placita erant in oculis ejus."

² And nevertheless, yielding to the intercession of St. Euspicius, he granted full pardon to the rebels of Verdun.

the adduced passage of St. Gregory which would indicate that the parricide was instigated by the Frank king, and certainly this sovereign was justified in punishing so revolting a crime.

Augustin Thierry,¹ Ozanam² and Kries³ assign a German legendary source to the belief in the cruelty and injustice of the Christian Clovis; but one of the best of the critics of our day, A. Lecoy de la Marche, discerns its origin in the hatred which the Gallo-Roman race resumed during the reigns of the immediate successors of Clovis.⁴ We believe that the adduced testimony of St. Gregory of Tours is at least an interpolation, and probably a malicious forgery. The saint himself realized the danger of indiscreet or malevolent interpolation which menaced all MSS. in his day, and at the end of his work he affixed this warning: "Although this volume is written in uncultivated style, I conjure all the priests of the Lord who will hereafter rule this diocese of Tours, and I conjure them by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and the judgment day, if they do not wish to be then covered with confusion and to be condemned with the demon, that they never destroy this book, and that in copying it they never add or omit anything." Even Henri Martin, who greedily receives any argument which militates against the sincerity of the conversion of Clovis or against the sanctity of Clotilda, says of the Franco-Burgundian royal marriage: "Its important consequences struck the popular imagination so forcibly that they became the text for romantic recitals, which every succeeding generation enlarged and embellished." It is very probable that some copyist, whose critical faculties had been affected by these "highly-embellished recitals," introduced them in the margin of his copy of the Gregorian work, and that in time some other transcriber, innocently or culpably, conveyed the annotations into the text as the original production of the saint. Every careful investigator of the mediæval history is painfully familiar with interpolations in olden manuscripts, and it is only by the supposition that the Gregorian work was so maltreated that we are able to understand the praise lavished on Clovis by popes, councils and saints. That the supposition is well-founded has been satisfactorily proved by Le Cointe,⁵ Kries,⁶ Carlo Troya⁷ and Alphonso de Boissieu.⁸

¹ In his preface to his *Temps Mérovingiens*.

² *Les Germains*, vol. i., p. 133.

³ *De Gregorii Vita et Scriptis*, Breslau, 1839.

⁴ "Clovis; Ses Meurtres Politiques" in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, vol. i., p. 450.

⁵ *Annales Ecclesiastici Francorum*.

⁶ *Ubi sup.*

⁷ *Storia d'Italia*, vol. xi.

⁸ *Inscriptions Antiques de Lyon*, last number.

IV.

The marvelous action of Christianity in the work of civilization has been recognized by all conscientious historians and polemics; not only by those who were guided by Catholic principles, but even by those who were the victims of Protestant prejudice, or who allowed their intellects to be obscured by the vagaries of rationalism. The Protestant Guizot says: "Among the causes of our civilization the Christian Church presents itself to every mind. Society has never made such efforts to influence its surroundings and to assimilate to itself the external world as the Church put forth between the fifth and the tenth centuries. The Church attacked barbarism, as it were, on every side and, conquering it, she civilized it." Probably the reader has noted the frequent passionate invectives of Michelet against the Church; but the otherwise grand historian found himself compelled to admit: "By the side of the civil order another order is established, and it will take up and preserve the civil during the tempest of the barbarian invasion. Everywhere, alongside the Roman magistracy which is about to be eclipsed and to leave society in peril, religion has established another magistracy which will never prove deficient. Imperial universality is on the verge of ruin; but Catholic universality has appeared, and the world will be maintained and arranged by the Church." Balmes observes: "Amid this social dissolution, this monstrous upheaval of laws and customs, Christianity stands erect like a solitary column in a ruined city, like a glowing beacon in the midst of darkness. Christianity is the sole element which can render life to the germs of regeneration which are covered by ruins and gore." Laurentie says: "When civil wars had desolated the empire, and the provinces were at the mercy of the barbarians, only one authority in Gaul was popular, and that authority took care of the nation, a prey to various conquerors, one after another. This authority was that of the bishops, who were ever ready to throw themselves between the combatants." And the eloquent Montalembert remarks: "With invincible perseverance religion performed the arduous work of kneading and moulding the various elements of those Teutonic and northern races which had overrun Europe, in order to civilize and sanctify them through the patient and vivifying action of faith. Even Littré, the great materialist and philologist, who persevered in his atheism almost unto the hour of his death, avowed, in the midst of his hallucinations, that "in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries the Church was the grand agent of social salvation." And Gibbon himself declared: "The bishops made the kingdom of France." This admission received the equally celebrated commentary of Joseph de Maistre: "The bishops made France, as bees construct a hive."

As Cantù well observes, it is only by agriculture that men become really fixed in a country, "and become attached to it by sentiments which make sacred the name of fatherland," and Guizot never spoke more solidly than when he said that the Benedictines were *les défricheurs* of Europe. This influence of the Church was felt wherever there were barbarians to be tamed; but, above all others, and from the very day of their conversion, the Frank barbarians seem to have been the most amenable to the lessons of their spiritual mother, and to have been the most zealous and enthusiastic in their demonstrations of gratitude to God for their rescue from the darkness of paganism. Probably much of their amenability and much of the simplicity of their Catholic spirit was due to their speedy amalgamation with the Gallo-Romans; for centuries were to elapse (in the case of the Prussians more than seven) before all the other Teutons abandoned idolatry. But their own nature also seems to have been in their favor. We can discern a heart yearning to love God and to fight for His honor in the Clovis who cries out when he first hears of the Passion of Christ: "Oh! why was I not there with my Franks"? From the day when Clovis and his three thousand companions issued regenerated from the Baptistery of Rheims, giving an example which was to be soon followed by their entire nation, France seems to have been—if we may reverently so express our idea—the special pet of heaven. In its entirety, although not in all its particulars, her history warrants the supposition, and many a time and oft her foes have proclaimed the idea as truth. Probably there never lived a less enthusiastic man than that profound observer, the Austro-Spaniard, Charles V.; but he declared, after many years of experience of French propensity to recover from even merited misfortune: "No people ever did so much to bring about their own ruin as the French have done; but they always recover, for they are specially protected by God."

Gesta Dei per Francos! Certainly the French Catholic has reason for holy pride as he peruses the annals of his country, and discerns so many instances of God's use of the arms of France to effect His designs in the world, especially in the sole really important matter of the preservation of His church. And now that a culmination seems to have been nearly attained by the efforts of the enemies "of all that is called God," which have been exerted for a full century and more to effect the unchristianization of his country, the French Catholic may well meditate upon these *Gesta Dei*; for in them he will find a justification of his confidence that God has not deserted France, even in the matter of her temporal prosperity. Of course, while individuals attain the end of their creation only in the next world, nations must accomplish their

end here below, and therefore it may easily be that the end for which God established French nationality has already been reached. It may be that all Europe is soon to be made a *tabula rasa* by a Russian, Tartar or a still more Mongolian invasion from the distant east, and that once again the Catholic Church, the sole surviving institution of what was once the European *populus Christianus*, will pursue her God-given work of taming and converting a new set of barbarians, who will be the most prominent members of her flock during a coming decade of centuries. But the remembrance of what France has done, as an instrument of God, for Catholicism and civilization will endure in the world when the annals of many a now proud nation shall have become myths; for that remembrance will be guarded as a precious souvenir by that Church which will endure until the end of time. Perhaps it will be chiefly by a study of these *Gesta Dei per Francos*—both the original series, which were so named a thousand and more years ago, and the later ones, equally glorious—that the student of the thirtieth century of the Christian era will be able to learn something definite concerning that Arianism which is even now almost a myth to most people, although it was, in its day, more powerful than Protestantism has ever hoped to be. The student will learn how a mortal blow was given to Arianism by the victories of Clovis—against the Burgundians on the plains of Dijon and against the Visigoths on the plains of Vouillé. In the thirtieth century the investigator will learn how, when Arianism was in its death-throes, Mohammed appeared, and, as Lacordaire observes, “renewed the idea of Arius at the point of the scimeter”; how, after its subjugation of Spain, Islamism tried to subject France to the laws of the Koran, and the nation that was baptized at Rheims furnished Christendom with its champion in the person of Charles Martel, whose victory at Poitiers hurled the Mussulman hordes back into the Iberian peninsula, and deprived them of future possibility of subjugating the whole of Europe. Then our thirtieth century indagator into the past will continue his searches among the *Gesta* of that wonderful people of whose glories the traditions circulating in his day will be so redolent; and he will read how Frankish monarchs *restored* (not *gave*) to the head of God’s Church that temporal sovereignty which the Founder of the Church had designed as its guarantee of independence amid the poor fluctuations of the politics of human intelligence. The Baronio of the thirtieth century will read how, when the Roman people, in 754, had proclaimed the secular sovereignty of their Pope-King, Stephen II., and the Lombard still quasi-barbarian monarchs, Astolphus and Desiderius, had appropriated much of what was rightly styled the Patrimony of the Church, the Franco-Gallic—in fact,

the French—sovereigns, Pepin and Charlemagne, restored, by force of French valor, the temporal power of the Pope, declaring that they reserved to themselves and their successors “No power within the same limits, unless that we may gain prayers for the repose of our souls, and that by you and your people we be styled PATRICIANS OF THE ROMANS.”¹ And when the searcher for historical truth shall have read such annals of the nineteenth century as may have come down to him, he will wonder why so many of the Italians of that time were so basely ungrateful to that pontifical monarchy which France had assured to them, and which had procured for them an almost uninterrupted primacy in letters, science and art during eleven centuries. Pursuing his studies, the thirtieth century publicist will find in the *Gesta* how, in the eleventh century, the great heart of France recognized the voice of God issuing from the sepulchre of the Saviour, and calling on the children of Clovis, Martel and Charlemagne to deliver the Holy Places from infidel persecution; how in that and all the following Crusades these descendants of heroes, and heroes themselves, shed far more of their blood in the holy cause than all other peoples combined, and how French monarchs ever afterward regarded that blood, and the tears and sympathy of those who could not fight, as the most precious jewels in their diadems. Then our investigator will read how, in the fifteenth century, God raised up that sweet maid of Orleans, who was canonized in the beginning of the twentieth century; how her valor, her purity and her faith triumphed over the arrogant nation which was soon to become heretical, and by that triumph preserved the Land of the Lilies from the imminent pestilence. Then the student will perceive, a little further on in the *Gesta*, how gallantly the French prevented their own land from succumbing to the dire conflagration which had seared the regions watered by the Thames and the Elbe. “Luther came into the world,” says Lacordaire, “and at his call Germany and England separated themselves from the Church. Had France accepted their fearful invitation, what would have been the result for Christianity? Her national enthusiasm saved France. Confederated in a holy league, Frenchmen placed their faith above everything else—even above their allegiance to their monarch—and they refused to recognize as legitimate heir to the crown any prince who would not swear fidelity to the God of

¹ In the olden time the title of “Roman Patrician” was given by the Pope-Kings to very few and only for very great services to the Holy See. Clovis had received the honor, and Pepin was anxious to bear a title which then signified “Defender of the Church,” and would therefore increase his consequence in the eyes of all Christian nations. He received it from Pope Stephen on the day that the Pontiff crowned him as King of the Franks.

Clovis, of Charlemagne and of St. Louis. For the defence of the Church we Frenchmen have fought combats of blood and of mind. Arianism crushed, Islamism vanquished, the temporal dominion of the Popes consolidated, Protestantism repelled, behold the four crowns of France which will not fade for all eternity."¹ These four crowns represent, indeed, the chief episodes among the *Gesta Dei per Francos*; but they are not the sole instances of God's use of the arm of France for the good of His mystic spouse, or of His loving protection of France. Much could be said about God's work in saving France from the philosophists and *sans culottes* of the last century, and much about France's defence of the Holy See almost to the present day.

Are there to be any more chronicles of *Gesta Dei per Francos*? An affirmative reply will be given by those who perceive pre-eminent vitality in the Catholicism of the great majority of Frenchmen: by those who contend that the French Church of our day has an inestimable advantage over that of the eighteenth century, inasmuch as now the warfare between good and evil in France is open, a contest between affirmation and negation, and not a question between religion and religiosity—because, in fine, the day of half-measures has passed, and now a Frenchman must be either a Christian or an atheist. Such students of their epoch find that the religious movement encouraged by Lacordaire, Montalembert, and Dupanloup, has been much advanced, of late, among the enlightened classes; and while they are invincibly opposed to the sect which now administers the affairs of the Republic, they see no reason why Catholics, as such, should regard the Republic itself with suspicion. "The Church follows all the natural movements of reason and of history, with the intelligent tenderness of a mother for her child; she is ever ready to satisfy the legitimate desires of her child. To the man of ancient times, crushed under the despotism of the Roman Empire, the Church offered refuge in one of her solitudes, where he could renounce the corrupting goods of earth. In the Middle Age, when man had acknowledged her maternal authority, the Church showed him that he could live according to the law of God, even in the world. At the time of the Renaissance, the Church associated herself with the literary and artistic movement of civilization; and she furnished the world with inspirations and subjects which helped to immortalize so many men and works of the sixteenth century. To-day, democracy, the equality of all men in civil and social rights and duties, is a general aspiration of civilized people; and it does not entail upon the Church any necessity of changing her doctrines, since

¹ *Ubi supra.*

she was the first to inculcate, under the superior law of charity—the love of God and of men—the principle of equality among men.”¹ Certainly, if we reflect upon the immense amount of good which Catholic France is now performing for Christendom, we shall be confident that there will be many more *Gesta dei per Francos* described for the edification of future generations, ere her nationality becomes what everything human must eventually become—a thing of the inexorable past. During the last two years, as we learn from the thoroughly reliable “Annals of the Propagation of the Faith,” France contributed three-fourths of the amount raised for Peter’s Pence in the entire world; and of the missionaries now laboring for the conversion of heathendom, and many of them awaiting a martyr’s crown, three-fourths are Frenchmen. We hope therefore, that Mgr. Freppel, one of the noblest Frenchmen who ever donned the mitre, was justified in pronouncing these encouraging words: “Lift up thy head, noble land! Have confidence in thy divine vocation! Thou hast not yet fulfilled thy divine mission; for shouldst thou disappear, thou wouldst leave a void which Divine Omnipotence alone could fill. If some days of forgetfulness have called down punishment upon thee, many centuries of devotion to Christ and His Church demand pardon for thee. Thou wilt resume thy glorious destiny; remaining in the world the soldier of Providence, the armed apostle of faith and of Christian civilization. Just as in the past, deliverance will be sought from thee by the weak and the oppressed of the universe. Thou wilt repeat those grand days of thy history, when all that was most venerable on earth was protected by the sword of Clovis, of Charlemagne, of Godefroy de Bouillon, of St. Louis, of Joan of Arc.”²

REUBEN PARSONS, D.D.

¹ Pellissier, *La France Chrétienne au XIXme Siecle*, Paris, 1895.

² “Discourse for the Benefit of Wounded Soldiers,” February, 1889.

THE CREED OF SCIENCE—OR AGNOSTIC EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION.

THE evolution theory has been so thoroughly thrashed out and winnowed, in book and pamphlet and periodical, that what little grain of truth it may contain has been carefully separated from the straw and chaff. The subject is trite and hackneyed. Merely to see the name in the title of a magazine article may create in some minds that peculiar sense of loathing which is produced by stale and insipid food. It may do even worse; it may arouse a suspicion of unorthodox tendencies. For, it has been said with a touch of sarcasm: "Soon no one will be found to treat this theme except some eccentric Catholic, who is anxious to convince mankind that he can hold the most advanced and progressive views without being denounced to the Holy Office; that he can go to the very brink of heresy without tumbling over it. Like a thousand other exploded theories, evolution has had its day; it should be quietly consigned to the limbo of obsolete opinions."

All this may be true of evolution as a scientific theory. At all events, we have no mind to dispute the assertion. But evolution, as it has been generally taught by non-Catholic writers, is not simply a scientific theory; it is a creed, a religion. It is not simply an error in philosophy; it is a heresy in faith. And on this account only does it still deserve the attention of the Catholic journalist. A scientific theory, if it involves no religious question, is readily abandoned when it is proved to be untenable; but a heresy lives on, even after the fallacies upon which it rests have been exposed. The reason is because formal heresy is a disease of the will rather than of the intellect. It owes its strength not so much to the arguments which it advances as to the passions which it flatters.

Evolution has become the creed or religion of many, and hence it "dies so hard." It is, in reality, only one of two very ancient forms or phases of false religion—or, rather, irreligion—which have been disturbing the world in the past, and which will probably continue to disturb it in the future.

I.

"There is nothing new under the sun." At the very dawn of the Christian era there existed a school of philosophers, who styled

themselves *Gnostics* (from the Greek word *γνωσις*, knowledge), because they professed to be in direct communication with the world of mind, whereby they obtained a full and comprehensive knowledge of everything both in the sensible and the supersensible order, including the profoundest mysteries of the divine nature. They claimed to be the sole exponents of scientific knowledge, and are supposed by commentators on the Sacred Writings to have been before the mind of the Apostle when he warned his disciples against the "oppositions of *knowledge* falsely so called," or, as the James version translates the text, the oppositions of *science* falsely so called."

In our times there has arisen another school of philosophers, who commonly go by the name of *Agnostics* (from the Greek word *ἀγνοσις*, want of knowledge, or ignorance), because they contend that the human intellect can have no knowledge of anything save the passing phenomena of sense, and that if it ventures beyond the bounds of matter, it "plunges into that vast Serbonian bog where whole armies of metaphysicians have floundered and sunk." Singularly enough, despite the contradiction implied in their very name, they, too, boast of holding the key to all scientific knowledge, and seem to orthodox believers to fall under the censure of another Apostle, who bids us "put to silence the *ignorance* of foolish men," or, according to another rendering of the passage, "the *agnosticism* of ignorant men."

With slight modifications, due to accidental causes, these two schools have represented the extremes of philosophic speculation—and of religious error—in every age. Between these two extremes, as the author of an admirable work entitled "Theistic Argument," clearly shows, the pendulum of philosophic thought has been perpetually oscillating, always attracted by the inherent force of truth, and yet, owing to the law of mental reaction or to some external impulse, often carried far beyond its centre of gravity. The point at issue, the *crucial question*, is ever the same. It divided Plato from the Greek sensist in ancient times, and the nominalist from the exaggerated realist in the Middle Ages, as it divides the idealist from the materialist in our days.

According to the idealist, the thinking mind is the self-subsisting centre of energy and life. It evolves the universe from itself by thought; it gives rise to society, government, art, religion and all the teeming activities of life; like the silk-worm, it surrounds itself with a mysterious web, which it spins from its own substance. According to the materialist, on the other hand, matter contains in itself "the promise and potency of all life." It evolves itself, by purely mechanical forces, from the nebulous state and the "fire-cloud," into the multitudinous appearances of the phenome-

nal universe; it works itself out, by a continuous process of ceaseless, indestructible activities, into all the masterpieces of human genius—into the “Hamlet” of Shakespeare, the “Paradise Lost” of Milton, the “Principia” of Newton.

The idealist not merely fancies himself to be in immediate contact with the eternal and absolute, but, in the words of the transcendental philosopher, he creates the Eternal and Absolute Being. The materialist does away altogether with the Eternal and Absolute Being; or if he admits it in some sort, he denies that it comes within the legitimate sphere of positive science, and sets it down as unknowable.

Not many years ago Emerson proclaimed to the admiring crowds that “drank in his honeyed words,” that in the future “the ideal would be recognized as the only real.” To-day Spencer bids us “forsake the shadowy region of intuition” and “follow the pathway of clearly ascertained fact” and experience. The idealist survives only in the ominous apparitions which come, like sprites and spooks from the spirit-land, to disturb the slumbers of the denizens of this lower world. Emerson no longer divides the empire of thought with Spencer; but the time, no doubt, will come when Spencer’s star will pale before some rising luminary, and idealism will be once more in the ascendant. What the poet wrote concerning words is likewise true, with a slight change, of rival systems of philosophy:

“Many shall rise, that now forgotten lie;
Others, in past credit, soon shall die,
If custom will, whose arbitrary sway
Thoughts and the forms of *science* must obey.”

The age of the *gnostic*, or idealist, is gone; the age of the *agnostic*, or materialist, is come. Positivism, determinism, and evolutionism are mere varieties of the same species. The agnostic marshals into the service of his system the brilliant discoveries of modern physical science; he transfers physical researches from the laboratory of the naturalist to the cabinet of the philosopher; he converts evolutionism into metaphysics. And while doing so, he claims to be “in alliance with the most intellectual tendencies of modern society.”

Evolutionism supplies the data, agnosticism interprets them. Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, Büchner commonly have played the part of evolutionist experimenters, who furnish the physical basis of the new system of metaphysics; while Spencer, Harrison, Matthew Arnold have usually appeared in the rôle of agnostic philosophers, who explain the experiments made conformably to the requirements of their school. They all represent the same form of

thought—materialism in its newest guise. Hence, too, they are often called by the common name of *agnostic evolutionists*; and Mr. Spencer's religion is known as the *religion of evolution*.

The doctrine of evolution is the *genesis* or *pangensis*, as the authors themselves call it, of the bible of agnosticism. In the authentic version the first chapter reads thus:

"1. Matter is the origin of all that exists, without the intrusion of any creative agency; all natural and mental forces are inherent in it. Nature, the all-engendering and all-devouring, is its own beginning and end, birth and death. (Büchner, 'Kraft und Stoff,' pp. 32 and 88.)

"2. At first there existed only a cosmic gas; then a fiery cloud; next a molten spheroid, in which not alone the more ignoble forms of life . . . but the human mind itself . . . all our philosophy, all our poetry and all our art . . . all are supposed to have been latent and potential. (Tyndall, 'Scientific Use of the Imagination.')

"3. Thereupon followed a long cooling process. The vapors were condensed; the crust of the earth, its seas, lakes and rivers, and life itself were formed. The difference between a living and a non-living body is a difference of degree, not of kind. (Fiske, 'Cosmic Philosophy,' p. 422). All natural bodies with which we are acquainted are equally living. (Haeckel, 'Natürl. Schöpfungsgesch,' by Dr. Ernst, 6 edit.)

"4. Light shines upon the water, and it is salted. Light shines upon the salted seal and it lives. (Oken, 'Elem. Physiol.'). Thus was produced the sea-mucus (or protoplasm), which is the life-stuff or physical basis of the earliest and simplest organisms. (Sect. 905, Ray Society's Edit. Oken's Physiol.)

"5. All the forms of vegetable and animal life, including man, have been successively and gradually developed from the earliest and simplest organisms (Spencer, 'Social Statistics,' p. 79) and, in particular, man himself is, without doubt, a lineal descendant of the anthropoid apes." (Haeckel, l. c.).

This completes the system of evolution, as now taught by the agnostic school; and we are assured by its adherents, that "no farther advance is probable or required," that it is "the only possible, thinkable system of ontology," and that those who do not accept it, are only such as "have not kept pace with the recent advances in natural history or have lagged behind in science." Whether any of its subordinate doctrines may be admitted, at least in a mitigated form—whether, in brief, the *Theistic Evolution*, advocated by some Catholic writers, can be reconciled with faith and reason—is beside our present purpose. We deal with *Agnostic Evolution* as a system and in its totality. Now, this system, as the reader will have observed, comprises these three fundamental dogmas:

1. Matter is its own beginning and end;
2. The lower forms of life were developed from inanimate matter by its own inherent, mechanical forces;
3. The higher forms of life, including man himself, were developed from the lower forms by the same inherent, mechanical forces.

Thus proposed, *evolutionism* may be viewed both as as a *philo-*

sophical system, and as a *religious creed*. Its advocates propose it under this twofold aspect. "Like Kant, they construct not merely a theory of knowledge, but, in a certain way, of belief."¹ Viewed as a philosophical system, an eminent Christian naturalist characterizes it as "a puerile hypothesis." Viewed as a religious creed, he observes that it culminates logically in three negations—viz., of God, of the soul, and of virtue.² And the advocates of evolution corroborate the latter statement. Professor Clifford, for instance, holds that, if it is right to call any doctrine immoral, it is right so to call that doctrine which recognises "a destiny or a providence outside of us, overruling the efforts of man."³ Büchner tells us: "There exists a phrase repeated *ad nauseam*, of 'a mortal body and an immortal soul.' A closer examination causes us, with more truth, to reverse the sentence. . . . In a higher sense [the body] is immortal, since the smallest particle of which it is composed, cannot be destroyed. On the contrary, that which we call spirit, disappears with the dissolution of the individual material combination."⁴ And Mr. Taine assures us that virtue and vice are merely "products like sugar and vitriol."

As a *philosophical system*, evolution concerns us at present only because it supplies the basis of the *religious creed of science*. And here, no doubt, we shall be met with the objection: What is meant by calling a set of scientific doctrines a *creed*? Can there be any room for faith in a system, which professes to be thoroughly, purely scientific? Let us see.

The old theological concept of faith is expressed by St. Paul in these words: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." 1. In the first place, it is an "evidence," *i.e.*, a proof resting on the authority of another. 2. In the second place, it demands our assent to the truth "of things that appear not," *i.e.*, of such things as are not perview or evident to our reason. 3. In the third place, it supplies the "substance," *i.e.*, the basis, "of things hoped for," and therefore of our conduct and of the manner of realizing our hope. Now, it will not be a difficult matter to show that, in all these respects, the doctrine of evolution, as proclaimed by the modern apostles of science, sets up distinct claims to the name of a *creed*.

II.

In the first place, as far as resting on the authority of another is concerned, the *creed of science* makes demands on our faith more

¹ Sterling, *As Regards Protoplasm*, p. 77, foot.

² St. George Mivart, *Contemp. Rev.*, Sept., 1874.

³ *Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec., 1874, p. 730.

⁴ *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 13.

exacting than any revealed creed with which we are acquainted. Let us not be understood to condemn all faith that is born of reverence for a great name. So long as it is kept within bounds, it is perfectly conformable to reason. There is a disposition in human nature, to lean upon the authority of a fellow-man and, in the hope of avoiding a painful personal investigation, to accept his evidence as final. Hero-worship, Carlyle tells us, endures forever while man endures. The man who has distinguished himself in any department of knowledge, is like a messenger from the infinite unknown with tidings for us. "Direct from the inner fact of things, he lives and has to live in daily communion with it . . . ; his utterances are a sort of revelation . . . Boswell venerates his Johnson, right truly, even in the eighteenth century. The unbelieving French believe in their Voltaire and crowd around him, in a very curious hero-worship, in that last act of his life when they stifle him with roses. He is the realized ideal of every one of them, the very thing they are all wanting to be, of all Frenchmen the most French . . . The ladies pluck a hair or two from his fur to keep as a sacred relic . . . He is properly their god—such a god as they are fit for."

Talk of demagogues in politics! There are as many in philosophy. Talk of Henry George, drawing after him the unthinking crowd! Heraclites, the pseudo-philosopher, did the same in cultured Greece; Ingersoll, the blaspheming infidel, does the same in our enlightened country. Let some daring spirit, with a little originality, arise; and forthwith thousands of satellites will follow in his train, especially if his doctrines cater to their baser instincts. They will be pantheists with Emerson, and fancy their souls to be "the Almighty in part and in infancy." They will be spiritists with Home, and hold *séances* to evoke the souls of the departed from their resting places. They will be buddhists with Colonel Alcott, believe in transmigration, and long for "Nirvana," as the final rest of their souls. They will be agnostics with Spencer, and deny the existence of spirits and souls altogether. Some have actually passed through all these stages within a few years; and, strange to say, they boast of thinking for themselves. There is no new opinion, however phantastical or preposterous, that will not count its proselytes by the scores. Its very extravagance has an irresistible charm for the fickle mind. "*Levia leves capiunt animos.*" It is the "fad" of the hour; and that is sufficient to recommend it. The fact is incontrovertible; it is patent to the least observant. But the question is: Is it reasonable? Is it worthy of men who pride themselves on their independence of thought?

Belief is a great factor in human life. But, according to Christian ideas at least, belief must be reasonable. "*Rationabile*

obsequium vestrum." When a prophet of old delivered his message, he confirmed it by signs and wonders, and said, like the Prophet of prophets: "Though you will not believe me, believe the works." How do the hierophants of the new dispensation accredit their mission? How do they qualify? So long as they announce merely the results of their observation of physical phenomena, they too appeal with right to their "works"—works of untiring industry and laborious research, which have written their names in blazing characters upon the golden scroll of fame. Far be it from us to depreciate what they have done for physical science. They come to us laden with the trophies of many well-proved facts. They delve deep into the bowels of the earth; they count and measure the rocky strata which compose the crust of the globe; they bring to light the giant forms of the mastodon, the deinotherion, the ammonite, the nummulite, which left their footprints in the obscure epochs of the past; they sound the ocean's depths, and find its loamy bottom, as well as the beds of our lakes and rivers, swarming with living beings so minute that 500,000,000 may exist in one drop of water; and they discover, under the microscope, that these same animalculæ possess an organic structure as wonderful as that of the elephant which swallows them by the millions in the running brook. "They have made it clear, that, in the animal and vegetable worlds, there exists, link on link, a complete chain of beings, from the microscopic mosses and algæ to the gigantic palm-tree, from the almost imperceptible minuteness of organization in the infusoria to the exuberant muscular organism of the mammoth; just as faith reveals, in the order of intelligences, another chain of beings, extending from man through all the bright hierarchies of heaven, up to the highest seraph that burns before the throne of God."¹

All hail to the patient explorers of nature's secrets! Long may they wear the laurels which they have won! We admit with gratitude the facts brought to light by their investigations, we accept with pleasure the verified results of their speculations, because we value every contribution to knowledge. So far they are within their rights. When, however, they leave the legitimate field of science to preach a new religion, we ask: Where are your credentials? What are the grounds upon which you rest your *creed*? But we ask in vain. Instead of producing their credentials they overpower us with polysyllabic Greek words, which only serve as a cloak to hide much learned ignorance. They forget Aristotle's precept about "thinking as the wise and speaking as common people do;" and they deliberately set at naught

¹ Heylen, *Progress and Dangers of the Age*, p. 25.

his advice, "define your terms and disputes will cease." Indeed, Pollock, Professor Clifford's biographer, tells us: "It is hardly worth the while to dispute about names when more serious things remain for discussion." And Huxley and Spencer consider that "in itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter. Matter may be regarded as a form of thought and thought may be regarded as a form of matter."¹ Assertions like these, as Mr. William Samuel Lilly remarks, are in themselves a revelation, not indeed of light, but of darkness. They give us a glimpse of chaos and of the void inane. Surely names are signs of—nay, the substitutes for—ideas. . . . Unless we use them as parrots do, which, to be sure, is the habit of many people, they stand to us in place of things.²

Like a certain well-known diplomatist, the modern scientific school seems to think that words were *invented*, not to express one's meaning but to conceal it and to "make the worse cause appear the better." Instead of intellect, scientists "speak of nervous centres; instead of life, of the play of cellular activities; instead of mental energy, of cerebral erethism. And their readers, piquing themselves on their distrust of everything outside the sphere of what they call facts, will *wonder with a foolish face of praise*." In their terminology *simple knowledge* is confounded at one time with *comprehensive knowledge*, at another time with *consciousness*, now with the *imagination*, and again with *sensitive perception* or *feeling*. We can have no *idea* of God they tell us, or *know* that He exists, because we cannot *comprehend* the Infinite; we can have no *notion* of Him, because we cannot *imagine* Him. Who ever said that we could *comprehend* God, *i.e.*, grasp or take in the fulness of the divine perfections? Who ever said that we could *imagine* Him, *i.e.*, represent Him under a material image, except only in the sense that even the painter's brush may depict an intellectual ideal or the poet's pen may body forth the forms of thought? Well may Mr. Lilly exclaim with Viola in *Twelfth Night*: "Words are grown so false that I am loth to prove reason with them." As the cuttlefish, when pursued, hides itself in a black liquor discharged from its ink-bag, so these scientists, when close pressed with arguments, retreat into the obscurity of a new-coined word. "*Stat magni nominis umbra*." Their tactics recall the saying of a witty priest, himself a scientific man who has enriched the world with more than one valuable discovery, and author of a spiritual work which a Protestant authority pronounced "the best book after the

¹ Elam, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 70.

² *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1886, p. 577.

Bible." Accustomed to accurate language and gifted with the happy faculty of presenting even the abstrusest subjects in an intelligible form, he had nothing but contempt for the scientific pedantry which seeks to pass off mere words as knowledge. Thus, if physicians called some familiar ailment by a learned name, he would compassionate the patient, saying: "Poor man! he is in a bad way; he has a *Greek* disease. If the disease doesn't kill him, the name will." The same thing may be said of much of our so-called science; its nomenclature alone is sufficient to "kill" it in the estimation of all real scholars. In metaphysics, in psychology, in ethics, in pedagogics, in every department of knowledge, the modern school of writers make it their chief study to mystify their readers by misapplying the terminology long familiar to the learned or by introducing a new and meaningless jargon of their own. Like certain presumptuous builders of old, they say to one another: "Let us make our name famous; let us make a tower, the top of which may reach to heaven." And the result is a Babel of tongues, so "that they understand not one another's speech." In fact, we may be permitted to doubt whether they understand themselves.

Is all this confusion deliberate and for a purpose, or is it only an index of their own minds? The question is not, perhaps, easy to answer. Certainly, for a philosopher who takes the dictates of common sense as the foundation of all correct reasoning, it is quite impossible to understand their mental structure. They are such anomalies in the universe that, in charity, one is inclined to believe that they must belong to one of those extinct species of transitionary beings which they are trying to discover, and to say with the poet: "*quod petis, hic est.*" Their contradictions are so numerous and so glaring that the fully developed human being seems to be scarcely capable of them. Take Mr. Huxley as a specimen among many. He defines man as a "conscious automaton." Man, he argues, must be an automaton because that is the logical corollary of the evolution theory. "The thoughts," he says, "to which I am now giving utterance and your thoughts regarding them are but the expression of molecular changes;" which amounts to saying, in ordinary human language, that man is only "an artful piece of mechanism, the cunningest of nature's clocks." Then, in the same breath, that automaton suddenly becomes "conscious," and elsewhere it is "endowed with free will . . . in as much as, in many respects, we are able to do as we like."¹ This is simply juggling with words.

Evolutionist philosophers are evidently able to go through the most extraordinary evolutions, far more rapid than any that are said

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1874, p. 577.

to have taken place in nature. No acrobat or tight-rope walker could go through so many in the same time. The unsophisticated, uninitiated man who witnesses their feats of mental gymnastics is simply bewildered, and unless he goes to such exhibitions with very steady nerves and sound metaphysical principles his head soon begins to swim. He feels as if he could not trust his own senses; he comes to doubt his own identity; and, perhaps, he is not quite sure that "two and two make four," as they used to do when he learned his tables.

Once the spectator has been brought to this state, the adroit performer

"Assumes the nod, affects the god,
And seems to shake the spheres,"

He proclaims loudly that agnostic evolution is the "only possible, thinkable system of ontology"; with Darwin, he asserts that "it is *known* to afford the only possible solution of the mystery of the universe—a conclusion, the grounds of which will never be shaken"; with Tyndall, he insists that it is a doctrine not founded "on the basis of vague conjecture, but on *positive knowledge*"; or, maybe, with Büchner, he tells you very modestly (?) that *his* method of investigation has conducted him and his followers "to truth and enlightenment and delivered them from obstinate and pernicious prejudices," and that those who do not agree with him are "a howling pack, mental slaves and yelping curs."

III.

By this time the reader will have perceived that the apostles of the *creed of science* do not allow their authority to be questioned for a moment; and, perhaps, in the words written by Mr. Spencer about the father of the whole agnostic school, he will have said to himself: "No Pope ever claimed such infallibility." There can be no doubt that, so far as blind and unhesitating faith on the word of another is concerned, the *creed of science* is fully entitled to be called a creed. It is far more of a creed than of a science; it is daily becoming more unscientific.

What now of its tenets? Are they evident or pervious to human reason? Let the apostles of the creed speak for themselves. It is a fundamental dogma with them that "there are mysteries and locked doors everywhere," and that, "so far from explaining all things, each *explication* of science is encompassed by insoluble enigmas; so that, in all directions, we come upon an ever-enlarging sphere of impenetrable mystery."¹ We thank them for the

¹ *Religion*, Spencer and Harrison, Introduction.

admission, though we need not their researches to convince us that there are mysteries in nature. For they force themselves upon our notice. What is light? How clear to the eye, how impenetrable to the understanding! A natural mystery! What is heat? We know some of its effects, but its nature remains unexplored. Another mystery! What is electricity? We admire its marvellous workings, but about its essence the most distinguished member of the academy of science knows as little as the beginner. A mystery! But why instance the grave problems with which science has been so long grappling? Are there not mysteries all around us? mysteries in the grain which develops into the plant, into the blossom, into the ear, into the fruit? mysteries in the food which we change into our flesh and blood and bone by a transubstantiation as rapid as it is wonderful? mysteries in the tiniest insect which crawls upon the ground? mysteries in the wing of the gnat which buzzes in the evening air? mysteries in the atom of dust which floats in the sunbeam? Do you comprehend them? Do physicists or chemists comprehend them? Will they not have to exclaim, in the words of a distinguished naturalist, "All science is forced to take refuge in mystery and to terminate its speculations with an act of faith?" Yet, in all these cases, there is question of objects that fall under the senses. We know of their existence, though we cannot understand the nature of their operations.

Still more. Analytical geometry, dealing with the hyperbola and the asymptotes, proves to demonstration that two lines continually approach each other; and, at the same time, it proves that these lines will never meet within the realm of mathematics. Navigation proves theoretically that, if a vessel sailing north or south follows a certain spiral line, known as the loxodromic curve, it will continually advance towards the pole of the earth; and, on the other hand, it proves that, so long as the vessel does not leave that spiral line, it will never reach the pole. Even in the exact sciences such paradoxes abound, but they are always legitimate conclusions from admitted premises. Hence, though puzzled by the seeming contradiction which they imply, the intellect accepts them as true.

If now we leave the domain of purely natural science, if we cross the boundaries of time and space and enter into the presence of the infinite, we look for mysteries at every turn; for facts which, owing to our want of adequate perception, appear to us to be impossible; for truths which, though not against reason, are as far above it as heaven is above earth or the infinite above the finite. It is not the craving for light nor the higher aspirations of the soul that revolt against mysteries. It is the conceited mind,

which looks upon its own little self as the centre of all being and the fountain of all knowledge; or it is the narrow mind, which does not even suspect the existence of truths above the reach and ken of the human intellect. Nothing, therefore, can be more reasonable than the attitude of the Christian towards the revealed mysteries of religion. Remembering that "the searcher of majesty will be overwhelmed by glory," he does not pretend to gaze directly upon the sun of eternal wisdom, feeling only too happy to be allowed to view it "dimly as through a glass." Amid the darkness that encompasses mankind here below, he is content to be guided by the torch of faith "until the day dawn and the day-star shine in (his) heart." Provided he has a sufficient guarantee for the existence of a mystery, he bows down in humility of soul and says "*credo*—I believe."

But the mysteries of the *creed of science* are of a very different order from those of the Christian religion. To be convinced of this, we need but recall the cardinal doctrines of the *creed*, as formulated by its apostles:

1. Matter is its own beginning and end;
2. The lower forms of life were developed from matter by its own inherent, mechanical forces;
3. The higher forms of life, including man himself, were developed from the lower forms by the same inherent, mechanical forces.

Each of these doctrines, as their advocates admit, involves an impenetrable mystery; nevertheless, they furnish us with no grounds of belief, no *motives of credibility*, as theologians would say.

They cannot claim to propose these doctrines as facts which they or any one else have witnessed. They have not seen the beginning of matter, for, "according to their own theories," writes a Christian philosopher, "they were drifting about just then in atomic or molecular form, without thought or self-consciousness." Before dogmatizing, they would do well to reply to the challenge, so full of divine satire, addressed to "the innumerable company" of self-sufficient wisacres: "Who is it that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if thou hast understanding. Who laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who stretched the line upon it? Upon what are its bases grounded, or who laid the corner-stone thereof?"

They have not seen life develop by "a mechanical process" from protoplasm, or seen a living organism baked from "life-stuff," as they have seen bricks baked from clay in a kiln. They have not seen a lower form of life evolved into a higher, nor one species

transformed into another; they have not even "gathered grapes from thorns or figs from thistles." O yes! We beg pardon; we were forgetting. Dr. Büchner, the elegant gentleman who applies such choice epithets to those that have the impudence to differ from him, states on his own authority that the *holothure*, an animal popularly called the sea-cucumber, *engenders snails*! Whence he argues: "If such an extraordinary process is possible that a holothuria should produce a snail, what naturalist can deny that conditions may once have subsisted (sic) in which . . . an ape, nay, any other animal, may have given birth to a man"? However, remarks Mr. Elam, "as this snail event is less likely to occur, zoologically speaking, than that a hen should hatch from one of her eggs a puppy dog, we may infer the value of Dr. Büchner's revelations generally.¹ Common sense people would not hesitate to class them with the legendary literature of his countryman, the Baron Von Münchhausen. Least of all have scientists seen the anthropoid ape evolve into a human being, or found the "missing link," for which they have been hitherto looking with as little prospect of success as the alchemist formerly looked for the *elixir* or *philosopher's stone*.

Do they prove their assertions by arguments either of deduction or induction? Rather, has not Mr. Spencer conclusively proved, in his "First Principles," that the idea of the self-existence or self-creation of matter involves a patent contradiction? Why, then, dogmatize, since the very first postulate of the whole system is manifestly inadmissible? With it the superstructure must fall, as the "baseless fabric of a vision"; and we must admit, as Spencer does in his sane moments, a first principle, which is not matter, from which the universe "proceeds by way of creation."

They do not prove that life can be produced by mechanical forces, from non-life. Like Huxley, they "frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory experimental proof that life can be developed, save from demonstrable antecedent life." They do not prove that the higher forms of life can be evolved from the lower. In fact, they do not make a single point. And if, in a truly scientific spirit, we "ask for some confirmatory evidence, we are told almost plaintively, that 'the strength of the doctrine of evolution consists not in experimental demonstration.' If we further inquire, in what its strength *does* consist, we fail to get any definite answer, except some vague statement as to 'its general harmony with scientific thought.'"² Agnostic evolution deals with phenomena, not as they exist, but as they might, could, would, or should have existed under certain undefined, impossible conditions, required by the "general harmony of scientific thought."

¹ *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 132, foot-note.

² *Idem*, p. 33.

The evolutionist, finding that the researches of science do not furnish a solid proof of his theory, adds, like Huxley, "If it were given me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time I should *expect* to be a witness to the evolution of protoplasm from not-living matter." Like Spencer he sees, with the eye of the scientific imagination, a primitive "nebular haze," gradually concentrating into a molten mass, in which everything that now exists is latent and potential." "Such freaks hath strong imagination." Indeed, like Tyndall, under certain hypotheses, he does "*not doubt* (his) ability to produce the highest forms of organic matter."

Is there any need of further argument to show that the *creed of science* has absolutely no foundation to rest upon? To rank even as a scientific hypothesis, it must assign at least some plausible reasons based upon well-ascertained facts, hitherto not satisfactorily explained, of which it can give a rational explanation. The *creed of science* has no such reasons to assign. Furthermore, to prove such an hypothesis true, there is, according to Mr. Huxley himself, no other way but that of "observation upon existing forms of life." The *creed of science* has no such observation to produce. Mr. Elam is right, therefore, taking Huxley's proposition as his premise, in arguing thus: "The conclusions which necessarily flow from the study of organic evolution, may be summed up in one syllogism."

Without *verification* a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect;

But the theory of organic evolution is an unverified theoretic conception;

Therefore *organic evolution is a mere figment of the intellect*.¹ In other words, the *creed of science* is like the dreams of the fever patient—the "*ægri somnia vana*" of which the poet speaks—which are dispelled as soon as he awakes to self-consciousness.

But we have not yet sounded the *creed of science* to its depths. While professing to follow the only scientific method, its believers destroy the foundations of all true science. While claiming to be the apostles of reason, they absolutely stultify reason and discredit its primary conclusions. Matthew Arnold, for example, tells us that from the beauty of design and the harmonious working of a watch, we cannot infer that an intelligent being devised and made it; we only know, as a *fact of experience*, that men make watches, and *conclude* accordingly. *Conclude* what, pray? We do not conclude to the existence of a thing which we know as a fact of experience. At this rate, we cannot conclude anything. All sci-

¹ *Winds of Doctrine*, pp. 134 and 135.

ence becomes simply impossible; because we cannot abstract or generalize, cannot reason to any law or principle underlying anything. Reason is strangled, paralyzed; and we must end by being, not merely sceptics, but agnostics in the strictest sense of the word, that is, philosophical *know-nothings*. When men tell us that we can know nothing with certainty, except passing phenomena—that these phenomena may not have any underlying reality, that they are mere “phantasmagoria”—that matter itself is only the “phenomenal centre of energy,” or as Huxley holds, that matter may be spirit or spirit matter, cause effect or effect cause—that, for aught they know phenomenally, this may be that or that this, the first second or the second first—that they cannot believe that fire burns, that fire is extinguished by water, or life by the rope, for any *reason* or for any *necessity*, but simply for the habit of the thing; when men make these and similar statements in sober earnest, there can be no longer any question of reasoning with them, but only of restoring their reason in some institution for the cure of mental disease.

Prove to such men, as Lionel Beale did by microscopic observations, that their premises are fallacies, “without the slightest even apparent support”; it is all in vain. Each successive writer will make the same statements, with as much confidence as if they were founded in fact. He will add that “no really scientific mind now questions these *facts*”; and perhaps, like Spencer, he will deny that those who disagree with him, actually *think* or *believe*, even when they have a reflex consciousness of doing so. To any one who says, that he thinks the universe was created, or that he believes in a Creator, Mr. Spencer replies: “No! you do not think so; for such a doctrine is unthinkable. No! you do not believe; you only believe you believe.”¹ Show them, that they contradict all experience, which tells you that you are not a mere piece of mechanism, but capable of spontaneous free acts; and they will answer you that what you, the uninitiated and profane, take for conscious volition and the power of determining your own actions, is not an act of volition at all, but only the “symbol” of some pre-determination of molecular forces, that freedom is only a word to cover your ignorance. Assure them, that you can think, and that thought bears with it “the impress of nobility direct from God;” and they will answer, that your thought is only a secretion of your brain, and that it was “potential in the fires of the sun.” Tell them, that you can distinguish your own personality, and are conscious that there is *that* within you which is not Mr. Huxley or Mr. Spencer; and they will cut you short by saying, that what

¹ Elam, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 33.

you regard as your little *self*, is only a collection of phenomenal sensations. In short, they turn man's noblest faculties, destined to be channels of truth, into so many avenues of inevitable deception and falsehood, and make of man himself, not merely a mystery, but a compound of contradictions and absurdities. Original sin, as admitted by Christians, can account for many shortcomings; but it cannot account for this absolute degeneracy of nature.

IV.

Surely, every one must allow that, on the score of teaching doctrines not evident or perview to human reason, the *creed of science* has triumphantly established its right to the name of *creed*. It only remains to examine, how it satisfies the third and last condition of a religious creed; is it "the substance of things hoped for"? In other words, can it be the basis of a religion which furnishes grounds for rational expectation and motives of human conduct?

This question some years ago engaged the two most prominent leaders of the scientific school—Mr. Spencer and Mr. Frederick Harrison—in a warm and prolonged controversy, which was followed at the time with considerable interest by the English-speaking world, and which to all, except partisans of the cause, seemed to have ended fatally to both parties and to the views which they advocated. Each combatant—if we may be permitted to borrow Mr. Spencer's figurative language—after exchanging polite salutes and professing himself the other's humble servant, proceeded to the deadly encounter, and, amid flashes of wit coming from his polished blade, passed it through the ribs of his opponent's arguments, let out the vital principle, and reduced to an inanimate form whatever elements of religion agnosticism had been supposed to contain. Nothing is now left save the lifeless, but still unburied, corpses of the excommunicates. All, therefore, that we need in mercy do is to consign them to their unhallowed graves in the potter's field, "uncoffined, unhonored and unsung."

Both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison are agnostics, and pronounce the belief in a personal God as plainly unscientific. Both glory in having shattered all theological systems. But both insist upon the paramount necessity of religion and, consequently, of some object to reverence and worship. Both pursue the path of negation until they have done away with everything save *phenomenal nature* in its operation on mankind and the *Unknowable*. "Phenomenal nature and the Unknowable" behold here, writes Mr. Wilfrid Ward, their exhaustive division of all things. After destroying, as they suppose, all genuine religion, they have divided the clothes among themselves—that is, those ideas and cor-

responding emotions with which the objects of religious faith are invested by us, and which form their natural adornment, as well as the phrases which have been associated with religious feelings and belief. The saying of the psalmist, which was applied to other slayers of their God, may be applied to these also: "They have parted my garments among them, and on my vesture they have cast lots." Mr. Spencer dresses up the *Unknowable* with the ideas of infinity, eternity and energy. He talks to us of an eternal, infinite energy from which all things proceed, and asks us to worship it with the profoundest awe. Mr. Harrison dresses up *Humanity* with the sentiments of brotherly love, and proposes the worship of an ideal. "They have parted my garments among them." And having appropriated the clothes, both philosophers try to persuade themselves and the world that, after all, the clothes are the important part of religion and that, if they dress up something else in the same clothes, it will do just as well as the ancient faith. But the clothes won't fit.¹

Quite *à propos* of this subject we recall a caricature of King Louis XIV. of France. As memory vaguely pictures it to us now, it consisted of two comic prints adroitly combined into one. The first of these represented a broomstick arrayed in royal robes—high-heeled buskins, richly-embroidered satin vest, trailing mantle, and a queue of powdered hair surmounted by a crown of sparkling brilliants. Under it were the words, "Le Grand Monarque." The second represented a dwarfy human form—a head covered with a few straggling hairs, a shrivelled face, toothless gums and haggard features, whose outlines were, however, unmistakably those of the historic French monarch. Under it were the words, "Louis Quatorze." According to the conception of the artist the former is royalty minus the man in whom it is vested; the latter is the man minus his royalty—a decrepit specimen of humanity, seemingly as little qualified to wear the trappings of majesty as the broomstick which has donned them. The former is a fitting symbol of Mr. Spencer's religion; the latter of Mr. Harrison's. Both are simply what the robes make them; they lack the essentials of religion. The *creed of science*, whether it sets up the broomstick or the decrepit form of man, offers us no object worthy of worship or capable of founding rational expectation. It is not "the substance of things hoped for."

To make this evident to any thinking mind we need do little more than summarize the reasoning of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison; for each of them sees, as well as any one else, the weakness of his rival's position. We shall, therefore, endeavor to repro-

¹ Wilfrid Ward, *The Clothes of Religion*, passim.

duce briefly the substance of their arguments, and supplement them with others in full accord with their train of thought.

Who or what is that "Unknowable," asks Mr. Harrison, with trenchant logic, which Mr. Spencer holds up as an object of religious worship? Does not religion of necessity imply belief in a Power outside of us that controls our destinies and exercises an influence over our lives—a Power that founds our hope and challenges our admiration and our gratitude? Are these conditions verified in the "Great Unknowable"? Mr. Spencer talks piously (so piously!) of the *practical belief* that man is ever in the presence of some *energy* or *energies* of which he knows nothing and to which it would therefore be unwise to assign any limits, conditions or functions. Does he profess to believe in one uniform *energy*? If so, he professes to know something very important about his deity. He tells us that from this *energy* "all things proceed by way of creation." This sounds like a sudden reversion to the theological type of a conscious, personal God. Long ago we predicted to Mr. Spencer that he would find himself in strange company. Our prediction seems to be now verified. Mr. Spencer should go and worship with Christians. Or, does he wish to preserve the negative character of the "Unknowable"? In that case, what are those energies, those forces about which he discourses? Gravitation and vibration also imply forces; yet who ever dreamed of believing in gravitation or of worshiping vibration?

How mere a phrase must any religion be of which neither belief nor worship nor conduct can be spoken! Imagine a religion which can have no believers because *ex hypothesi* its adepts are forbidden to believe anything about it. Imagine a religion which excludes the idea of worship because its sole dogma is that there is a sort of something about which we know nothing, its first precept that it is a duty not to try to know anything about it. Lastly, imagine a religion that can have no relation to conduct; for obviously the "Unknowable" can give us no help to conduct and, *ex vi termini*, can have no bearing on conduct. What is religion for? Why do we want it? And what do we expect it to do for us? If it can give us no reason for hope, nothing for the mind to rest on, nothing to purify the heart, to exalt the sense of sympathy, to strengthen our resolves, to chasten us into resignation and to awaken a spirit of self-sacrifice—what is it good for? As to acknowledging our dependence upon the "Unknowable" or conforming our lives to it or trusting in it, the use of such words is absolutely meaningless. We can wonder at it as the child wonders at the "twinkling star," and that is all. Does Mr. Spencer commune with the "Unknowable" in the secret of his chamber? Does he find in it the ideal, the model to conform to or imitate?

One would like to see the new *Imitatio Ignoti* to replace the *Imitatio Christi*. It was said of old, "ignotum omne pro magnifico." The new version seems to be, "ignotum omne pro divino." The foundations of a creed can rest only on the known and the knowable. Better bury religion at once than let its ghost walk uneasy in our dreams. It cannot be found in this no-man's land and know-nothing creed. True religion must of necessity have something anthropomorphic, like the Christian, and present us with an object that shall respond to our human instincts, human feelings, human sympathies.

We have listened to Mr. Harrison. Let us also give his rival a hearing: Who or what, retorts Mr. Spencer, is that "Great Adorable Being, Humanity," which Mr. Harrison worships? Where is the incorporated form which we are to regard as the author of all the good that has come to our race, which founds our hope and challenges our admiration, our gratitude, our veneration and our awe? Faith, hope, love, gratitude, veneration and awe imply a conscious being—conscious of its ideas and its actions, its volitions and its feelings. Where is the seat of that consciousness? Is it diffused throughout mankind at large? That cannot be; for consciousness is an organized combination of mental states such as certainly do not exist throughout humanity. If that "Great Being" is unconscious, the emotions of faith, hope, veneration and gratitude are absolutely irrelevant. What and where, we ask again, is that "Great Adorable Being?" Is it the individual? Is it the aggregate of human beings, the community at large, the chosen few? What have any of them done for us individually with conscious love? Individuals have labored, the race has progressed, communities have organized themselves for the attainment of private ends with utter ignorance and unconsciousness, or at least with entire selfishness and disregard of social effects and the public welfare. We say nothing now of that ludicrous self-deification indulged in by the religion of "Humanity" and that wholesale canonization of saints upon its diptychs—nothing of the glaring inconsistency which places side by side in the same category Jewish patriarchs, Christian apostles and pagan philosophers, St. Bernard, Mahomet, Napoleon Bonaparte and other characters historically and ethically unsociable—nothing of those singular gatherings of the worshippers of "Humanity," wittily described by some one as consisting of three persons and no God—nothing of that strange ritual which incorporates Christian hymns into its meaningless service and ends with a prayer such as Dr. Congreve is said to have offered at one of his meetings: "Let us pray! We praise thee, Humanity, as for all thy servants, so especially for Auguste Comte (the founder of our faith); and we pray that in proof

of our gratitude we may become thy more willing and complete servants. . . . Thou queen of our devotion, the lady of our loving servitude, the one centre of all our being, the one bond of all ages, the one shelter of all the families of mankind, the one foundation of a truly catholic church. To thee be all honor and glory. Amen!"

If such a service looks like a comedy, and a travesty of religion, it is because it combines the maximum of imagination with the minimum of religious truth. What excites our sense of the ridiculous is not the want of inborn reverence in human nature, but the evident incongruity of the worship and the absence of any fitting object on which to lavish our affections. Yet surely veneration and gratitude are due somewhere, and if they are due at all, it must be to that ultimate cause from which humanity, individually and as a whole, in common with all other things, owe their origin, to that infinite energy from which all have proceeded by way of creation.

Such is the drift of Mr. Spencer's arguments. And here we may safely rest the issue of the whole cause. The two champions of the *creed of science* tell us that they have spoken the last words on agnosticism, and beyond all doubt, if there is any value in sound logic, they have triumphantly refuted each other and dealt the death-blow to the whole system. Of the two, Mr. Spencer, who is the recognized leader of the school, is unquestionably the abler reasoner; and he, so his antagonist tells us, is compelled, in virtue of his own premises, to join hands with Christians. If he does not hide himself again amidst the clouds and fogs of primeval nebulae, he must worship with us at the altar of a personal God—hitherto an unknown God to him, as He was to the learned judges of the Athenian areopagus until the great Apostle of Christianity came to announce Him to them. What is wanting to Mr. Spencer is not native intellect to discern the truth when it is fairly presented to him, but a little of that humility which converted Dionysius from a pagan philosopher into a believer of the Christian revelation. It is so hard for a "doctor in Israel" to become a simple disciple of the Crucified. The "whirlwinds of applause" said to greet Mr. Spencer when he addresses a crowd of adoring listeners, carry with them a blinding dust, much more likely to obscure his vision than any philosophical difficulty.

The issue between so-called science and religion is not substantially different from what it was when "Socrates, in Xenophon's hearing, confuted the little atheist Aristodemus." The groundwork of reasoning, the laws of the mind, have not changed. They cannot change as purely physical science changes. We may make new inventions and discover new secrets of nature; but all the dis-

coveries of physics, if they are to present anything more than a hap-hazard collection or museum of natural curiosities, must in the end be tested and systematized according to the laws of metaphysics. And, just in this respect, we find that our scientists and self-styled philosophers are lamentably at fault. What we censure in them is not too much science and philosophy, but a lack of all genuine science and philosophy, and of an accurate analysis of truth. Mr. Spencer furnishes us with many startling proofs of this lack of accurate analysis. Forced by his own reasoning to recognize an ultimate cause, distinct from the material universe, he suddenly takes fright at his conclusion, and, as usual, seeks shelter behind a polysyllabic Greek word. Though recognizing an ultimate cause, he refuses to accept the Christian idea of God, because that idea is "anthropomorphic." In other words, Christians—and, indeed, all but agnostics—conceive of God in the likeness of a *human person*; they speak of Him as seeing, hearing, loving; they give Him the attributes of knowledge, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc., and all these things connote a *human personality*.

Has Mr. Spencer ever heard of the figure of speech called *metaphor*? If he did not persistently confound reason with imagination—though he knows the difference full well—he would remember that the sensible image—the phantasm—may recall an idea and represent, in its own way, an intellectual truth. The smallest Christian child which has learned its catechism would tell him that God has no eyes, no ears, because He is a pure spirit; but that we use such expressions in speaking of Him in order to convey some notion, however inadequate, of that infinite Being who transcends all human language, as He transcends all human comprehension. Has he ever heard of *analogous* terms? The merest tyro in logic would tell him that knowledge, wisdom, goodness, justice, personality, etc., are not predicated of the infinite and eternal in precisely the same sense as of the finite and temporal; that in man's noblest faculties there is only a dim shadowing forth of that "Power of which," as Mr. Spencer says truly, "man and the world are products, and which is manifested through man and the world from instant to instant."¹

According to the clear and positive teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, the First Cause is *above* and *beyond* all genus and species, and between Him and finite beings there can be question only of *comparison* and *analogy*. Plato writes, in the same sense, that "the First Good is not being, but *above* and *beyond* being in dignity and power."² Mr. Spencer certainly requires no more, when he bids

¹ *Religion*, Spencer and Harrison, p. 68.

² *Republic*, 509, B.

us "submit ourselves, with all humility, to the established limits of our intelligence," in the conviction that the choice is not "between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality (*i.e.*, human personality) and something higher." Quite unwittingly, no doubt, he gives expression here to very sound Christian doctrine. It is only on the supposition that there is in God something higher than *human personality* that the Christian philosopher or theologian can reconcile the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation with the dictates of reason, that he can adore three divine Persons in the unity of the divine Essence and recognize his God in the Son of Man. How marvellously the deductions of right reason agree with Christian dogmas!

Science is dishonored when it rises in revolt against the teachings of well-proved revelation, and allows itself to be made "the stalking-horse of the miserable ghoul of atheism." Out upon such miscalled science! It is only another name for nescience and denial of truth. Its wild theorizing, its endless shifting and shirking and changing are leading the minds of men further and further from the truth. For truth does not change; like God, its spring and source, truth "remaineth forever;" truth "is ever ancient, ever new, the same yesterday, to-day and forever." "For those who believe," writes Mr. Gladstone, "that the old foundations are unshaken still, and that the fabric built upon them will look down for ages on the floating wreck of many a modern and boastful theory, it is difficult to see anything but infatuation in the destructive temperament which leads to the notion that to substitute a blind mechanism for the hand of God in the affairs of life, is to enlarge the scope of remedial agency; that to dismiss the highest of all inspirations is to elevate the strain of human thought and life; and that each of us is to rejoice that our several units are to be disintegrated at death into 'countless millions of organisms'; for such, it seems, is the latest 'revelation' delivered from the fragile tripod of the modern Delphi. Assuredly, on the minds of those who believe, or else on the minds of those who, after this fashion, disbelieve, there lies a deep judicial darkness—a darkness that may be felt. While disbelief, in the eyes of faith, is a sore calamity, this kind of disbelief, which renounces and repudiates with more than satisfaction what is brightest and best in the inheritance of man, is astounding and might be deemed incredible. Nay, some will say, rather than accept the flimsy and hollow consolations which it makes bold to offer, might we not go back to solar adoration, or with Goethe, to the hollows of Olympus?"¹

Out upon a *creed* which can furnish us no more reliable author-

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, November, 1885, p. 706.

ity than the *ipse dixit* of arrogant theorizers, which sets at defiance the first principles of reason, which destroys the very foundations of hope, and makes us doubt whether life is worth living. We want none of it. We want a creed based upon an authority that reason can commend—a creed which, though it may demand of us belief in many truths *above* our comprehension, yet contains nothing *against* sound reason—a creed which teaches us to look forward with hope to the day when the problem of life shall be fully solved—a creed, in fine, which cheers us with the thought that, when we shall have shaken off this mortal coil, the spiritual part of our being—the *divina particula auræ*, the breath of God—shall survive; that, like the phoenix, we shall rise again from our ashes, and that, amid the last wreck of matter, we shall light the torch of hope “at the funeral pyre of the universe.” R. J. M.

BALFOUR'S PHILOSOPHY.

PART III.

(SOME CAUSES OF BELIEF.)

IN our examination of the second part of Mr. Balfour's work—the part entitled *Some Reasons for Belief*—we concluded that although he was successful in showing that *Sensism* is both incoherent and baseless, he comprehended under the one term, “Rationalism,” two very different things. He placed under it both (1) what he terms “Naturalism in embryo,” or what is termed by us “Sensism” (which ignores the fundamental intuitions of the intellect), and also (2) rational philosophy (which builds upon the fundamental intuition of the intellect).

This confusion must infallibly lead to scepticism unless some help can be obtained to succor man's rational faculty when reduced to such sore straits as Mr. Balfour has felt himself compelled (owing to this confusion of thought) to reduce it.

In shortly restating the pith of the first two parts of his book, he says:¹

“In the first part of these notes I endeavored to show that Naturalism was practically insufficient.”

We have already called attention² to the admirable and convincing way in which he has done this by means of a process of *reductio ad absurdum*.

But the insufficiency of *Naturalism* or *Sensism* might have been directly demonstrated in a very summary manner.

For “Naturalism” and “Sensism” are essentially mere imaginary enlargements and prolongations of *physical science*, and on that account can be plainly seen to be *necessarily* insufficient for our intellectual needs. Thinking men require to have some satisfying notions about morals, art, philosophy and religion, but *physical science* is, of course, unable to supply information about any such matters which are altogether beyond its sphere. It is, of course, perfectly true that physicists, *as such*, cannot justly be blamed for ignoring ethics, æsthetics, philosophy and religion, since such matters are in no way their business.

Physicists, *as such*, are right in trying to explain everything by

¹ P. 185.

² See *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January, 1896.

physical conceptions,¹ and the most the physicist (*qua* physicist) can say of any marvel whatever, is that he "cannot explain it."

He could never, as a physicist, be justified in affirming a miracle, for to do that he must step beyond physics into the regions of philosophy and theology.

Similarly he cannot deal with matters philosophical, and if a physicist (*qua* physicist) tries so to do, he must fall into what Mr. Balfour justly ridicules as "Naturalism" and we as "Sensism."

In so doing, the physicist is simply attempting the absurd and the impossible, and would end by depriving even his own physical science of any logical foundation if his views could prevail.

But if he continues to seek an ultimate foundation for his own science in a logical and unbiassed manner, he will thereby be led, or driven, into philosophy and to that which is the ultimate basis of philosophy and physics alike, namely, self-evident facts, self-evident first principles and a perception of the nature and force of logical inference.

But no rational man can be purely a physicist or purely a biologist; for some system of philosophy must be held (however unconsciously) by every person not mentally deficient, and every one has some perception of right and wrong and of causation. On this account we cannot hold physicists as free from blame for not apprehending truths with which, *as* physicists, they have nothing to do. For every man is bound to live *as* something more than *as* a physicist or *as* a biologist, namely, as a reasonable man in all the relations of social life. Mr. Balfour, not recognizing the profoundly rational, not "rationalistic," basis of natural theology, goes on to observe:²

"But if Naturalism by itself be practically insufficient . . . and if as I think . . . Idealism has not got us out of the difficulty, what remedy remains? One such remedy consists in simply setting up, side by side with the creed of natural science, another and supplementary set of beliefs which may minister to needs and aspirations which science cannot meet, and may speak amid silences which science is powerless to break. The natural world and the spiritual world, the world which is immediately subject to causation and the world which is immediately subject to God, are, in this view, each of them real, and each of them the objects of real knowledge. But the laws of the natural world are revealed to us by the discoveries of science, while the laws of the spiritual world are revealed to us through the authority of spiritual intuitions, inspired witnesses or divinely guided institutions. And the two regions of knowledge lie side by side, contiguous but not connected, like empires of different race and language, which own no common jurisdiction nor hold any intercourse with each other except along a disputed and wavering frontier where no superior power exists to settle their quarrels or determine their respective limits."

¹ Obviously the biologist, as such, is bound to consider the phenomena and laws of organic life, and will naturally try to explain all the phenomena of living beings of all kinds thereby.

² P, 186.

Well may Mr. Balfour term¹ such a system "a patchwork scheme of belief," and we cannot but marvel greatly that anyone of ability who has tried in many respects so admirably to lay serviceable foundations of belief, should declare that he "can hold out small hope of bettering it." Admitting his claim for it, that it is "more satisfactory as regards its content than Naturalism," it is indeed a sorry mode of quieting a mind troubled by religious doubts and difficulties. It is curious also that this system, thus brought forward as important, has never been advocated by any important writer, so far as we know.

Now what is really required, and what Mr. Balfour affirms (with us) is demanded "*rightly*," is a philosophy (or scheme of knowledge) which shall give "rational unity to an adequate creed." But such a philosophy Mr. Balfour pathetically declares² he neither has nor hopes soon to obtain.

Seeing clearly that there is no hope of obtaining any secure basis for morals and religion out of "Naturalism," or from "rationalism," in the first sense³ in which he uses the word, and seemingly unconscious of the support to be derived from "rationalism" in the second sense also comprehended by him under that term (*i.e.*, reason reposing on first principles), he proposes⁴ to "turn for assistance towards a new quarter," and attack "the problem by the aid of some more comprehensive, or at least more manageable, principle."

For this purpose he suggests that we should, for the moment, divest ourselves of all philosophic preconceptions, and consider beliefs with respect to their origin only—the causes which have actually given birth to them.

"Thus considered," he says, "they are, of course, mere products of natural conditions; psychological growths comparable to the flora and fauna of continents or oceans; objects of which we may say that they are useful or harmful, plentiful or rare, but not, except parenthetically and with a certain irrelevance, that they are true or untrue."

He then imagines an impartial spirit from another planet studying to discover the place different beliefs occupy in the natural history of the earth and its inhabitants, and arriving at the conclusion that even the simplest⁵ of them—those of sense-perception

¹ P. 187.

² P. 188.

³ See pp. 168, 170 and 185.

⁴ P. 188.

⁵ He tells us the observer would note "that the vast majority of these beliefs were the short-lived offspring of sense-perception"; "the sun is shining," "there is somebody in the room," "I feel tired," would be examples of this class. Here we have a glaring example of a misuse of the word "belief." Of what can a man be more certain than that he feels tired, and what testimony does a man with eyes require that the sun shines?

—are due to the action of external objects upon the believing organism, and more particularly on the nervous system, though multitudes of nervous changes do not result in the generation of any beliefs.

Neural changes would also be perceived by such an observant spirit to have a psychical side relating to beliefs, not concerning things present and perceived, but concerning things antecedent (memories) or future (anticipations).

"These two classes of beliefs," he continues,¹ "relating respectively to the present and the absent, cover the whole ground of what is commonly called experience, and something more. They include, therefore, at least in rudimentary form, all particulars which, on any theory, are required for scientific induction; and, according to empiricism in its older forms, they supply not this only, but also the whole of the raw material, without any exception, out of which reason must subsequently fashion whatever stock of additional beliefs it is needful for mankind to entertain."

He then goes on to point out that his impartial imaginary observer, intent on discovering how convictions are actually produced, finds that these simple beliefs require to be supplemented by something more than reason² in order to provide the apparatus of beliefs now current in the scientific, social, and spiritual life of mankind.

"These conditions," he tells us,³ "though necessary, are clearly not enough; the appropriate environment has also to be provided, and . . . it contains one group of causes so important in their collective operation, and yet in popular discourse so often misrepresented, that a detailed notice of it seems desirable."

In his second chapter, entitled *Authority and Reason*, he proceeds to develop, and points out of what this group of causes, which have so important a collective effect, consists. The name he applies to denote the group is "Authority."⁴

He goes on to remark,⁵ "that the theory of authority has been for three centuries the main battlefield whereon have met the opposing forces of new thoughts and old. But if so, it is only because at this point, at least, victory is commonly supposed long ago to have declared itself decisively in favor of the new. The very statement that

¹ P. 192.

² Mr. Balfour's words are: "Our Imaginary Observer . . . would soon find out that there were other influences besides *reasoning* required to supplement, etc." Evidently, however, he does not here refer to "ratiocination" only, but to rational mental activity of all kinds, *i.e.*, to reason. We shall find other instances in which he uses this borrowed term in an unduly wide sense—confounds "reason" with "reasoning."

³ P. 193.

⁴ At p. 219 Mr. Balfour defines what he means by authority as follows: "Authority, as I have been using the term, is in all cases contrasted with reason, and stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning."

⁵ P. 195.

the rival and opponent of authority is reason, seems to most persons equivalent to a declaration that the latter must be in the right, and the former in the wrong; while popular discussion and speculation have driven deep the general impression that authority serves no other purpose in the economy of nature than to supply a refuge for all that is most bigoted and absurd.

"The current theory by which these views are supported appears to be something of this kind: Every one has a 'right' to adopt any opinion he pleases. It is his 'duty' before exercising this 'right,' critically to sift the reasons by which such opinions may be supported, and so to adjust the degree of his convictions that they shall accurately correspond with the evidences adduced in their favor. Authority, therefore, has no place among the legitimate causes of belief. If it appears among them, it is as an intruder, to be jealously hooted down and mercilessly expelled. Reason, and reason only, can be safely permitted to mould the convictions of mankind. By its inward counsels alone should beings who boast that they are rational submit to be controlled. Sentiments like these are among the commonplaces of political and social philosophy.¹ Yet, looked at scientifically, they seem to me to be not merely erroneous, but absurd."

In this account Mr. Balfour is manifestly correct. He continues² as follows:

"Suppose for a moment a community of which each member should deliberately set himself to the task of throwing off so far as possible all prejudices due to education; where each should consider it his duty critically to examine the grounds whereon rest every positive enactment and every moral precept which he has been accustomed to obey; to dissect all the great loyalties which make social life possible, and all the minor conventions which help to make it easy; and to weigh out with scrupulous precision the exact degree of assent which in each particular case the results of the process might seem to justify. To say that such a community, if it acted upon the opinions thus arrived at, would stand but a poor chance in the struggle for existence is to say far too little. It would never even begin to be; and if by a miracle it was created, it would without doubt immediately resolve itself into its constituent elements."

Then he eloquently and forcibly depicts the disastrous and absurd consequences which would ensue were every one so to act³ in matters of every-day life.

"Consider by way of illustration the case of morality. If the right and the duty of private judgment be universal, it must be both the privilege and the business of every man to subject the maxims of current morality to a critical examination; and unless the examination is to be a farce every man should bring to it a mind as little warped as possible by habit and education or the unconscious bias of foregone conclusions. Picture, then, the condition of a society in which the successive generations would thus in turn devote their energies to an impartial criticism of the 'traditional'

¹ No one has been more persistent and forcible in stigmatizing what he called "the sin of faith," and in affirming the sacred duty of doubt, and our moral obligation to make an equation between credence and evidence, than the late Prof. Huxley. It is true he carefully abstained from applying this rule to morals, and only made use of it as a weapon against religion. Yet what could be more absurd than to declare that our reason is qualified to judge as to our duties to Almighty God whose being is not only unimaginable but inconceivable, but must yield a blind obedience to authority with respect to our duties to our fellow-men whose nature we are, nevertheless, well able to estimate by our knowledge of our own!

² P. 196.

³ *I.e.*, on Professor Huxley's canon as to credence.

view. What qualifications, natural or acquired, for such a task we are to attribute to this emancipated community I know not. But let us put them at the highest. Let us suppose that every man and woman, or rather every boy and girl (for ought reason to be ousted from her rights in persons under twenty-one years of age?), is endowed with the aptitude and training required to deal with problems like these. Arm them with the most recent methods of criticism and set them down to the task of estimating with open minds the claims which charity, temperance and poverty, murder, theft and adultery respectively have upon the approval or disapproval of mankind. What the result of such an experiment would be, what wild chaos of opinions . . . I know not. But it might well happen that even before our youthful critics got so far as a rearrangement of the Ten Commandments they might find themselves entangled in the preliminary question whether judgments conveying moral approbation and disapprobation were of a kind which reasonable beings should be asked at all; whether 'right' and 'wrong' were words representing anything more permanent and important than certain likes and dislikes which happen to be rather widely disseminated and more or less arbitrarily associated with social and legal functions."

The truth of this contention is manifest and unquestionable. Nevertheless, even here, Mr. Balfour's neglect of the unnoticed action of human reason is very noteworthy. His distrust of and apparent dislike to "reason" are extraordinary, and this in spite of his employment of his own exceptionally gifted individual reason in the task of discrediting reason as it exists in the race. And he does this, *mirabile dictu*, in the interest of religion! Yet what is more certain than the fact that if reason is not absolutely to be trusted as to its declarations concerning evident ultimate truths and first principles, all religion becomes thereby deprived of its *prolegomena*, the only foundation upon which it can possibly repose?

Mr. Balfour represents¹ his supposed "students" (of the above-cited passage) as tempted to reject ethical laws because "while there is no great difference as to what things are right or wrong, there is no semblance of agreement as to why they are right or why they are wrong." Thus he says, though all concur in holding murder to be wrong, one philosopher says it is so because inconsistent with human happiness; another because it is against conscience; a third because it is against God's law; and a fourth because it leads to the gallows.

"Now, whence," he asks,² "this curious mixture of agreement and disagreement? How account for the strange variety exhibited in the premises of these various systems and the not less strange uniformity exhibited in their conclusions?"

Surely the answer is most simple. The four selected philosophers agree as to the fact of murder being wrong and they only differ because each gives but a single fragment of the total reason *why* it is wrong. Murder is wrong because (1) it is anti-social, (2) is against conscience, (3) contravenes God's laws, and (4) leads to

¹ P. 198.

² P. 199.

the cutting short of a life which ought to have been prolonged to find happiness in doing good. All the reasons assigned are valid, and it would be easy to add others such as : (5) the putting an end to a life renders impossible the further performance of social duty by the murdered man ; (6) it causes distress to any one who loved him ; (7) it stops all acts of divine worship on the part of the victim, etc.

The position taken up as respects reason and authority by Mr. Balfour will become more and more clear to the reader as he peruses this second chapter.

He tells us that always and everywhere his imaginary observer would note the immense, inevitable and mainly beneficent part which authority pays in the production of belief.

The familiar sayings that "every man is the product of the society in which he lives," and that "it is vain to expect a man to rise much above the level of his age," are manifestations of that view to a certain extent, though they do not express Mr. Balfour's precise position.¹ This is because they rather pertain to the theory which regards reason as a sort of Ormuzd and authority as a sort of Ahriman in constant opposition to progress, which it identifies with all that is good. This confusion he declares to arise "out of the tacit assumption that reason means *right* reason."

But "reason" is and necessarily must be "right reason." To say that reason may not be right is like saying "a blue vase may be colorless;" it is simply a contradiction in terms. Reason which is not "right" is not reason at all, but unreason. Probably here, as in other places, Mr. Balfour means by reason "*reasoning*." There are, of course, plenty of erroneous attempts at ratiocination, and many men are very unreasonable. But for the frequent mistakes made in reasoning it would be superfluous to warn mankind against fallacies.

But Mr. Balfour observes we might identify reason with right reason "and yet deny that all right belief was the fruit of reason." In a sense we might, indeed, say this of the truths of revelation (*e.g.*, the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and Transubstantiation), for they are necessarily inaccessible to reason. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Revelation itself reposes on its prolegomena, we might affirm that, thus considered, they are "the fruit of reason," as the produce of a pear tree grafted on a thorn may be said, in a sense, to be the fruit of the thorn, through which alone the grafted plant can nourish itself, blossom and bear fruit.

¹ He says (p. 202) : "Our ancestors . . . were not to be pitied because they reasoned little and believed much ; nor should we necessarily have any particular cause for self-congratulation if it were true that we reasoned more and, it may be, believed less."

After what Mr. Balfour mistakenly regards as a first source of error (the assumption that reason means right reason) he represents a tendency to magnify the importance and influence of self-conscious reason as a second source of error. We know we have set the rational machine in motion and are responsible to ourselves for its proper working, and this, he thinks, leads us naturally to concentrate our attention on it and unduly magnify its importance in the general scheme of things.

As an illustration he refers¹ to a primitive form of steam-engine which required a boy to work the valve of the cylinder by pulling a string, adding:

"I have little doubt that until the advent of that revolutionary youth who so tied the string to one of the moving parts of the engine that his personal supervision was no longer necessary, the boy in office greatly magnified his functions and regarded himself with pardonable pride as the most important, because the only rational, link in the chain of causes and effects. . . . So do we stand as reasoning beings in the presence of the complex processes, physiological and physical, out of which are manufactured the convictions necessary to the conduct of life. To the results obtained by their co-operation reason makes its slender contribution; but in order that it may do so effectively it is beneficently decreed that, pending the evolution of some better device, reason should appear to the reasoner the most admirable and important contrivance in the whole mechanism."

The lad, however, was perfectly right. He *was* the only rational link in the machine; but he would have been wrong indeed if he had esteemed himself above the men of science, the engineers and the artisans by whose intelligence the machine had been first conceived in principle, then accurately imagined and designed in detail, and finally formed and put together with skilled labor. Still more absurdly wrong would he have been if he had thought the power and strength he exercised in pulling the string was comparable with the energy of the physical forces or the strength of the masses of metal in aiding the play of which he performed his subordinate, yet then necessary, part. But the greatest mistake of all would have been if he had ranked his ill-instructed and undeveloped intelligence as anything less than all physical forces and any masses of matter whatever and wherever in one whole.

Of course the mechanism of the universe, including that of all living creatures and above all of man, has been so ordered by an all-wise Creator, that human beings have been unconsciously compelled by degrees to assert and arrange themselves in more and more developed and stable aggregations, without prejudice to their conscious reason and to the free-will necessary for their moral responsibility which exists amidst an overwhelming preponderance of acts due to habit, to the action of the environment and to other determining agencies.

¹ P. 203.

Mr. Balfour illustrates his position by appealing to physiology, and with much truth observes:¹

"Of all the complex causes which co-operate for the healthy nourishment of the body, no doubt the conscious choice of the most wholesome rather than the less wholesome forms of ordinary food is far from being the most unimportant. Yet, as it is within our immediate competence, we attend to it, moralize about it, and generally make much of it. But no man can, by taking thought directly, regulate his digestive secretions. We never, therefore, think of them at all until they go wrong, and then, unfortunately, to very little purpose. So it is with the body politic. A certain proportion (probably a small one) of the changes and adaptations required by altered surroundings can only be effected through the solvent action of criticism and discussion . . . matters we seem able to regulate by conscious effort. . . . We therefore unduly magnify the part they play. . . . We perceive that they supply business to the practical politician, lost material to the political theorist; and we forget amid the buzzing of debate the multitude of incomparably more important processes, by whose undeveloped co-operation alone the life and growth of the state is rendered possible."

The comparison, however, is not a good one. He justly considers that reason does intervene in political activity and in the rise or fall of states, but with regard to the processes of organic life (the vegetative functions of the organism) not only is reason unable to aid their action, but, as the late Sir Henry Holland interestingly pointed out, may do us serious mischief by frequently directing attention on the automatic actions of the bodily frame.

In the third section of his second chapter, Mr. Balfour directs our attention to what he regards as yet another (a third) source of delusion,² namely, the taking of non-rational, emotional tendencies (called by him "psychological climates") to be really products of reason.

Beliefs he regards as largely produced (as of course they are) by education, the pressure of domestic, social, scientific and ecclesiastical surroundings, but he tells us³ that:

"The power of authority is never more subtle and effective than when it produces a psychological 'atmosphere' or 'climate' favorable to the life of certain modes of belief; unfavorable, and even fatal, to the life of others."

They may vary enormously as to extent, duration, intensity and quality, but "their importance to the conduct of life, social and individual, cannot easily be overstated."

External circumstances, conditions of time and place limit the number of possible opinions on the one hand, and internal senti-

¹ P. 204.

² The two previous sources of delusion, according to Mr. Balfour, appear to be (1) "the assumption that reason means *right* reason," and (2) the exaggeration the part played by reason in manufacturing "the convictions necessary to the conduct of life" (p. 204), as above pointed out.

³ P. 206.

ments (which often cause opinions to be rejected without a hearing) also limit them on the other hand.

"Can this process," Mr. Balfour adds,¹ "be described as a rational one? That it is not the immediate result of *reasoning* is, I think, evident enough."

Here we have again the unfortunate confusion between "reason" and "ratiocination." If such limiting influences are not the immediate results of ratiocination, that does not prevent their being the immediate results of *reason* guided by its fundamental intuitions. We are compelled in this matter to differ altogether from Mr. Balfour, and to affirm that these "climates" are the immediate results of reason—not of course of reason exclusively, but of reason and emotion variously combined.

Minds are acted on by other minds, and every mind has its own passions, desires and sympathies, and is of course far from being all intellect. That "the wish is often father to the thought," is admitted by all, and we have elsewhere called special attention to the influence of emotion on religious belief.² Nevertheless every man's convictions—and therefore the convictions of every group of men and women—are intellectual states due to intellectual judgments and inferences, although, of course, they may be mistaken ones. Though the mind may be closed against the reception of some truth by bigotry or "inveterate" prejudice, the closure is due to a judgment of reason, often to a syllogism not explicitly recognized, such as, *e.g.*, "No good thing can come out of Nazareth. Something has come out of Nazareth. Therefore it cannot be a good thing." "The doctrines of Popery are doctrines of antichrist. The Immaculate Conception is a doctrine of Popery, therefore the Immaculate Conception is a doctrine of antichrist." Or, again, "all believers in religion, being men necessarily opposed to science, are men whose opinions need not even be considered. A. B. is a believer in religion, therefore, etc."

Mr. Balfour, indeed, admits³ that "psychological climates" may in many cases be the products of reasoning:

"As 'climates' are among the causes which produce beliefs, so are beliefs among the causes which produce 'climates.' . . . But are these results rational? Do they follow, I mean, on reason *quâ* reason, or are they, like a schoolboy's tears over a proposition of Euclid, consequences of reasoning, but not conclusions from it?"

Our reply to this apt and amusing illustration is that they follow not as the tears, but directly from reason itself.

¹ P. 207. The italics are ours.

² See the article entitled "Sins of Belief and Sins of Unbelief," in the *Nineteenth Century* for 1884.

³ P. 208,

Mr. Balfour takes the opposite view, and to test its justice and validity he considers the case of rationalism in the naturalistic (or sensist) meaning of the term. This he regards¹ as "a non-rational effect of reason and a non-rational cause of belief," affirming that rationalism "is not a logical conclusion, but an intellectual temper."

With this assertion we cannot at all agree. We, of course, regard the "sensist" position as not only false, but absurd (as we have done our best to show in our preceding articles in this REVIEW), yet none the less we also regard it as an inevitable product of most mistaken premisses. Such premisses (explicitly recognized or not) are, *e.g.* :

1. "Men who have greatly promoted physical science are (as Hobbs explicitly declared them to be) the best authorities we can have as to philosophy and religion."

2. "Modern physical science has carried all before it, and in the opinion of the great majority has triumphed over the opponents of its speculative doctrines."

3. The statements of those who oppose such doctrines cannot be worth listening to.

4. Such obscurantists have opposed what has become generally received, and they must therefore be foolish or dishonest.

5. The opinions which have spread so widely and rapidly amongst those who know most of the world about them and are earnest in pursuit of new truths, must be the opinions which are to be supported, while whatever contradicts them should be scouted.

It would be an easy task to bring forward other such premisses. Mr. Balfour refers to witchcraft and mesmerism as instances of beliefs abandoned, or opposed, in deference to authority; but the belief in witchcraft could not have died out merely because a distaste for it had gradually arisen, but because the gradual advance in natural knowledge, and a more correct appreciation of the laws of evidence, made it less and less credible. Mesmerism was opposed because its asserted facts were deemed to be in contradiction with what seemed to offer an utterly overwhelming weight of contrary evidence. It has since been widely accepted, not because a taste for it has arisen, but because facts have been brought forward the truth of which has been deemed sufficiently demonstrated to outweigh antecedent opposition. That moods and tempers of different kinds ("psychological climates") exist is unquestionable, but they are results of reason, though its dictates be not explicitly drawn out as so many inferences distinctly adverted to by consciousness.

Mr. Balfour's treatment of the relations borne by reason and

¹ P. 212.

authority to belief, cannot fail to suggest to any one at all acquainted with English Catholic theology, some of the teachings of the late Cardinal Newman, especially in his "Grammar of Assent."

As every one knows, he attributed to mankind a special faculty which he called an "illative sense,"¹ to denote those conclusions concerning concrete matters at which men arrive with full confidence without the aid of any conscious process of ratiocination.

We ourselves believe the term to be a superfluous one, and consider the faculties enumerated by the scholastics amply sufficient to account for all our rational processes.

But however this may be, it is at least certain that Cardinal Newman regarded it as a distinctly *intellectual* power, and not as a merely "instinctive" process, and certainly not as anything resembling that "blind trust" to which modern writers so often misapply the name of "faith." He thus differed *toto cælo* from Mr. Balfour, according to whom "authority" enforces an obedience which is not intellectual, but instinctive—as we shall soon very clearly see. The impulse by which we follow authority is rational and rests on reasonable grounds, though these may never be distinctly drawn out before the conscious mind.

The first principles of reason are possessed by all men, and are continually acted on as they were by the farmer's wife and the rustic carter² of our former "illustrations."

If an Englishman is led by the authority of fashion to send his son to Eton, his act is not, on that account, a non-rational one. He says to himself: "A, B and C have all sent their boys to Eton; it will be good for my son and for me that my boy should not take a lower position than their boys have. He will also make very valuable friends there, and if the teaching is not quite what I should choose, lots of young fellows get on there, and mine will have a good chance of getting on too."

Even in a matter seemingly so unintellectual as that of a married lady buying a bonnet in the latest fashion, the act is really a rational one, whether the reasons acted on are admirable ones or not. "Mrs. X. has such a bonnet; I will at least be equal to her. It will do my husband credit, besides it suits me, and shan't I make other women scowl at me!"

Mr. Balfour charges advocates of natural theology with being merely "naturalists" (sensists) of another sort.

But as we pointed out in our last article, they are by no means

¹ An unfortunate term, since the word "sense" is inapplicable to any *intellectual* power, and such Cardinal Newman represented this illative faculty to be.

² See AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1896, p. 313.

such, but build on the universal and necessary truths which constitute the first principles of all science of whatever kind.

In so far as Mr. Balfour does not build on such evident truths (such primary intellectual intuitions), but is content with "authority" as a basis, and, *mirabile dictu*,¹ with "custom" (!), he is himself an empiricist, and ranks but as a "naturalist," though one with lofty aspirations and refined and admirable tastes.

In his fourth section² of the second chapter of his third part, Mr. Balfour proceeds to examine what he regards as "the most important source of error," in estimating the influence of reason and authority, namely the jurisdiction over belief which "we can hardly do otherwise than recognize as belonging to reason by a natural and indefeasible title."

This is a direct consequence "of the view we find ourselves compelled to take of the essential character of reason and of our relations to it. Looked at from the outside, as one among the complex conditions which produce belief, reason appears relatively insignificant and ineffectual; not only appears so, but must be so, if human society is to be made possible. Looked at from the inside, it claims by an inalienable title to be supreme. Measured by its results it may be little; measured by its rights it is everything. There is no problem it may not investigate, no belief which it may not assail, no principle which it may not test. It cannot even by its own voluntary act, deprive itself of universal jurisdiction, as, according to a once fashionable theory, primitive man on entering the social state, contracted himself out of his natural rights and liberties.

This is well said. We cannot get behind our own reason, and what that declares to be evidently and necessarily true must be accepted by us as such, or we fall into the intellectual paralysis of absolute scepticism. A sound epistemology is at the basis of all science. But the clear recognition of this truth need not lead us to ignore the contagious influence of emotion.

We are convinced, however, that Mr. Balfour exaggerates this influence, and unduly minimizes the sway of reason while he exaggerates the action of non-rational influences. Because persons may not be able to give reasons for their convictions in no way proves that they are not convinced by very good ones. Abstract truths and first principles are often found very difficult of apprehension, but by the use of apt concrete examples, their supreme certitude can often be brought home to very poor intellects.

Of course, there may be exaggeration on either side of this contention, and if there have really been men so irrational as to uphold³ the right of every man to judge on every question, nothing could exceed their folly.

Mr. Balfour gives, as instances of arguments due to a prevailing "taste," the teaching of Hobbs' "*Leviathan*" and the doctrine of

¹ P. 164.

² P. 212.

³ P. 215.

'divine right' as taught by the Anglican clergy of the Stuart period, adding that as soon as the crisis which called them forth had passed away, "they were repugnant to the taste of a different age; 'Leviathan' and 'passive obedience' were handed over to the judgment of the historian."

But if certain theories find favor as responding to the needs of any particular period, they are not necessarily less the product of reason on that account. The doctrines of the "Leviathan" and of the passive obedience due to "kings by divine right," were logical deductions from the false and abominably Erastian principles of the Protestant Reformation, against which the doctrines of Puritanism were a relatively noble reaction. Mr. Balfour speaks of¹ "the ostentatious futility of the theories—'rights of man,' and so forth—by the aid of which the modern democratic movement was nursed through its infant maladies."

But there are very real and true "rights of man" which are the inevitable consequence of man's morally responsible nature, and constitute him "a person and not a thing."²

It is quite true, as Mr. Balfour says, "that in many cases conclusions are more permanent than premisses," and emotional tendencies are frequently the cause that "successive growths of apologetic and critical literature" often produce so little effect. But none the less those prejudices themselves are the results and outcome of rational deductions from unsatisfactory premisses.

In the fifth section of this second chapter Mr. Balfour considers what he deems an illegitimate process of giving as the alleged *reason* for a belief what is in fact an expression of the *authority* on which it is really based. He says:³

"To say that I believe a statement because I have been taught it, or because everybody in the village believes it, is to announce what everyday experience informs us is quite adequate *cause* of belief. It is not, however, *per se*, to give a reason for belief at all. But such statements can be turned at once into reasons by no process more elaborate than that of explicitly recognizing that my teachers, my family or my neighbors are truthful persons, happy in the possession of adequate means of information—propositions which in their turn, of course, require argumentative support. Such a procedure may, I need hardly say, be quite legitimate; and reasons of this kind are probably the principal ground on which in mature life we accept the great mass of our subordinate scientific and historical convictions. I believe, for instance, that the moon falls in towards the earth with the exact velocity required by the force of gravitation, for no other reason than that I believe in the competence and trustworthiness of the persons who have made the necessary calculations and observations. In this case the reason for my belief and the immediate cause of it are identical. The cause, indeed, is a cause only in virtue of its being first a reason. But in the former case this is not so. There early training, paternal authority or public opinion were causes of belief before they were reasons, and it is not impossible that to the very end they

¹ P. 218.

² As I have strongly urged in my book, *The Truth*.

³ P. 220.

contributed less to the resultant conviction in their capacity as reasons than they did in their capacity as non-rational causes."

Now, of course, as we have again and again affirmed, we possess emotion as well as intellect, and a benign Providence has ordained that the young child, at the mere dawn of reason, should be made acquiescent and docile through its feelings. In men also who have slightly developed minds the action of reason, of course, falls below what is usual. But the average youth soon begins to reason, and the intellect too often leads not only to questioning but to disobedience and revolt from paternal authority, as well as disregard of the more common opinion of those about him. But, as Mr. Balfour has admitted, reason may affirm the truth of paternal teaching, the probability of things commonly reputed true, and may give absolute certainty as to various matters, the evidence of which may consist of nothing but human testimony, as, *e.g.*, that there is a city known as New York in the United States or that a battle was fought which is known by the name "Waterloo." Not but, of course, Mr. Balfour is plainly right when he says¹ "that the argument from 'an authority' or 'authorities' is almost always useless as a *foundation* for a system of belief." More than this; it is and must always be not only useless but absurd. Every system of belief must repose (1) upon self-evident first principles, (2) upon our perception of the fact of our continuous existence, and (3) on the evident validity of logical reasoning. The error which would erect the opinion of mankind into a basis for philosophy was the error of De Lammenais.

The powerful action of reason against authority has been shown again and again in the revolt of a good man against his "psychological environment," and his success in producing stable moral reforms. Almost every canonized saint and every religious order is a witness of the supremacy of "reason" over Mr. Balfour's "authority."

Mr. Balfour accuses² theology of a tendency to extend the use of the argument from "an authority" or "authorities," so as to cover the fundamental portions of the system, and seeks to illustrate his accusation by the case of "Papal Infallibility, an example which may be regarded with the greater impartiality, as we are not, we suppose, likely to have among the readers of these notes many by whom it is accepted." This is an extraordinary assertion. We should think it probable that the number of educated English-speaking Catholics who have read carefully his "Foundations of Belief," would be relatively more numerous than those of any other denomination.

¹ P. 222.

² P. 223.

As to Papal Infallibility, Mr. Balfour supposes that no Catholic can hold it adequately unless he is antecedently convinced that (1) the New Testament narrative about the words "Thou art Peter," etc., are above all possible Biblical criticism; (2) that they actually instituted a Petrine primacy (3) to be transmitted by perpetual succession (4) in bishops of Rome, (5) that the primacy of jurisdiction carries with it the certainty of divine "assistance" (6) which insures inerrancy in *ex cathedra* definitions of facts and morals, and (7) that no announcement can be regarded as *ex cathedra* unless it relates to some matter already thoroughly sifted and considered by competent divines.¹

But no such elaborate mental process is needed, for every Catholic is convinced of the divine authority and inerrancy of *the Church*, and without that conviction he could not of course be a Catholic at all. All that his intellect can require may be summed up thus:

"Whatever the Church has decreed is true. Papal Infallibility has been decreed by the Church. Therefore, Papal Infallibility is true."

Mr. Balfour² very reasonably observes that instead of what has been written—or any merely fallible organization—forming a sole basis of support for Christianity, an infallible authority is rather needed to support the written word itself or an efficient organization. The supreme absurdity of the Bible and the Bible alone serving as a basis and guide of religion, is excellently expressed by our author in the following passage:³

"Indeed when we reflect upon the character of the religious books and of the religious organizations through which Christianity has been built up; when we consider the variety in date, in occasion, in authority, in context, in spiritual development which mark the first; the stormy history and the inevitable division which mark the second; when we further reflect on the astonishing number of the problems, linguistic, critical, metaphysical, and historical, which must be settled, at least in some preliminary fashion, before either the books or the organizations can be supposed entitled by right of rational proof to the position of impossible guides, we can hardly suppose that we were intended to find in these the *logical* foundations of our system of religious beliefs, however important be the part (and can it be exaggerated?) which they were destined to play in producing, fostering, and directing it."

In the sixth section of the second chapter, which concludes the third part of this work, Mr. Balfour summarizes his previous contention to the further depreciation of reason and the elevation of non-rational influences which, as we have seen, he dubs "authority."

¹ P. 224.

² P. 225.

³ P. 226; which may also be applied to the various sects and organizations which have separated from the one Church, and do not even venture to claim that infallibility which can alone render them efficient.

Wonderful to say, he even ventures to affirm:¹ "It is from authority that reason itself draws its most important premises." (!) As if those premises were not the self-evident truths and perceptions which (as we have again and again pointed out) underlie all our reasonings and constitute the ultimate ground of all truths apprehensible by the human intellect, which are not, like them, directly evident in and by themselves. He even ventures to say, in terminating the chapter:

"That if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it, not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of authority."

We, on the other hand, affirm that the lowest and least human character of men in society is their tendency to act like the "*Moutons de Panurge*," and to approximate in their actions to those of different tribes of gregarious animals.

It is true that we are all animals and that deep down in our sensitive nature are those more instinctive tendencies which lead the infant to seek and swallow its milky food and which later in life tend to the multiplication of the species.

It is true also that the feelings which underlie and favor the development of altruistic actions and so give a material support to ethics may be said to be instinctive,² as are those at the root of social agglomerations and therefore ultimately of politics.

But these dumb and blind tendencies lie hidden beneath the foundations of social life which is built up, sustained and developed by the action of reason, to which we entirely owe the acceptance and cultivation of that supreme and highest of all sociology which we call religion. It is such actions as those before referred to as those of saints and religious orders which constitute the greatest possible contrast which exists, or can exist, between the social activities of man and the gregarious habits and instincts of mere animals.

The fourth and last portion of Mr. Balfour's work consists of "suggestions towards a provisional philosophy."

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

¹ P. 223.

² As I have pointed out in the *Proceedings of the Zoological Society*, b. 1884, p. 462.

MADAME ROLAND.

THE new biography of Madame Roland¹ presents a most inviting subject for study, and in a way which cannot fail to gain attention. The book is charmingly written; the narrative is clear and strong; the story is well balanced; French life of the eighteenth century and events of the revolution are again distinctly before us. But more than this. The new light which is shed upon many aspects of the career of this remarkable woman and the resultant criticism of character and conduct are such as to put this book indisputably in advance of all previous biographies.

In the careful preparation of her work, Miss Tarbell resided several years in Paris, where she had access to a large mass of hitherto unpublished correspondence and other manuscripts of the Rolands, which had then recently been placed in the "Bibliothèque Nationale." She also made the acquaintance of the descendants of Madame Roland, who were of great assistance to her, and to one of them she dedicates her book. She visited Le Clos, the family home in Beaujolais, and in her chapter upon Madame Roland's country life there she gives an enchanting description of the place and its surroundings. These were the author's special opportunities, which, with her well-known ability, she has improved in producing a book which is at once bright, suggestive, scholarly and critical. From beginning to end it is a work rich in insight, in analysis of character and motive, in its opposition to the sentimentalism and idealizing which were Madame Roland's weakness; it is even fair criticism to say it is sometimes too cold and unsentimental, and seems to teach the banishing of all ideals in its eager zeal against those which are false and vain. Certainly the tone is quite different from the passionate admiration of Lamartine or the somewhat indiscriminate eulogy of the radical Miss Blind. It does not breathe the French spirit of praise intense like Sainte-Beuve, nor of hate intense like Taine. It does not exalt its subject as high in some ways as does the brief monograph of Austin Dobson, nor is there anything of the sensational extravagance of Carlyle's few words: "She shines in that black wreck of things like a white Grecian statue." But though a certain class of readers may be disappointed that they do not find exactly the hero or the martyr which Madame Roland has been so

¹ *Madame Roland; A Biographical Study.* By Ida M. Tarbell. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896.

commonly claimed to be, those who are fair-minded will close the book with an appreciation of the genuine critical spirit which has delineated both the strength and the weakness of this noted woman, and which attempts to put truth before fancies of even a century old!

MARIE JEANNE PHILIPON (*Manon* was her pet name) was born in Paris, March 18, 1754. Her parents were of the *bourgeoisie*. Her father was an engraver, an ordinary man, though respectable; her mother a high-minded woman. She had far more influence over their child than her father, who was often severe and arbitrary, and tried to govern her by force, which she resented; while she would readily yield to her mother's gentle guidance.

Marie was a precocious child. Her parents were pleased, and early provided her with various masters for her education. Her real training came, however, more from the books she read, which furnished food for the strong nature, both emotional and intellectual, which soon began to develop itself. The author who first most deeply impressed her was Plutarch, whose "Lives" stirred her imagination almost to delirium by their stories of noble deeds. "How many times," she says afterwards, "I wept that I had not been born a Spartan or a Roman!" With her mental acumen and her strong hunger for knowledge she was also in childhood and youth very pious. Her mother was a devoted Catholic and taught her the Bible and the Catechism, and religious and secular reading were carried along together. In preparing for her confirmation and first communion she manifested a keen moral sensitiveness, and after a while her parents yielded to her entreaty that she might go to the quiet of a convent for a time to escape from the distractions at home. So she spent a year with the Dames de la Congrégation de Notre Dame, where her growth in piety was most satisfactory, and where her spiritual devotion so developed that before she left she had resolved to enter a religious order as soon as she became of age. She enjoyed special opportunities for study at the convent, and while there she formed a fast friendship, which greatly influenced her, with a girl three years older, Sophie Cannet, from Amiens.

Before she had grown to womanhood—between fourteen and twenty-one—her inner life underwent a severe change. She began to go out into the world; she came home from certain visits "full of disdain and anxiety." She was shocked by the hollowness, the pretensions, the patronizing insincerity of those higher in life whom she saw; and though a visit to Versailles when she was twenty, where she saw the French court, did not yet develop any "contempt of monarchy" or any idea of "the sovereignty of the people," she did say if she were near the king she should hate his

grandeur, and was distressed by "the chasm between millions of men and one individual of their own kind." Still she didn't yet crave equality, and wrote, "truly, human nature is not very respectable when one considers it in a mass." The radical change just now was in her attitude towards religion. All her good resolves were thrown to the winds. She was a deeply thoughtful person, as well as intensely emotional. But at this period reason, or what she called such, got the supremacy. She began "to apply the test of reason to her faith," and ended by giving up Christianity and accepting a kind of Deism—a belief in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul. There does not seem to be sufficient evidence for Miss Blind's view that she became then—if ever—almost an agnostic. Under the influence of such writers as Diderot, D'Alembert, Raynal, and the encyclopædists generally, she revolted against a conception of authority which her imagination told her "would force her to believe a cruel absurdity," rebelling chiefly against her interpretation of the doctrines of infallibility and eternal punishment. She says, later, "I became skeptical by an effort; and I took for my creed beneficence in conduct and tolerance in opinion"; and while she prided herself upon her goodness and her practical morality, it was plain enough before the close of her life that if she had kept the guiding principle of the Catholic faith, she might have preserved a purer ethical standard, from the outward violation of which, as our author shows, the *guillotine just saved her!*

But though, in her self sufficiency, she did her best to throw off authority, did she wander on, a law unto herself, all the rest of her days? By no means. The death of her mother, in 1775, was a dreadful blow to her; and she recovered her happiness through the influence of a book, the "*Nouvelle Héloïse*," of Rousseau. She had read him somewhat already; but from this time he became her guide. "The feminine need of an authority," says Miss Tarbell, "was satisfied"—(rather, we may suggest, the *human* need of authority was met!)"—"she accepted him *en bloc*, and to defend and follow him became henceforth her concern." And this meant a reaction from the reign of *intellect* to that of *sentiment*. "Her vigorous, passionate young nature," says her biographer, "asserted itself; her mind burned with the possibilities of happiness; sentiment regained the power temporarily given to intellect, and from that time was the ruling force of her life." It is quite important to remember the influence of this man's teachings upon her, though we cannot delay to trace it fully. That was a sentimental generation; but for this very reason it is all the more sad that one of such undoubted mental powers should have taken for her chief master the very apostle of mawkish sentimentalism and even sen-

suality;—a man of so many noble ideas, but of so many base ones; theistic, but anti-Christian; in a way religious, but practically and abominably immoral. His views of education (in “*Emile*”—the best of his works, though, as says Mr. Lowell, “not without deplorable marks of his baseness”) afterwards formed the model for the bringing up of her daughter; at the outbreak of the Revolution she said his teachings were “perfectly suited to civism,” and in prison she boasted that she was fashioning her Memoirs upon his “Confessions,” saying “these will be *my* Confessions, for I shall conceal nothing”; and so, in her slavish following of him she revealed experiences which violated good sense and delicacy; for, as Miss Tarbell writes, “she was incapable of exercising an independent judgment in a matter of taste, of opinion, of morals, where Rousseau was concerned, so completely had she adopted him.” Alas! she had given up her faith, because she would not yield her *intellect*; and now, for a guide in *sentiment*, would not the authority of that old faith, with all its claimed mysticism, have been better than this?

The history of Mademoiselle Philipon’s suitors and marriage is long and intricate, and we can only touch upon prominent points in the account. She was so susceptible that her biographer says she was one of those women who see in every man a possible lover. We know how marriages are arranged in France, particularly in the rank of life to which she belonged—by the parents. She had plenty of attention; but she would not accept any one of “the eligible, common-place suitors;” she was versed in Plutarch and the philosophers—she looked higher than her station, for which she cannot be blamed, any more than for telling her father she would marry only for love; and when he asked her, “What if you do not find your ideal?” “I shall die an old maid,” she replied. At length one after another came who seemed philosophers or were so, who wrote books, or had artistic tastes, whose *sentiments* were in harmony with hers—all of them much older, strange to say, and with one of them, sixty years old—and she twenty-two!—she used to read verses of Rousseau and Voltaire—once both of them weeping and re-reading the same thing ten times! An odd pair of philosophers, indeed!—as Miss Tarbell calls them. M. Roland de la Platière, at the outset a rival of this very man, came to have the field to himself. It was in 1776 that he first met her; and he was about forty-two years of age, which made a disparity of years between them surely startling enough. He was an inspector-general of commerce, living in Amiens, and was related to Sophie Cannel, Mademoiselle Philipon’s friend, by

¹ P. 32, and *vide* the valuable chapters upon Rousseau and his writings, in Edward J. Lowell’s *Eve of the French Revolution*.

whom he was presented to her. He is described as "a man of more than ordinary value, who had rendered large services to his country ;" but morose and irritable, and "not an easy man to get along with ;" a man, moreover, who prided himself not only on his abilities but on his character, especially for scrupulous frankness. After various vicissitudes—a refusal to marry him, a Platonic arrangement to be friends, an engagement made, broken, and renewed—they were finally married February 4, 1780. In connection with the Roland courtship and marriage Miss Tarbell quotes fully from correspondence hitherto unpublished. This correspondence both brings out the sentimental side of Marie Philippon's nature, and is also in marked contrast with the tone of her "Memoirs," written at the close of her life, as to her feeling towards Roland. There she gives the impression that "her heart was not in the affair," but that she only yielded to his persistent entreaties, and, as Austin Dobson expresses it, "married a theory and not a husband." But these letters are full of even extravagant passion and devotion ; and it is rightly enough claimed that they show she was "desperately in love, happy in her betrothal, miserable in her liberation, and when the marriage was finally effected thoroughly satisfied." And the explanation which this book gives of the inconsistency is, not that she meant to falsify, but that when she wrote the "Memoirs," "she was under the influence of a new and absorbing passion," before which the ardent love of years ago "had become an indifferent affair of which she could talk philosophically and at which she could smile disinterestedly. The later passion was that for Buzot, which the world knew nothing of till nearly seventy-five years after her death—a passion which various writers since then have tried to excuse and smooth over, or even (as Sainte-Beuve) to justify, but which this most recent biographer does not hesitate to condemn. Nothing more need be said of this matter just here, as it must be referred to again ; but the plain argument from this newly published correspondence is—let not Madame Roland say or fancy she was not in love with Roland, for *she was !* And, incidentally, abundant proof is brought out, in succeeding pages, of her continued affection and devotion certainly for the next seven or eight years. Not long after that, in 1789, the Revolution began to take their attention, and in 1791 Buzot appears upon the scene !

The Rolands spent the first year of their married life in Paris. He was occupied with literary labors—just then getting a book ready for the press—and his wife gave him all her time, alternating domestic cares with copying and proof-reading. She was well qualified to become a valuable helper in his work, and with a manifest interest in her new duties she soon made herself indis-

pensable. Before the year was over they went upon a charming visit to Roland's family in the Beaujolais, and the next year found them settled in Amiens. Here their only child, Eudora, was born, in October, 1781. Their life in Amiens was a quiet one. Roland was busy with long and heavy articles for the "*Encycopédie Méthodique*;" she was helping him during all the time she could spare from the care of the child, to whose bringing up she applied the principles she had learned of Rousseau—many of them quite sensible.

In the spring of 1784 a somewhat curious episode occurred, in Madame Roland's visiting Paris, where she spent a couple of months in soliciting for Roland *a title of nobility*, which he thought he had grounds for asking in the antiquity of his family, and in his thirty years of service to the country. She was unsuccessful, and she heard a good deal of hard criticism of her husband's pretensions. Other biographers have not made much of this event; but to Miss Tarbell it seems that these ardent republicans, perhaps all the more from the very inconsistency of their conduct, always made it an additional "sting" against royalty and aristocracy that the title was refused, Roland's services unrecognized, and their pride so rebuked. Baffled in her earnest attempts, she asked and secured for Roland a transfer to Lyons as inspector, with a larger salary and less work, and consequently more leisure for his studies. For reasons of economy, although his new duties kept him mostly there, they decided to live in Lyons only a couple of months of each year; and the rest of the time Madame Roland made her home with his mother and older brother, partly in Villefranche, and partly at Le Clos, their family estate in the country, about eleven miles away. In Lyons and in Villefranche they are both said to have made themselves unpopular—and she particularly by criticisms and even mocking satires upon leading people, and it is plain that they felt above their surroundings and were unhappy. But her country life at Le Clos, from all the description of it, must have been delightful; and in our survey it is worth while to dwell for a few moments upon these, her happiest, sweetest days. She was largely occupied with the education of her daughter, and there is a long and interesting letter (hitherto unpublished), telling how she applied the teachings of Rousseau. It is a pleasure to note the genuine interest she took in her neighbors, serving them and teaching them, and joining in their amusements. She set them a good example, too, in morals, and outwardly, at least, in religion; and Miss Tarbell thinks we may have "a genuine respect for the unselfishness of a woman who would get out of her bed at six o'clock in the morning for her neighbor's sake, to climb up the long steep hill to the church for early Mass." Her

imagination had pictured much from the country life she was now enjoying; and if we may trust her biographer, the reason why Le Clos realized many of her dreams, was "largely because she took hold of the practical life of the house and the farm with good will and intelligence." "She was no woman," says our author, "to allow work to master her; *she managed it*. Nor was she weak enough to fret under it, or to regard it as beneath her. She respected this most dignified and useful of woman's employments, and gave it intelligence and good will. This acceptance of and cheerfulness over common duties is one of the really strong things about Madame Roland." As for her husband, it seems quite clear that her love for him was as great as ever, and that she looked upon her affection as enduring. Her writing to him she says is "the dearest of her occupations," and there are specimens enough to give proof. The surmise is expressed that part of the secret of her tenderness may have been in the very fact of his being away from her so much, and that, according to her habit, *she idealized him*, whose actual presence afterwards, in "the friction of everyday life," broke the spell!

When the Revolution came the Rolands welcomed it. They were in hearty sympathy with its theoretical causes, for they were both strongly under the influence of the free-thinking of the time. They both had felt the oppression of the extreme taxation which prevailed; and Roland had suffered from it in its effect upon commercial interests. Madame Roland herself, from a child, had had, in a way, *a political education*. She had seen and felt "the rage or joy of the people, and had brooded over its meaning." *Révolution* had been always a familiar word in her ears, and she had seen practical workings of the idea on a limited scale. So when the States General met, in May, 1789, she hoped much for a reform of the old régime. The highest authorities show conclusively that at first there was no idea of the overthrow of monarchy in France at this time; that the people hoped only for reform; likewise that, in common with the rest of France, constitutional reform was all the Rolands then asked or thought of. But after the storming of the Bastille on the 14th of July, everything was changed. Says Miss Tarbell, "A new ideal arose, full winged, before Madame Roland. . . . Compromise, half-way measures, were at an end. Instead of reforms she demanded 'complete regeneration.' She saw in the sudden uprising of the people the 'sovereign' exercising 'the divine right of insurrection,'"

It was only the carrying out of what Rousseau had said it was right for "the sovereign people" to do in the circumstances. Civil war and riot had become justifiable, and she believed were now even necessary to accomplish the end that the people should

provide a fit government. *The ideal* was before her; and if there was ever an instance of the end taught to justify the means, she now gave it. For the first eighteen months of the Revolution they were at Le Clos or in Lyons; but she began and she continued the work of agitation. She carried on a violent correspondence with the leaders in Paris and elsewhere—Brissot, Champagneux, Bancal—and many of her papers were published in Paris, in Brissot's journal *Le Patriote Français*. She nourished the fire of her "restless energy" by her letters, by talks with her neighbors, and particularly by her reading; and Rousseau, as ever, was her inspired guide. And, all the while, her powerful influence was shaping the future policy of Roland in the part he was to take. She had lost faith in the sincerity of the king and the court, and she sneered at the action of the National Assembly, calling them "nothing but children, and their enthusiasm a straw fire," bidding them "put on trial two illustrious heads, . . . or they were all mad!" Truly, in her own madness she had entered upon "uncompromising war against the existing government," and how concentrated her idea was may be seen from her saying that the hope, the only hope, was not any more in the French people as a whole, but *in Paris!* The comments of Miss Tarbell at this point are terse and suggestive, and are worth citing, as a woman's broad criticism upon a woman. "She saw no danger in her doctrines. They moved to noble sentiments, to great aspirations. What greater good? That they incited to crimes, too, she did not admit. She was recklessly indifferent to what is; she only looked at what might be. Her eyes were turned to America, to Greece, to Rome, and not to the facts of the struggles of these countries; only to the fine actions of their heroes, the rounded phrases of their orators. . . . Nor was it a momentary enthusiasm. Her conviction never wavered. . . . She never admitted that anything but 'complete regeneration' could come of her teachings. It was the woman's nature, which, stirred to its depths by enthusiasm or passion, becomes narrow, stern, unbending—which can do but one thing, can see but one way, that inexplicable feminine conviction which is superior to experience and indifferent to logic."

In face of the aristocratic element, Roland was elected to the municipal government of Lyons, and was sent by that body, in 1791, as one of several deputies to urge the financial needs of Lyons before the National Assembly. So, in February of that year they came to Paris. The earnestness of Madame Roland, as serious as it was intense, at once manifested itself. For some months she followed the sessions of the Assembly, till she vowed she would never go again—angry at their folly and disgusted with

their compromises and delays, particularly in the Lyons matter. She had come up prejudiced, and closer knowledge only deepened her suspicions of their patriotism; while she believed in the sincerity of the aristocrats, but not in their principles, and their superiority of manner nettled her pride. She went to the patriotic clubs; but was not satisfied with them, and thought the Jacobins "too conservative." Of deepest interest were the gatherings of patriots in their apartments. The account shows us much of her character and influence at this period. The meetings were held four times a week. Brissot was there, the prominent leader, with whom now they first became personally acquainted; Pétion was there, soon after the mayor of Paris; the young Robespierre was there; and the melancholy, serious, sentimental Buzot. They discussed political questions and the general condition of affairs, while Madame Roland, with careful calculation, *took no part*, but sat at her table near by, sewing or, more often, writing letters, though listening with both ears and remembering all they said. She seems to have possessed the faculty of double attention, and once when one of the guests expressed surprise at her writing so rapidly in the midst of their discussion, she smilingly replied: "What would you say if I should repeat all your arguments?" Miss Tarbell, in some good remarks upon French conversation, suggests that she made too much of their talk, and that it was one of the Roland's greatest mistakes to regard this "game of words and sentiments" as if meant for "reflections and reason." However this may be, she did see that it was only fruitless "conversation"; she was disappointed that "few measures resulted"; she learned, she said, that there was "nothing so difficult as to unite different minds to work persistently for the same end"; and for all her own impatience she made this sage observation to one of her friends: "Our fine minds laugh at patience, as a negative virtue. I confess that in my eyes it is *the true sign of the force of the soul*." With all her silence at these meetings, it is plain that she gained a wonderful hold upon these patriots. Her biographer carefully analyzes the sources of this influence, and attributes it in part to her qualities of mind and soul—she was the pure ideal of their principles, like a chaste Greek statue, "the type of the republic of which they dreamed"—and in part to her remarkable personal charm. Many writers have described her as beautiful, though this idea is contrary to all the traditions of her family, and none of the five portraits in this volume quite represent her thus; but all authorities agree that she was most attractive, charming, fascinating, and the secret was in the sonorousness, flexibility and mellowness of her voice, bringing out when she spoke all the vivacity, sympathy and intelligence of her face. She appreciated

her gift and knew how to use it. Lamartine quotes her speaking of it as "a gift most rare and most powerful over the senses," and we may forgive her self-complacent comment when told that Desmoulins wondered how with so little beauty and at her age she could have so many admirers—"He had never heard me talk."

When the king fled, on the 22d of June, the Rolands took heart; it was proof of his treachery; if the people would only *act now!* When he was brought back in twenty-four hours, and restored, they were in dismay. It was becoming evident to them that, as Miss Tarbell states it, "the Republic, which she and her friends dreamed of at this moment and did not hesitate to announce, *was not in the public mind*, and that when they insisted upon it, they were insisting upon *an individual opinion* of which the country at large had no conception, and for which it had no sympathy." Madame Roland left Paris in deep discouragement in September, and retired to Villefranche. She said she had had enough of Paris for now, and would go to the country. This was only a passing whim, however. Roland came soon. His office of inspectorship at Lyons had been abolished by the government; he had failed to get the nomination to the new Assembly for which they had hoped. Yet various reasons, and perhaps particularly that they might be at the centre of excitement, where they could "watch," and help start the "shock" of a new revolution, brought them again to the great city in December of that same year, 1791.

With the adoption of a new Constitution by the Assembly, and its acceptance by the king a few months before, and the people beginning to get quiet, how could Madame Roland continue "to prevent peace?" asks her biographer. And the answer given is, "*Her ideal was not satisfied*. It mattered little to her that the people were indifferent to this ideal; that they were satisfied with the constitution and asked for nothing but a chance to let it work. The satisfaction of this ideal had become a necessity, an imperative personal need. She could not give it up. It was too beautiful." These last became afterwards, we know, the exact words of the leader Buzot, as he looked back upon their tremendous mistake; "My error was too beautiful to be repented of." "Our dream was too beautiful to be abandoned."

From this time on, the weakness as much as the strength of Madame Roland's character is manifested, though she came to be known as the queen—the soul—of the Gironde, and is so often spoken of as the miracle of the Revolution. She was suspicious of all but those of her own precise views, verily diseased with suspicion, well called "the malady of those times." On the other

hand, she was supremely confident in herself. With impudent conceit, and that "self-admiration" which Taine (perhaps uncharitably) calls "her mental substratum," she writes, later, in her "Memoirs" that "the only rôle which ever suited her exactly in the world was that of Providence"; and so she profanely uttered what was near being a divine truth, for all along she was the instrument of Providence, though in ways she little knew or would little recognize!

The status and the relations of parties in the Assembly when she returned to Paris bring prominently before us the *Constitutionalists*, supporters of the king; the *Mountain*, coarse, ill-bred, ragged and dirty agitators; and the *Girondists*, the pure republicans, as they may be termed, even "blindly partisan," young and talented, as Miss Tarbell describes them, "brought up on Plutarch and Rousseau, and their heads filled with noble doctrines and drafts of perfect constitutions," but with little experience "of politics, of men, or of society"; and just at this time, in the freshness of their new influence and their eagerness for power—to carry out their republican ideas—wavering between the Constitutionalists and the Mountain, "fearing both, suspected by both." It was with this party that the Rolands joined themselves. Madame Roland would have brought its indecision to a quick end in favor of anarchy and insurrection. Without thus far openly committing themselves, they became soon after a power in the Assembly, under the leadership of Brissot, which the king felt he must reckon with. At last, probably to avoid suspicion, he consented to name a Girondist ministry, and in March (1792) Roland was appointed to the Department of the Interior.

It is easy to see in what a position of responsibility and power this event placed the aspiring Madame Roland, still bent upon her ideal. Though it is not necessary, with Taine, to call Roland only "an administrative puppet whose wife pulled the strings," it is true that she examined every question with him day after day, gave her opinion, and so far had the controlling influence that she was really the power concealed. It is much to her credit that all she did was "in private," and that in her salon she was as quiet as ever. They removed to a spacious palace, but continued to live in a simple way—exercised more and more upon matters of the State. Roland was dry and theoretical in the discharge of his duties, or often harsh and arbitrary. In April war with Prussia was declared, and the country was in greater commotion than ever; and particularly in Paris were there increased terror and suspicion. Madame Roland had a plan for the defence of the capital which she persuaded the Minister of War (Servan) to present to the Assem-

bly without the king's knowledge. They passed the measure, but he hesitated to sign it.¹ She thought him "disloyal," and wanted him forced to a decision. To this end she induced Roland to send him a long, threatening, even insulting official letter. She wrote the letter herself! Miss Tarbell gives it in full. The result was that in June both Servan and Roland were dismissed from the ministry. Then she bade him at once announce to the Assembly his discharge, and send in a copy of his—*her* letter,—a private letter, be it noted, meant originally only for the king's eye. Here was a *coup d'état* indeed! They thought "usefulness and glory" would come of it, and they were not wholly disappointed. The Assembly ordered the letter printed and sent throughout France! It did not cause the popular uprising which they hoped would ensue, and drive the king to reinstate the ministers; but it helped to keep up the excitement against royalty, and the whole Gironde party furthered the effort and did everything that eloquence and intrigue could to incite insurrection. Meanwhile the enemy from without was actually drawing near the capital, and in face of that danger the agony was growing terrible—"the irritated, harassed country," as our author pictures it, "opening its heart and pouring out its blood, young and old, weak and strong, even women and girls offering themselves." The Marseillais movement, for federalism, just then began to take shape. The cry was "Arm Paris; if that fails, seize the South." The Rolands and the Girondists knew it meant *insurrection*; but they did not stop, though a few of them, we are told, began to be nervous, lest they might not be able, on the king's overthrow, to control the fury of the people which they were arousing—especially as the insurrectionary element was now well organized, with Danton at its head, whom they feared. This dreadful "tension"—the most trying in the Revolution—was ended by the setting up of *The Commune* as the governing power of Paris on the 10th of August. Girondists and Jacobins now made up the Assembly; they voted the suspension of the king, to restore the Gironde ministers, Roland, Servan and Clavière, and to add others, chief of whom was the savage Danton. And Danton was at the head of the mob, which surged and swelled!

If the Girondists were now in power, representing *law*, they soon found that the Commune too was in power, and that they felt "called to act *above all law*." The insurrectionary element became "the new party of *Terror*," under the triumvirate of Robespierre, Danton, and Marat; Robespierre, "the abstract idea of the Revolution," Danton "its will," Marat "its avenging demon," as

¹ Perhaps partly because the same measure also urged the proscription of the priests.

Miss Blind calls them. They speedily entered upon deeds of zeal and savage fury, of which the climax was in setting up the guillotine. Alas! it was all only the carrying out of the principles for which Madame Roland had long labored. Her biographer's words are true, "It was her conviction which held Roland. It was her inspiration that fired the Gironde. Now that the force that she had evoked was organized, logically she must unite with it." But "disillusion" began to break up her ideal dreams; the patriot "radical," of a sudden, though too late, "became a conservative." She had thought of insurrection, says Miss Tarbell, as an ideal avenging spirit, but the realization, the "living incarnation," in the beastly Danton, she had not reckoned upon. Perhaps, as Danton was in the ministry, and with Roland, if she would have consented to work with him, she might have controlled him, and so controlled the Terrorists; but she loathed him; he inspired in her only "physical repugnance," and she utterly refused to have anything to do with him—which, of course, angered the brute all the more. Moreover, she was beginning to be deeply in love with Buzot—he seemed to her now to be the only hope of the Gironde, and undoubtedly she contrasted the two men, who were radically different, and had hopes and ambitions for her new lover. The horrible September massacres came on; Roland protested; but what cared the Commune for him, or for her? September 5th she wrote, "We are under the knife of Robespierre and Marat"; and a few days later, "Danton directs everything, Robespierre is his mannikin, Marat holds his torch and his knife." . . . "You know my enthusiasm for the Revolution. Well, I am ashamed of it. It is stained by these wretches. It is become hideous." So, as writes her biographer, "she had begun to experience one of the saddest disillusionings of life, the loss of faith in her own undertaking, to see that the thing she had worked to create was a monster, that it must be throttled, that it was too horrible to live."

What was called *The Republic* began with September 21, 1792, when the Convention replaced the Assembly. They wanted Roland and his colleagues to remain in the ministry, and Danton sneeringly asked, "Why not invite Madame Roland too? Everyone knows that he has not been alone in his office." He withdrew the resignation he had sent in; but at the same time arraigned the Commune and the Mountain, and said he staid as their enemy. From this point on the Rolands were plainly *turned against the Revolution*. The Gironde was in a final desperate struggle, which was to end only in ruin. Roland continued at his post for the next four months, fighting the Terrorists, "fearless, sincere, honest, disinterested," as our author affirms, but "so pitifully inadequate to

the situation, so ridiculously subjective in his methods, that irritation at his impotence is forgotten in the compassion it awakens." Madame Roland was active, too, but with noble spirit keeping her place at home, assisting him continually in all his official work. Buzot championed his cause in the Convention, partly from sympathy with Madame Roland, and partly because she had won him over to her own disillusion with the Revolution. His own words show what this book claims, that in the downfall of the Gironde he was the one who felt most deeply the failure of their beautiful dream. Most of those who pretended to be republicans at this time, he says, were so only in name. "It is useless to deny it," he writes, "the majority of the French people sighed after royalty and the constitution of 1791." . . . "The guillotine explains everything. It is the great weapon of the French government. This people is republican because of the guillotine." In addition to other perils, at the opening of 1793 the Rolands were in danger of mob violence, and for many days and nights they lived in constant fear of assassination. On January 22d, the day after the execution of the king, Roland resigned from the ministry. When they had moved to their palatial residence they had still kept their little apartment in the Rue de la Harpe, and thither they now retired. They were indifferent to the change of position and surroundings. Miss Tarbell's words pay them a fitting tribute. "Their convictions of their own right doing," she says, "made them superior to all influences which affect worldly and selfish natures. It is impossible for such people as the Rolands to 'come down,' in life. Material considerations are so external, so mere an incident, that they can go from palace to hut without giving the matter a second thought."

But meanwhile the personal relations of these two people to each other were becoming most painfully strained. One of the two was certainly very far from perfect or exemplary in the matter we are now to speak of, for all she talked so much of what she called her "duty." Alas! the passion for Buzot was doing its work. Madame Roland, with what her biographer rather strangely calls "a sentimental need of frankness," "useless and cruel," had confessed to her husband that she loved Buzot, but that "she would stay with him, and be faithful to her marriage vows;"! *i.e.*, that with a certain sense of "duty" she would try to do what was outwardly right, while she had deserted him in her heart! In her "Memoirs," when in prison, justifying herself, as always, she writes, "while remaining faithful to my duties, I was too artless to conceal my feelings. My husband, excessively sensitive on account of his affection and self-respect, could not endure the idea of the least change in his empire (!); he grew suspicious, his jealousy

irritated me. Happiness fled from us. He adored me; I sacrificed myself (!) for him, and we were unhappy." Was it strange? we are inclined to ask. So, though the three had politically worked in harmony "for many months," now at last in May, the Rolands, says Miss Tarbell, "felt they must get away from Buzot, and resolved to go to the country." There had been so many threats, too, that they feared Roland would soon be arrested if they staid longer. They had been waiting some days for their passports, and when, at last, these came, Madame Roland was detained by a sudden illness for another week. On the 31st of May Roland was arrested, but in some way escaped from the guards and found a place of concealment. He reached Amiens safely within a few days. Very early the next morning, June 1st, Madame Roland was herself taken, by order of the Commune. Though there was no ground of arrest given, she did not resist; it would have been useless; and she was led away to the Abbaye in the midst of a jeering crowd. All that was made known by the questioning of June 12th, was that "she was a *suspect*." On June 24th she was set free. But this was only the refinement of cruelty, the cat playing with the mouse. On the very door steps of her house she was re-arrested, and was now taken to another and worse prison, that of Sainte Pélagie, where she found herself in the vilest surroundings, with the worst and lowest criminals.

Madame Roland's prison life of five months is a most important portion of her career, for what it reveals of her conduct, character, and example. It was marked by a strangely calm and cheerful courage and endurance; and by a kindness and gentleness towards jailers and fellow-prisoners which won all hearts. She rose to the occasion with a proud indifference to results and a nature that proved itself victor over all outward circumstances. In a most telling chapter, Miss Tarbell inquires carefully into the reasons for this "phenomenal fortitude." Undoubtedly it was in part from her very nature, and in part from the environment of the present and the training of the past. Moreover it was partly concerned with *the struggle for liberty* in which she had been engaged, the determination to endure to the end, though the bright dream of life had failed; and it is partly explained, this strange courage, by *personal considerations* which entered into her very soul.

As regards liberty and the tragedy in which she had been engaged, and in which she could now imagine herself "an independent actor," this latest and clearest biographer says—and with much truth, as it seems to us—"She took a dramatic pose and she kept it to the end." This is not made a motive for severe criticism. On the other hand, we read: "If there was a shade of the theatrical in it . . . there is so much indifference to self, ha-

tred of despotism, contempt of injustice, courage before pain, that the lack of perfect naturalness is forgotten." As regards more personal considerations, we refer, of course, to her passion for Buzot, which now spoke out, in the five letters to him which were long lost to the world and first came to light in 1864. Miss Tarbell gives a more critical analysis of these letters than has yet been offered, though it must be said she is sometimes rather inconsistent in her observations, and not on the whole very strong, from any high point of view, upon the moral bearings of the matter. We cannot resist the impression that she sympathizes a little too deeply with the one whom she is both blaming and trying to free from blame.¹ In a previous chapter upon "Buzot and Madame Roland" it is brought out that once before with another near friend (Bancal) her heart became much engaged, and "she was saved from folly by circumstances"; and after the necessity of such an apology as that there seems little use in trying to smooth over in any way the moral relations to Buzot because of the theories at that time in reference to love and the state of nature (we well know whence those shocking theories sprang and what they meant!) or because she herself maintained an outward allegiance to her notion of "duty," while her heart was unfaithful. The facts prove that Madame Roland did not fully resist the base theory and the lax morals of the times! Let us quote her biographer's own words: "There is no escaping the conclusion that, had she lived, she would have ultimately left Roland for Buzot. . . . She was happy to be guillotined when she was, otherwise she must have inevitably suffered the most terrible and humiliating of all the disillusiones of a woman—the loss of faith in herself, in the infallibility of her sentiments, in her incapability to do wrong." And so her spirit in prison is partly accounted for in her feeling that her prison was giving her a higher kind of freedom. The whole tone of the letters shows this. "What does it matter to me," she writes, "if I am here or there? Is not my heart always with me? To confine me in a prison—is it not to deliver me entirely to it? My company—it is *my love*! My occupation—it is to think of it!" Again: "I dare not tell you, and you alone can understand, that I was not sorry to be arrested. . . . I owe it to my jailers that I can reconcile duty and love. Do not pity me. People admire my courage; but they do not understand my joys." Once more: "Circumstances have given me that which I could never have had without a kind of crime. How I love the chains which give me freedom to love you undividedly, to think of you ceaselessly! . . . I do not want to pene-

¹ See particularly pp. 239, 241-42, 274.

trate the designs of heaven. I will not allow myself to make guilty prayers; but I bless God for having substituted my present chains for those I wore before. And this change appears to me the beginning of favor. If He grants me more, may He leave me here until my deliverance from a world given over to injustice and unhappiness!" Is not all this enough to make right-minded people turn from the sickly sentimentalism of Sainte-Beuve, who declares that Madame Roland's love for Buzot "was the one touch of softness that her nature needed to make it *wholly feminine and French!*"

In the prison they let her have a few books, and a friend sent her flowers. She followed regular occupations day by day, drawing or studying in the morning and writing in the afternoon; and all this, though she was in the midst of distraction most trying, from the noise of the quarreling and cursing and obscene talk that was borne to her ears through the thin partitions of her cell. This careful arrangement of her time amidst such surroundings our author remarks is "perhaps a better index to her real force of character than her exalted periods and professions."

She chiefly busied herself with writing out "Historical Notes," as she called them, and a great mass of "Political and Personal Memoirs," producing in all some seven hundred pages of manuscript which she got to her friends and most of which has been preserved. Space forbids our treatment of all this work with the detail which it deserves. It is wonderful in whatever aspect it is viewed—the flow of thought, the deep emotion (biasing judgment, as might be expected), sometimes definite characterization, sometimes sparkling mirth, and, not least, the clear handwriting with scarcely an erasure and only marked with stains of tears. In the "Political Memoirs" Miss Tarbell considers it unquestionable that she poses, that she continually remembers she is speaking to posterity and must appear to the future as "the apostle of the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity." The "Personal Memoirs" have nothing of this over-dramatic conceit and this stiffness of manner, and we can well believe in the irresistible charm of their freshness and naturalness, only counting it most pitiful that she should have so taken the base, morbid Rousseau for her model as to what she should put in and what she should leave out. They are not wholly to be trusted in their representations of herself, yet their value is great, both personal and historical, for they not only furnish the chief record of the first twenty-five years of her life, but are "the most attractive material we have of the life of her class in the eighteenth century."

On November 1st, Madame Roland was taken to still another prison, the Conciergerie, where she was exposed to still worse in-

dignities than before. But only for a short time, for the Conciergerie meant a transfer to the death-cart and the guillotine. On two different days she was brought before the dread Revolutionary Tribunal. The questions were so cunningly worded that "in answering them honestly she condemned herself." November 7th, three witnesses appeared against her, one of them, overborne by fear or cowardice, a servant who had been thirteen years in her employ! The next day came the form of trial, on the charge of "a horrible conspiracy against the unity and indivisibility of the republic, the liberty and surety of the French people." She was allowed no defence, and was sentenced to death. The cart awaited her, and she went to the guillotine—"upright and calm," as one says who saw her, "her eyes shining, her color fresh and brilliant, a smile on her lips, trying to cheer her companion, a man overwhelmed by the terror of approaching death." The story of her calling for a pen and paper at the guillotine to write the thoughts which arose in her is only a story, which good authority makes us agree with Sainte-Beuve in calling "impossible, puerile, untrue to her nature and unsupported by contemporary evidence"; but it is true that, as they fastened her to the plank, her eyes falling upon a great statue of liberty near by, she uttered certain words, though authorities differ as to just what they were, whether, "O Liberté, comme on t'a jouée!" or, "O Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom!"

In the course of this paper we have already made so many comments upon the career of this noted woman and upon the work of her biographer that fuller estimates can hardly be expected. From a Christian standpoint one is more and more saddened, as he goes on with the record of Madame Roland's life, that she made shipwreck of her faith as she did. She had remarkable, superior natural gifts. With the guiding principle of the faith for reason and for sentiment, what errors and extravagances she might have been saved from! How much purer a reputation she might have left behind! Her pride and self-sufficiency were the source of her spiritual downfall. She came under the control of free-thinking authors, and thus she illustrates the care which all need to exercise over their own reading or that of others whom they can influence. Books were the elevation of Madame Roland; books were her ruin.

With her political ideas and the means she took to advance them we are not further concerned. In her ambition she followed a dream of liberty and equality, and she saw the dream come to naught. She bravely suffered; yet the record of that miserable passion for Buzot shows her death was not wholly for liberty, by any means!

She was one who idealized everything, as her biographer affirms, and the great ideal of her life was dispelled; but that does not prove the vanity of ideals nor the folly of cherishing them, as this book so strenuously keeps insisting or implying. We must have ideals. All who have accomplished anything worthy of God or of their fellow-men have had them and been guided by them. Everything depends upon what the ideal is and how wisely it is aspired after. It is those who have made God their Supreme Ideal who have given the world the noblest of examples. Their aspirations bring the courage of heroes, the patient endurance of saints.

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CATHOLIC MISSIONS IN AFRICA.

WITHIN recent years Africa has attracted in no small measure the attention of the civilized world. The immense continent which, if we except its coast-line, was fifty years ago a *terra incognita* to the rest of the world, has become in our time an object of jealous interest to the leading nations of Europe. Almost every part of it has been explored, whether in the interests of geographical science or of commerce. It has been shown to possess, especially in its interior, immense regions capable of great development and teeming populations. In consequence, those nations of Europe that have been smarting under the loss of colonial empire and viewing with jealous eye the vast strides made by England outside her sea-girt home, have turned towards Africa with all that earnestness of hunger usually displayed by late comers in gold-mining regions. France tries to recoup herself for the loss of North America and the Indies by huge efforts to Gallicize Algiers, Senegal, part of the Congo district and several other regions. Her national ambition in this respect has been, under God's providence, of great use to missionary work. Belgium and Holland have hoisted their flags over large tracts of the dark continent in the hope, probably, of restoring thereby something of the pristine splendor of the commerce of the Netherlands. Germany has made a new departure in colonizing on the east coast of Africa; and even poor Italy, under the impression, apparently, that it was

unworthy of a member of the Triple Alliance to be without colonial possessions, has made an unsuccessful attempt to establish her sovereignty in Abyssinia. But England has been in Africa, as elsewhere, the first in the van, and the genius of her statesmen and the swiftness of her fleets have left but the offal to others. She practically owns the eastern continent from the Isthmus of Suez to the Cape of Good Hope. All the south is hers, and she possesses in the west most of what is valuable.

In presence of this rush to Africa on the part of nations for the purpose of greed and gain, it ought to be of interest to consider what the Church has been doing for spreading the light and blessings of the Gospel in those regions, as well when they were utterly abandoned by commerce and civilization as since. It redounds to the credit of the Church in America that to her is due the initiative in modern missionary enterprise in Africa, whilst to a congregation composed chiefly of zealous Frenchmen, and known as that of the Holy Ghost and Immaculate Heart of Mary, is due the honor of proving the possibility of carrying out the most stupendous of missionary enterprises—the conversion of the black races of Africa. The connection of the Church in the United States with the earliest missions in Africa was brought about in this way. The Fathers of one of the early Provincial Councils of Baltimore having become cognizant of the vast efforts being made by Protestant sects to evangelize, according to their views, the republic of Liberia, which had been recently founded under American auspices, resolved to send hither an Apostolic missionary. They chose for this purpose a very remarkable man, Mgr. Barron. He belonged to an ancient and most respectable family of Waterford, Ireland, and was an accomplished scholar and most zealous ecclesiastic. At the time of his appointment to the mission in Africa he was Vicar-General of Philadelphia. His first anxiety, in taking up his new work, was to find missionaries. The young Church in the United States had none to spare. He, therefore, turned to France, the mother-land of missionaries. He consulted on the subject the celebrated M. Desgenettes, the saintly founder of the Arch-Confraternity of the Immaculate Heart of Mary at Notre Dame des Victories in Paris. Through him he made the acquaintance of another saintly founder, Ven. F. M. Libermann, who had recently founded a Congregation of Missionary Priests for the express purpose of the evangelization of the most abandoned souls. Hitherto the Ven. Libermann and his disciples had been engaged almost exclusively in the French colonies; but the new missionary field in Africa quite accorded with their end. And so a band of seven missionaries were put at the disposal of Mgr. Barron in 1843. Theirs was the first serious effort

made since the days of the early Church to Christianize Africa. Such an enterprise could not, of course, count on anything like immediate success. In fact, it met with what the world would call irreparable disaster. Soon after landing on the inhospitable and unhealthy west coast of Africa all the missionaries but one perished. The envoy from America, in a fit of despair, gave up the undertaking and returned home, where he afterwards died the death of a true missionary amid the yellow fever patients of Savannah. The Ven. Libermann found himself thus confronted with the problem: What was to be done with Africa? Was it to be abandoned? Guided by the Holy See and following their own inspiration, he and his determined never to abandon what had hitherto been *par excellence* the region of abandoned souls. And the religious society he founded has been from that day to this faithful to the noble resolve to devote its best efforts to the evangelization of Africa. The annals of its labors are strewn with sacrifices of every kind; year after year it has had to mourn the death of several of its ablest and best members carried off by the deadly climate; but it has never once allowed itself to be discouraged. And, thank God, it can to-day rejoice in results that could not have been dreamed of fifty years ago. In addition to the large and numerous Christian communities that have been formed and fostered by herself, the Congregation of the Holy Ghost finds her pioneer efforts imitated by numerous other religious orders, so that to-day Africa is fairly well supplied with missionaries in every part.

We trust it will prove interesting to our readers to consider the ways and means adopted by African missionaries, the chief obstacles that beset their work, the successes they have so far achieved, and the hopes of ultimate success they can reasonably entertain. The writer had recently an opportunity of getting information on these several points from the very best sources, the heads of various missions. On Pentecost Sunday, this year, there was a notable gathering of African Missioners at the Mother House of the Society already mentioned, for the purpose of electing a superior-general, and transacting other important business. There were present five bishops from Africa, Mgr. De Courmont, Vicar Apostolic of Zanguebar, Mgr. Carrie, V.A., of French Congo, Mgr. Barthet, V.A., of Senegambia, Mgr. Augonard, V.A., of Oubanghi, and Mgr. Le Roy, V.A., of Gabon, the Pro-Vicar of Sierra Leone, Very Rev. James Browne, and several Prefects-Apostolic and Superiors of Missions were also present. Their views, as well as their modes of procedure, may be fairly considered as identical with those of other missionaries in Africa who find themselves in practically similar circumstances.

The first question that suggests itself in connection with the African Missions is, What means do the missionaries adopt for converting the natives? Do they preach to them in large assemblages, as St. Paul did at Athens and St. Patrick at Tara? Or do they content themselves with a stray conversion here and there? Or do they adopt some systematic, though slow, method of winning over the blacks unto Christ?

It would seem that the conversions of adults wholesale, or even in considerable numbers, is utterly impracticable. Polygamy, and all its attendant sensuality, bars the way. And, as plurality of wives is a mark of social prominence, the adult who would become Christian would have to sacrifice not only animal pleasures but social caste. Hence conversions of adults are rare and little to be relied on. However, in some missions, as in that of Senegambia, young people between the ages of ten and twenty are frequently converted, and become excellent Christians. In other places, too, especially when Fetichism is the only superstition prevalent, young men are easily persuaded to give up their idols and embrace the faith. Many missionaries prefer these converts to all others and find them more reliable than those who have been brought up Christians from childhood. Still, the general experience favors the system of taking up children, teaching them the elements of learning, and especially trades and agriculture, and forming out of them Christian families. This method demands much patience, but it is held to be the only one which will bear substantial fruit. And, thus, the majority of missionaries are engaged in the routine work of training young children. It is evident that for such a work the co-operation of nuns is indispensable for the female portion of the population. A self-sacrificing order of French nuns known as the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny has rendered invaluable services in this respect in the missions conducted by The Fathers of the Holy Ghost. There is a community of Black Sisters also which renders great aid for the material service of the missions.

The children brought up by the missionaries are of two classes—those redeemed from slavery and those born free. It is found that the latter form far better material than the former for Christian development. The children are trained with a view exclusively to future usefulness. Their booklearning is confined, as a rule, to the Catechism, and reading and writing—all in their native tongue. The greater part of their time is spent in learning useful trades, and especially agriculture.

Much difficulty is experienced in training the boys to work, as it is considered in Africa unmanly and suited only to women to do work. But systematic training overcomes this as well as other

obstacles. And, thus, when these boys and girls have grown up to manhood and womanhood they are far better able than their pagan neighbors to support themselves. The missionaries have introduced foreign grains and fruit trees into the country, so that in the course of time Christianity will be synonymous with higher civilization and greater prosperity.

When the boys have grown up to manhood they choose partners for life from among the wards of the nuns, and set out, with the missionary at their head, to found a new Christian settlement, or else to introduce the goodly salt of Christianity into communities already existing. But wherever they settle down the missionary goes with them. His presence is needed not only for spiritual, but also for temporal matters. It is to him that the young community looks up for guidance and encouragement in all its undertakings. The establishment of such a community, say of fifty families, is evidently the result of much watching and waiting and toil on the part of the missionaries; but it carries with it the reward of much promise. Nor are the promises founded on these young communities unfulfilled. The members of them observe well the usual Christian practices, and most of them live up to the requirements of holy faith. Thus, in the mission of Senegambia, founded less than fifty years ago, there are already 15,000 Christians. There is an annual average of 1200 baptisms and 600 confirmations. Some 50 priests, together with a corresponding number of lay brothers and nuns, are employed in this mission. They are distributed among 20 stations or residences, some of which are separate a fortnight's journey from each other.

The results obtained may seem small to the eyes of those who are accustomed to the large numbers of Christian populations, or who have read in history of the wholesale conversion of nations. But the obstacles in the way of missionary work in Africa are greater than have ever been experienced elsewhere. The climate, in the first place, is a deadly obstacle. The name given to Sierra Leone, "the white man's grave," may be applied to two-thirds of the spheres of missionary labors. Fever antidotes, such as quinine, form part of the daily bread of nearly every missionary. The average term of endurance of the climate is about half a dozen years.

Another great obstacle to Christian progress in Africa is the ingrained sensuality and barbarism of the people as a whole. Steeped in immorality for thousands of years, enervated by a tropical climate, the inhabitants of the dark continent are but poor subjects for the self-denial inculcated by the Gospel. It will take generations of Christian training and influence to counteract the sensuality and barbarism of the past; but those who are thoroughly

conversant with the situation are unanimously of opinion that the happy consummation of a Christianized Africa is perfectly possible in the course of time. All that is needed is an increase of missionary resources. Every head of missions whom the writer consulted asserted that he could find fruitful employment to-morrow for one hundred more missionaries. "The harvest indeed is great, but the laborers are few."

In connection with the supply of missionaries for Africa, arises the question whether there is any hope of training a native clergy. Great efforts have been made in this respect by the early missionaries and are continued by their successors. In several of the missions there are both Junior and Senior seminaries for the training of black Levites. But the success so far obtained is only very partial. None of even the oldest established missions possesses more than four or five native priests. The percentage of defections before ordination is very large, and the danger of falling away even after receiving Holy Orders is considerable. Experience has taught the vicars-apostolic to be very cautious about promoting blacks to the priesthood; and the Holy See has given express instructions that black priests shall, even though seculars, live in community. But notwithstanding all difficulties, several excellent native missionaries have been raised on African soil; and the heads of missions are unanimous in holding that it will be possible after a lapse of time to provide the country with a native clergy.

For the present, the conversion of Africa must depend on the zeal of those who have imbibed the faith for ages. To help to forward it is the privilege and duty of every Catholic throughout the world. The Church has a prime obligation to teach the Gospel to every nation. The countless millions of Africans who have never heard of Christ appeal to the Church at the present time. The success of her efforts to Christianize them will be in proportion to the co-operation of all Catholics. Missionaries have to be trained, have to be forwarded to their missions, and have to be supported there. Whence will come the resources necessary for all this missionary equipment, if not from the faithful at large? One country, ancient, Catholic France, has hitherto sustained most of the missionary work in Africa. Through the association known as "The Propagation of the Faith," established some fifty years ago in Lyons, and mainly supported by her own people, she has contributed the material resources for the good work; and she has freely given of her noblest and best sons to preach the Gospel to the blacks. But in recent times the demands made on her at home, in consequence of the aggressive hostility of an infidel government, have largely crippled her missionary resources. The time is certainly come when other countries, notably the Church in the United

States, ought to give a helping hand to the evangelization of Africa. It is true that we have many demands at home, and that we have a large dark population at our own doors. But there can be no fear of lack of resources for our home work, which will always appeal to the generous zeal of American Catholics. There is far more danger of our losing sight of the distant vineyard towards which we have obligations in common with the Catholic world. One of the essential attributes of the Church is zeal for the salvation of souls, especially of such as have never received the light of God's spirit; and one of the healthiest marks of every branch of the Church is participation in her missionary spirit. What wonders could be effected in the way of missionary development in pagan lands by very slight sacrifices on the part of even half of our ten million Catholics in the United States! More than fifty years ago Africa appealed not in vain to the infant Church of the United States. To-day she appeals to our increased numbers and resources. The brightest page in the history of the Universal Church is the record of her Apostolic labors in pagan lands, and the brightest page in the history of every branch of the Church is that which records its co-operation in bringing the light of God's truth to those who have sat for ages in darkness and the shadow of death.

JOHN T. MURPHY, C. S., SP.

THE POWER OF ENGLISH NONCONFORMITY.

IT was remarked recently by the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, an eminent Nonconformist authority, that "as Anglicans number only twenty millions and Nonconformists number sixty millions (throughout the world), conversion to any one church in particular must be regarded as mathematically impossible." There was probably more humor than accuracy in the use of the word mathematical. By "any one church in particular" Mr. Hughes meant any church save the Catholic, and certainly we are baffled when we imagine the possibility of the conversion of all sects to one sect. Whichever way we take Mr. Hughes's meaning, whether we think of all Anglicans as being converted to "any one" of the more than two hundred English sects, or of all the multitudinous English sects being converted to the religion called Anglicanism, or of the twenty millions of Anglicans being proportionately divided among the more than two hundred English sects, we can appreciate the numerical difficulty, and we have only to regret that the sheer absurdity of the consideration obscures for the moment its deep gravity.

But now as to the power of English Nonconformity; and before we touch upon sectarian statistics, is it not true that the multiplicity of the divisions gives it a huge power for evil throughout the world? We know that the conversion of the heathen is retarded by the conflicts of the missionaries, that more than two hundred sects, *plus* the huge Eastern schism and *plus* the infinitely varying Church of England, appear to the heathen to present almost every credential save that of a supernatural commission; and thus the power of schism becomes so great throughout the world that it is difficult for truth to fight against it. And perhaps England is the greatest offender. In one sense, indeed, "Orthodox" Russia is more scandalous than Protestant England, for all the world knows that the Czar's Church possesses a true priesthood, and that Orthodoxy is very close to Catholicity, so that the scandal of schism, where there is so much of Catholic truth, is less excusable than in Protestant England. But the English religion has a power for evil which is not possessed by the Russian schism. English ships carry schism and heresy into the ports of many other countries, whereas Russia keeps her schism and heresy for home use, and never thinks of evangelizing the heathen. Thus "the English religion" is almost everywhere, and that religion is

synonymous with variety and discord and with the destruction of ecclesiastical authority.

And it must be remembered, when considering the power of Nonconformity, that a good half of that power is derived from the example of the infinitely divided Anglican Church. Nonconformists reasonably point to the divisions among Anglicans as justifying their own separations. They argue—and their logic is irresistible—"if a church which affects to have Apostolic Succession, to be so richly endowed with Divine Authority as to be able to teach the Catholic Church and the Greek Church, and to be the true heir, the sole heir, of all primitive truth, is yet more divided in its doctrinal teaching than is any one of the sects of Nonconformists, how can she blame us for believing what we like without the affectation of church authority?" Thus Anglicanism lends power to Nonconformity by demonstrating the fallacy of its own pretensions. At the very time that it scolds the dissenting sects for their separation from the national mother-sect, it pronounces their absolution for both schism and heresy by proving that both offences are Anglican.

We cannot speak of English Nonconformity apart from its acknowledged parent stem, for every one of the English sects is the offspring of that Anglicanism which has taught them to make light of church authority. And in the present day we are struck by the strange anomaly that not a few of the English bishops favor Dissent, and even fraternize, doctrinally, with Dissenters. The Bishop of Worcester has administered holy communion to Scotch Presbyterians and English Baptists, and has affirmed in public speeches, and has rejoiced in the affirmation, "I fully recognize the Nonconformist bodies as churches." So, too, the late Archbishop of Canterbury fraternized with the late Mr. Spurgeon, and hailed him as an ally in Christian teaching. And, on the other hand, to show how "comprehensive" of every doctrinal extreme is the Church of England, Dean Farrar says that "seven thousand of the Anglican clergy are avowed supporters of the Romeward movement"—that is, of Ritualistic excesses—while the Dean of Norwich expresses his hope that the Low Church clergy in the same Church will "out-pray the Ritualists, out-work them, out-live them," to the confusion of the wicked "seven thousand." So that Nonconformists may certainly claim the Church of England as their strongest champion for the principle of self-pleasing, and may plead its "hundred sects battling within one church" as "the Authoritative approval of No Authority."

May we not say, then, that the power of English Nonconformity lies mainly in its alliance with Anglicanism; an alliance, not of professed doctrinal harmony, but of warfare against the principle

of authority. We do not say that the power of Nonconformity is mainly in the direction of evil; on the contrary, we should affirm that its power for good has been greater than the power of the Church of England. It would be no exaggeration to say that the national English piety, through the whole of the time of the four Georges, was mainly kept alive by Nonconformists; John Wesley, who left the National Church, being certainly the truest apostle of religious enthusiasm whom Protestantism had ever engendered. To him was due that rebound from Georgian insensibility which prepared the way for the birth of Oxford Puseyism; the modern Ritualists owing their after successes to the earnest spirit which Wesley introduced. English Dissenters have no reason to be ashamed of their influence in leavening the tone of national Protestantism. It is to them, largely, that the National Church is indebted for having preserved its belief in our Lord's Divinity. While the learned Dons of the establishment, as well as rectors and curates, were preaching heavy sermons to prove that "there is a God," or were rivaling each other in scholarly discourses on the authenticity or genuineness of the Scriptures, the Dissenters, in their simplicity, were preaching "Christ Crucified," and left all ponderous disputations to the Anglicans. They might be looked down upon for their half-educatedness (no such charge could now be brought against them), but they were innocent of spreading dry scepticism by laboring over the evidences of Christianity. Nonconformity had its power among the poor, and a gentle and real power it was. Persecuted, despised, almost ostracised for centuries, their quiet, earnest piety has been edifying; and, spite of vagaries which were inevitable in their position, they have seldom been scandalous or indecorous. More than this, they were fully justified in their desertion of a sham church, which had positively nothing in the world that could recommend it, save the fact that it was endowed and established. Men who are old enough to remember the dead-and-alive Anglican religion, so late even as forty-five years ago, the dull and dreary services in the churches, the uninteresting written sermons of the clergy, the neglect of the sick poor and of the dying, cannot wonder that so many Protestants who were in earnest turned their backs on the parliamentary religion. Add to such incitements the adamant social barriers which were thrown up between the wealthy and the poor classes—the latter being only permitted to attend the church services on the condition that they were kept severely to the back seats—and we can only marvel, not that so many became Dissenters, but that so many submitted calmly to such indignities. The present Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, Dr. Gregory, has published his recollections of forty years ago, of Anglican public worship and clerical

dulness, drawing a picture which, for arid, heartless Paganism could scarcely be surpassed by the imagination.

There are two truths on which we should emphatically insist when discussing the present power of Nonconformity, (1) that all dissent was engendered, through three centuries, by the utter unworthiness of Church of Englandism, (2) that the Church of England has persecuted its own offspring as relentlessly as it has persecuted Catholics. There is perhaps nothing more contemptible in English history than the persecution of Dissenters by Anglicans. In the time of Queen Elizabeth every English Dissenter who refused to attend the Church of England divine service was fined one hundred dollars for each offence; and was, moreover, compelled to find sureties for one thousand dollars until such time as he should conform to the Establishment. The refusal to comply with these conditions was followed, first, by imprisonment, then banishment, and if the offender returned to his own country he was hanged by the order of the High Commission. And this state of things was continued by King James I., while the pretended Act of Toleration, A.D. 1689, only permitted Dissenters to enjoy their civil rights on the condition that they took an obnoxious oath; an act which had full play for ninety years, and of which the spirit, if not the letter, was approved by Englishmen down to the early part of this century. Moreover, in the present century the British Parliament has been guilty of repeated acts of gross cruelty towards Dissenters. The House of Lords has been far worse than the House of Commons. Not content with maintaining the Test Act, with refusing education grants to Dissenters, and with insisting on retaining the odious Church Rate, the Upper House of English gentlemen refused to allow Dissenters the consolation of their own ministers at their friends' graves, forbade more than twenty Dissenters to worship together without a license from the Anglican bishop of the diocese, and several times rejected bills for the abolition of those tests which deprived Dissenters of all prizes at the university. Now with such a chain of cruel wrongs against Dissenters it might have been thought that Anglican churchmen would hold their peace in regard to "the bigotry of Catholic governments against Protestants." Quite the reverse. No institution in the world has ever persecuted religious dissidents with more ferocity than has the English National Church, while no institution has ever prated more about its religious and civil liberty, as though it held a monopoly of such privileges.

If we enquire, is the present status of Nonconformity—religious, political, and social—higher or lower in England than it used to be? the answer is, it is in most respects improved. There are still strange and curious sects, whose very names are mirth-provoking;

but educated Dissenters do not heed them any more than they heed the vagaries of eccentric politicians who spout their wild theories in the public parks. Nor is there much difference between the sects as to opinion, or worship, or practice. Indeed, one does not see why Dissenters should be disunited, why they should need so many names, so many sects. Perhaps it is the variety of such distinctions which fascinates the lovers of independence. It is the assertion of the *right* to please one's self. The Registrar General counts 248 sects in England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, without reckoning Jews or Greek schismatics, or the quite innumerable divisions in the National Church. No doubt each of the sects has its speciality, which may be known to the more critical of its adherents, but the great majority appear to be very much alike. Putting aside such sects as a Theistic Church, the Humanitarians, or the Eclectics, who have evidently a leading idea in their novelties, one does not see why there should not be some sort of *impar congressus* between a Reformed Episcopal Church, a Free Church, a Free Episcopal Church, and a Free Church of England; as also between the five divisions of the Methodist Church, the three divisions of the Baptist Church, and the three of the Congregational Church; or why the Unsectarians, the Reclative Religionists, the Independent Religious Reformationists, the Church of the People, and the Episcopalian Dissenters should not find sufficient in common for a combination. We must be afraid that to some minds the love of disintegration—it matters little by what name we describe it—is stronger than the love of religious harmony. The passion for novelty in Nonconformity increases with its unbridled indulgence. It may seem strange; yet, with all this embarrassment of sectarian wealth, there are always men who cannot find the exact thing, and who fly to the easiest remedy at hand, which is to invent one more creed, and proceed to immortalize it by giving to it the name of its inventor.

The most respectable—if the word be not discourteous—of English Nonconformist associations is what is commonly called the Wesleyan. There are said to be about fifteen million Wesleyans in the world; while as to England, there are nearly half a million Wesleyan Methodists; the Primitive Methodists numbering close upon two hundred thousand, and the remaining three divisions of the Methodist community possibly a hundred and twenty thousand; so that the total number is about three-quarters of a million. It is curious, however, that in England Wesleyanism does not spread or develop; the sect seems to be hereditary in belief, but seldom to be recruited by converts. "Respectable," however, is an appropriate word for a body which has preserved a

certain dignity, which has neither taken up with new fantastic ideas, nor minimized its evangelical traditions.

Calvinism, which was said by an energetic writer to have been "long since kicked out of creation," has still its foothold in Great Britain, though it has been softened as to the harshness of its tenets. Calvinistic Baptists, Calvinistic Independents, and Welsh Calvinists have all rubbed off, more or less, the sharp angles of their dogmatism; they have become amalgamated in some degree with other bodies; and their old doctrine of reprobation, repulsive and anti-Christian, if not absolutely discarded, is, at least, not now formulated, and is seldom preached by the more cultured of their pastors.

So that religiously, and perhaps still more, socially, Nonconformity has made real advances. The late Mr. Spurgeon was its benefactor. He found Nonconformity under a cloud, and he helped to raise it to social credit and respectability. It may be said that he did more to reconcile Anglicans to dissent than any other preacher since John Wesley. He was more of a Nonconformist than a sectarian; insisting less upon special Baptist tenets than on the superiority of a "ministry" over a "priesthood." But his great merit was that he made English Dissent "respectable." It may be true that few Anglicans care to enquire whether a Dissenter is a Baptist or a Wesleyan, or even a Quaker or a Plymouth Brother; but socially, and also intelligently, a Dissenter is no longer despised, though he may be regarded as a curious product of self-opinionism. The old expression, "he is only a Dissenter," is never heard in any class of society. Most people have read the story of Dr. Johnson—whether Boswell records it we are not sure—that he threw a weed over his garden wall into the garden of his neighbor, because his neighbor was "only a Dissenter." It is unlikely that Dr. Johnson would have been guilty of such coarseness on the ground of his disesteem for Dissenters; it is more likely, if the story be true, that he was ridiculing the popular Anglican prejudice against a class which had been driven into Nonconformity. We all know that Anglican prejudice, whether busied against "Popery," or against its own multitudinous offspring, the Dissenters, is very hard to be converted to even amenity. But the fact being now admitted, that the new Anglicanism is a wider departure from the old Anglicanism than was Nonconformism in the last century from Georgian Anglicanism, Anglicans feel that they have so "dissented" from their own church that they cannot consistently reproach their brother Dissenters. All Anglicanism is, and always has been, dissent; the Dissenters, so-called, only differing from Anglicans in a more candid profession of private judgment.

Politically, members of parliament have now to reckon with Nonconformists in preparing a "party cry" for an election. Mr. Disraeli made one of his political characters to say in "Coningsby," "I am all for a religious cry; it means nothing, and if successful does not interfere with business when we are in." But that was fifty years ago, and in these days a religious cry does mean something, as about ten millions of Dissenters would soon make known. On such a question as disestablishment, and perhaps still more on that of popular education, the Nonconformists have a strong voice in parliament. As Dr. Brown observed some time ago in the City Temple, "Nonconformists are no longer sent to prison by churchmen; they are sent to parliament to make laws for churchmen. Churchmen have to submit to this, and, so long as they take the money of the state, they must."

But now let us go a little more deeply into the so-called theology of Nonconformists. A somewhat wide acquaintance with their literature may enable us to do this without presumption. And such literature, upon the whole, is very painful. It is indeed more than painful, it is disheartening. While recognizing, as we should wish to do in this brief paper, the *bona fides* of the great body of Dissenters, we have yet to deplore their slowness in realizing the distinction between the Bible and its individual interpretation.

After reading scores of dissenting writings, published by their best men, we seem to be in a perfect wilderness of nothingness, or in a sort of maze of contradictory principles, in which we cannot find the beginning or the end. As to what the Dissenters do *not* believe, we get a tolerably clear understanding; but as to the doctrines which they really do accept, or as to the authority on which they accept them, we are left in a state of confusion. "We do *not* believe," says one of their writers, in a brief summary of Congregational Principles, "that by the waters of baptism, or the touch of priestly hands, any one can be made a child of God, a member of Christ, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven. It seems to us essentially superstitious to think so. But the very earnestness of our protest against the delusion of baptismal regeneration makes us lay deeper stress upon the spiritual truth of which that doctrine is the distortion, almost the caricature." So much for the Christian Sacrament of Baptism. But now as to the duty of Christian Unity. In a tract widely disseminated we find this curious rejoicing in sectarianism: "Diversities in creed, in worship, in enterprise that spring from loyalty to Christ and love to men are our glory." How are we to reason with men who call diversities in creed a proof of loyalty to the Divine Teacher of truth? Indeed these diversities—often flat contradictions—appear to be regarded, not only as permissible, but as revealed and com-

manded by Almighty God. What other interpretation can we put upon such words as "federation, not absorption, must be the watchword of the future; each church faithfully maintaining the special forms of truth *committed to its trust*." Here we have the assumption that (1) these "special forms" of doctrines *are* all truths; and (2) that Almighty God has committed to each sect the guardianship of its contradiction of others' beliefs, and of its own latest inventions in the way of heresies. It is so difficult to make any sense out of the position, and still more difficult to make any religion. It would seem to be both more simple and more honest to say plainly, "There is no such thing as positive truth. Let every man believe that which is right in his own eyes, and believe that it is right because he thinks so."

To turn now for a moment to the dissenting estimate of Ritualism. We shall at best find here a certain amount of common sense, though we shall not find the inferences which Catholic instinct, Catholic knowledge, would assume to be absolutely unavoidable. In a formal and well-written "Address delivered from the Chair of the Congregational Union of England and Wales," we read these very sensible observations: "The position taken up by Anglo-Catholics to-day is almost an entire reversal of that held by the Elizabethan divines of three centuries ago. . . . Our visitors from America will find 'the Church' no longer professing to be a bulwark of Protestantism; for a large section of its clergy scout the very name of Protestant; they will find a teaching ministry turned into a sacrificing priesthood, a communion table into an altar, the confessional creeping stealthily into use again," etc. And one more passage may well be quoted, as being perfectly true as to matters of fact, and as teaching a lesson which is ignored: "It is difficult to repress a smile when we remember that this (Anglican) Church, which refuses to recognise our churches, is itself not recognized by the Eastern Church—either Greek or Russian; that it has been formally excommunicated by the Western Church; and that therefore the whole of its clergy—archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, rectors, vicars, down to the humblest curate—all lie to this day under the ban of excommunication, and every man of them is a schismatic in the eyes of the only Church from which he can have derived that mystical sacramental grace which he claims to have."

If we next take the subject of ordinations, we find that Nonconformists, while at variance with the Ritualists, and at variance with the Catholic Church and with the Russian schism, have a theory which may be formulated as follows: "If a man thinks as I think, and preaches what I choose to consider 'Gospel,' I ordain him by my own personal approval." It is quite possible to express the

same theory in language which sounds less egotistical. For example, we find it formulated in this way by one of the most eminent of Congregationalists: "Our ordinations are the delegation of certain powers of the common priesthood of all believers to a brother deemed to be divinely gifted for their service." Here we have "delegations" from persons who possess no authority to delegate; we have "powers" said to be conferred by men and women who neither possess nor could define the assumed powers; we have a "common priesthood of all believers" imparted by persons who do not believe in a priesthood at all, and who are believers in contradictory doctrines; and we have the judgment as to persons being "divinely gifted" delivered by those who are not themselves divinely gifted, but who elect preachers who will conform to their "views" and strengthen them in their preconceived creeds. After such a conception of ordinations, we expect to find the same spirit of eclecticism pervading all other grooves of theology.

Thue, when we inquire as to the sin of schism, we are answered (in the "Tracts on Church Principles"): "It appears plain, not only that there can be separation without schism, but that a certain separateness is even essential to what may be truly called Catholic Unity, the unity, namely, of all churches, as well as of all Christians, in Christ. For freedom is indispensable to the highest kind of union." These statements, reduced to plain terms, mean that you may indulge in any amount of schism you like, and also in any amount of heresy, provided only you call yourself "spiritually" united with those whom you consider to be in error. And at this point we may notice the habitual confusion, on the part of Dissenting controversialists, between differences of opinion in regard to discipline, and differences of belief in regard to truths. We may also notice the habitual misstatement as to the most elementary teaching of the Catholic Church. As an example of this last kind, we read: "A consistent and loyal Roman Catholic is bound to believe that no members of the Church of England or of any Protestant Church can be saved, except by joining the Church of Rome." No Catholic who ever lived believed anything so false or so uncharitable; and the real doctrine has been explained by theologians in a hundred books, pamphlets and tracts. It is this disingenuousness of statement as to Catholic belief which it is so hard to successfully combat. In the same spirit we have the oft-repeated fiction, "The Catholic would take my Bible from me, and give me only a few mutilated pieces of it," which is thought to be an honest way of putting the truism that the mother and mistress of all truth withholds portions of the Old Testament from young persons; while, as to Paul's Epistles, she warns the faithful not

to "wrest things hard to be understood to their own destruction," after the manner of the vast majority of Protestants.

It may be thought that we have not thus far seen much of "The Power of English Nonconformity." Let us try to describe what this power is in the sense of its present effects on the English mind.

An Englishman finds himself living in an island where, theoretically, every man is a pontiff. With the exception of the small Catholic population—perhaps about two and a half millions—every man, say thirty-five millions, professes a vast range of infallibility in regard to all Christian truths, such as never was claimed by any Pope; being ready at a moment's notice to teach his own church and every other church what is necessary to be believed unto salvation, in regard to sacraments, public worship, church authority and all doctrinal and all moral theology. It is manifest that such an estimate of one's own powers must be accompanied by a correspondingly low estimate of the very "truths" which one is capable of judging. Why do Nonconformists, and why do Low Churchmen, speak lightly of the Mysteries of the Faith; sweeping away, as it were, by half a dozen at a time the most profound and supernatural verities? The answer is that since *they* are the sole judges of such truths, it is obvious that such truths cannot be divine. If any Protestant can settle off-hand the true doctrine of Baptism, or of the Real Presence, it is manifest that the doctrine of Baptism or of the Real Presence must be intellectually level with private intelligence, and that as to its supernatural character, well, how should it have any, since to define the supernatural is beyond the natural intellect, and can be done only by the Holy Spirit of God? Hence, we find that in Protestantism the supernatural element is eliminated from worship as from faith; Protestantism being little more than Natural Religion *plus* the sentiment of faith in redemption. This is, of course, only a rough way of putting it; just as Cardinal Newman summed up popular Protestantism as "paganism *minus* its gods." Intellectually, Protestantism has brought down Christianity to a level with private opinion; and spiritually it has deified private opinion, by making it sole judge of divine mysteries.

As an inevitable consequence, all kinds of Nonconformism—and Nonconformism is only superlative Church-of-Englandism—tend to exalt the individual at the price of truth, while affecting, before all things, to be "spiritual." This word "spiritual" is made to shelter the vagaries of almost any amount of personal vanity, and it is an example of the Protestant habit—specially rampant among Dissenters—of using a word which in itself is very good in a sense which is really very false. Thus, when a

Dissenter denies some Catholic verity he will say that he interprets it "spiritually." (We saw this just now in regard to baptism.) Schism and heresy, so far from being blamed, are spoken of as "spiritual union." The rejection of the adorable sacrifice of the Mass is the "spiritual" apprehension of Christ's sacrifice, and the same is said of the Protestant Communion. The refusal to confess sins in the sacrament of penance implies a "spiritual" confession made to God. And the substitution of Dissenting laymen for Catholic priests shows how spiritual is the pure ministry of the Gospel. No word has been more tortured by all kinds of Nonconformists than this (to them) misunderstood word spiritual. Every kind and degree of disobedience has found shelter under its far-spreading wing; every tortuous explaining away of Scripture, every bold denial of Catholic authority, every invention of some new conceit in heresy, has pleaded its spirituality in its defence, so that there is scarcely a form of error which has not been dubbed spiritual by its sectarian votary for the time being. Like the word "scriptural," what it really means is egotism—"scriptural" being used by Protestants, not to convey scriptural truth, but to convey "*my* interpretation of the Scriptures." These two words have been made the apology by all Dissenters for almost everything which is *not* spiritual, *not* scriptural. Yet the subterfuge is too transparent to deceive any one. Nearly two hundred and fifty sects in England, and at least three big churches within the Establishment, cry aloud that, whatever else Protestantism may be, it is certainly neither spiritual nor scriptural.

The wild luxuriance of English Nonconformity has at least this undeniable merit: That it shows how the "principle of Protestantism," if logically and consistently carried out, must make every man his own Supreme Pontiff. A study of the literature of Nonconformism makes it evident that its chief leaders have no objection to "Popery," provided every man may be his own Pope. Personal infallibility is a Protestant dogma; but always on the condition that the Head of the Teaching Church is excluded from all right to its possession. The power to judge pontiffs, to judge councils, to judge saints is lodged in every Protestant breast; but the Head of the Christian Church is the one melancholy exception to the enjoyment of universal infallibility. To put the position differently: Protestantism, which is a synonym of mutability, and which repudiates the teaching-power of the living Church, confers on every man the power to make his own creed; but the Catholic Church, which has never once contracted its own teaching through a period of nearly nineteen hundred years, is debarred from the privilege of knowing what is truth, and may be taught it by hosts of conflicting sectaries. This may seem an ex-

aggerated estimate; but to test the value of a principle we must see where it would lead us, and though no sincere Protestant, whether Nonconformist or Anglican, would admit that he carried his principles so far, and have the witness of an infinitely divided Protestantism to the general truth of the statement.

Suppose, however, we take the converse of the position. Instead of holding that every man is born a supreme pontiff, we are perfectly aware that there are not a few Protestants—not only Nonconformists but Anglicans—who hold that it does not much matter what you believe; but what *does* matter is that you live peaceably with all men, whether you think them to be heretics or orthodox. Peace, peace is their watchword, their aspiration, and they much prefer a harmony of discords to a harmony of obedience to authority. It is true that Nonconformism has mainly fathered this illusion in its despair of ever arriving at unanimity; but Anglicanism also cherishes the illusion. And we have recently had a remarkable illustration of its mastery over a very strong mind.

Mr. Gladstone, in his letter to the Sovereign Pontiff on "The Validity of Anglican Orders," considers that "an enquiry resulting in the proscription of Anglican Orders would be no less important than deplorable." And he adds that in his opinion "wisdom and charity" would arrest a promulgation of a hostile decision, which would be "an occasion and a means of embittering religious controversy." This may be the view of an astute politician, who is also an amiable Anglican, but it is not a Catholic estimate. It is indeed a very painful example of the cry of "peace, peace, where there is no peace;" or the aiming at smoothing over terrible differences, in place of bringing the differences to an end. We have just been tracing the consequences of this resolute rejection of the divine and infallible teaching of the Holy See; and we have seen that one of the worst features of that rejection has been its "embittering" of irrepressible controversies. Mr. Gladstone thinks it a pity to disturb the doubt about Anglican Orders, because people who doubt may still hope; and it is better, he thinks, to live on in hopeful doubt than to be told plainly that such orders are worthless. This is hardly a love of truth, it is a love of policy. It is carrying the spirit of the House of Commons into the sacred domain of divine rule. If Mr. Gladstone understood the Catholic faith, he would know that the Holy See has been implanted in the world expressly to teach truth to the nations; and that though policy and diplomacy must largely guide its action in all matters which are *not* of divine faith, they can have no place in regard to God's truth. The question of the validity of Anglican orders is primarily a question as to facts, not as to faith or to morals; but

the facts involve such terrible issues as the possession or the want of true sacraments—the receiving or the not receiving holy communion; the receiving or the not receiving absolution; the presence or the absence of the adorable Sacrifice, which is the one only “divine worship” worthy of God. Mr. Gladstone thinks it “wisdom and charity” to obscure such pre-eminent issues, and recommends the going to sleep for another century or two, before trying to put an end to all doubt. Is not this an example of the power of Nonconformism (whether outside or inside the establishment) to so completely shake the foundations of real earnestness that men prefer doubt to divine rule?

The power of the colossal weakness called Nonconformism is in the direction of the dissipation of the intellect in all that concerns divine faith. It is a dissipation which enfeebles the perception of the differences between human opinion and inerrancy; the differences between the natural and the supernatural; the difference between the certainties of the faith and the necessary uncertainties of “I think.” It is a dissipation which began in rebellion, and has resulted in a chaos of doubt. And one of its worst evils is that it puts a false “wisdom” and a false “charity”—no doubt sincerely conceived of by Mr. Gladstone—into the place of the wisdom which would adore divine certainty, and the charity which would seek to save all Christian souls. What wisdom can there be in *not* knowing the truths of God: what charity in *not* ending strifes? The humorous Frenchman who said that “language was given us with which to conceal our thoughts” might have added that, in some cases, it conceals from ourselves the real meaning of the words we employ. Wisdom is not perplexity, charity is not discord; and perhaps the exact opposite would be true, that wisdom cannot rest without knowledge, nor charity without true bonds of unity. The fictions, in the way of language, of which we have given examples—the word “spiritual” being made to veil private sentiment, and the word “scriptural” being made to veil private opinions—show how easy it is to “dissipate” the intellect by confusing the human with the divine. Nonconformism is only the ultimate dissipation of the intellect which puts self before authority. Queen Elizabeth put self before everything; she put her crown before the national salvation. Nonconformism does not do this; it is not so wicked. On the contrary, it desires everybody’s salvation. It only manumits private judgment in the place of living authority, because it does not believe in living authority.

A. F. MARSHALL.

THE APOSTOLATE OF FATHER BARAGA AMONG
THE CHIPPEWAS AND WHITES OF
LAKE SUPERIOR.¹

AMONG the élite of most of the surviving North American Indian nations certain peculiarities with some, and physical traits with others, may still be traced, indicating and connected with their race origin.

Take, for example, the full-blood Abnakis, the Algonkins, and the Micmac tribes in the Dominion of Canada, and they will be found to have retained the cleanly habits and the even temperament peculiar to the peoples of these nations when they were converted to Christianity during the early decades of the seventeenth century by the Jesuit missionaries.

The warriors of the Five Nations, "the Indians of the Indians," as some writers at the present day have, in our opinion, appropriately designated the people of the tribes of the nations of "the Long House," the Iroquoian League of the "Country of the Lakes" of New York, differed materially in facial contour and in physical formation.

The hard-set face, the keen vision, and the athletic form of the warriors of the Mohawk and of the Oneida nations, who, until the eclipse of French supremacy in New France, had been leaders of the raids which devastated the French settlements on the St. Lawrence, and who may well be termed the Roman conquerors of so many contemporary Indian nations, indicated the manner of men they were; whose cult, by inheritance, was of that nature which included no mercy for an enemy, and who ruthlessly struck their tomahawks upon the heads of the helpless women and children of their foes.

The facial contour of the full-blood survivors of these two nations at the present day is about all that is left to indicate their race origin. The Onondagas, who were of a more gentle nature, agriculturists, and the resident custodians for three centuries of the archives, and guardians of the council fire of the league, have so degenerated that little remains of the former dignified appearance of the constituency of the "tribes of the hills," as they were called during the seventeenth century, when the Catholic faith had become permanently, to all appearance at least, established in the

¹ See "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW* for January, 1896; and the "Chippewas of Lake Superior," in the *REVIEW* for April, 1896.

capital of the league in the Onondaga valley, and when Garacantie, its head sachem, one of the most distinguished converts to Christianity, was baptized with great éclat by Bishop Laval, in the castle of St. Louis at Quebec.¹

Those who are familiar with the present condition of the Onondagas, as well as with their past history, say that the people of this nation have never ceased to mourn the fallen condition of their once powerful confederacy.

The Cayugas, who were also of agreeable mien, and who might be termed the "truck gardeners" of the people of the "Country of the Lakes," have become so nearly extinct that few of pure blood can be found to trace a resemblance of original stock.

Our proposition, however, of hereditary distinction apparent in the peoples of the North American Indian families, finds its best illustration, in so far as the Iroquoian nations are concerned, in the Senecas; most numerous of all, having the largest number of warriors, custodians of the "first fire," or "western door" of the "long house," who have inherited the physical peculiarities of their ancestors of three centuries ago. Of the several thousands of this people inhabiting the Seneca reservation in western New York, the great majority of the men are six feet high, of lithe and wiry frame, with blue eyes, elongated facial formation, and agreeable aspect.

Of the "savages of the savages," if we may be permitted to so designate the tribes whom Tecumseh marshalled under the British flag in the war of 1812, they probably represented the most barbaric and the lowest grades of the American Indians at that period.

They were, as a rule, a drunken and a murderous collection of brutal thieves, whose physiognomies but too plainly indicated their debased and cruel instincts. But their autonomy is difficult at the present day to define; their descendents are wards of the Dominion of Canada.

We have, in a former article, described the Ottawas, whose Adonean physique neither national misfortune nor eras of debauchery has materially changed.²

Let us write a few lines about the ensemble of the Chippewas of Lake Superior, as the people of this nation appeared during the decade of Father Baraga's apostolate among them at La Pointe.

Assemble in daylight, in an open field, and in a line, one hundred or more American Indians of the Northwest, of pure blood and of ten different nationalities, and he who is familiar with the

¹ See "The Romance of the Country of the Lakes of New York," in *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xviii., No. 69, January, 1893.

² See "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xxi., No. 81, January, 1896, pp. 106-129.

physiognomies of the races of this people will readily point out to you the Chippewa Indians of Lake Superior among those assembled.

The lower jaw-bone of the average Russian is not more distinctive of his race, than is the high cheek-bone of the average Chippewa. While the broad chin of the former, as well as his upper lip are, as a rule, covered with russet hair, there is no sign of a beard, neither the suspicion of a mustache, on the bright copper-hued and hollow-cheek face of the latter.

But there is no bright gleam in his eyes; while his well-formed and stalwart frame, but scantily covered, seems wasted from want of nourishing food, and tanned from exposure too frequently endured from the want of protection against the winter blast, by the warm blanket, which is the inseparable part of an Indian's costume while living in his normal state.

There is a cast of hopelessness on a full-blood Chippewa's face which is more decidedly developed on the face of his squaw.

Who ever saw a smiling or a merry-faced Chippewa squaw?

Even the daughter of the great Chippewa chief, Wa-ba-jeek, wife of John Johnston of the "Sault," when seen by Colonel McKenney in 1826, a high-caste Chippewa of pure blood, as she was, wore that look of sadness usually seen on the faces of the women of her race; while the tinge of melancholy lingering on the fair faces of Mrs. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft and her beautiful sisters, children of Wa-ba-jeek's daughter and of her Irish husband, added, perhaps, to the charms of these exquisitely mannered ladies.

At what precise epoch this peculiar sadness became a feature in the physiognomy of the people of the once great Chippewa nation, or from what cause, is uncertain. The expression of an American Indian's face is usually grave; but there is no such melancholic peculiarity to be noted among the Roman Catholic people of the Abnakis, the Algonkins or the Micmacs; nor does it prevail among the Christian and Pagan Iroquoians either in New York State or in Canada.

From Marquette the coast line of Lake Superior curves north-west by south, around a semicircular shore, which extends almost due south, forming a bay, the east line of whose coast terminates at a hooked-nosed point in the lake; this is Keweenaw. Lake Superior navigators usually rejoice when they have rounded this rather dangerous point. The bay referred to extends some distance inland, and its waters wash the shores of one of the few agreeable and sheltered localities on the Lake Superior coast.

The Jesuit explorers of the seventeenth century named this calm haven, *L'Anse*, "the little bay"; and this name remains to the present day.

It is a central point in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. It is in the heart of one of the richest mining regions in the world, which has been developed during the nineteenth century. It is midway between the copper mines of the Ontonagan and Keweenaw ranges and the prolific iron mines of the Marquette district.

Before the development of so much mineral wealth, Father Baraga decided to transfer the centre of his apostolic work from La Pointe to L'Anse. He had evangelized the Chippewas, the half-breeds, and the whites on the shores and islands of the headwaters of Lake Superior.

It is doubtful if Father Baraga had any definite idea of the enormous mineral wealth hidden under the arid and uninviting surface of the soil, upon which, at the time, there lived, and starved, and suffered from cold, so many of the people of the Chippewa nation.

But, that he was moved by Divine Providence to make this change, we firmly believe; he was a very holy man, and nearer than most men were to the source of Infinite Power. A great change was impending over the Upper Peninsula; her wealth of copper and of iron, practically demonstrated, drew capitalists as well as adventurers in considerable numbers, to the localities where the richest mines were expected to be discovered. When organized capital became active in the work of developing mining property, skilled miners were brought from Pennsylvania, Illinois, and other States, as well as from Cornwall and from Sweden. The time came when a considerable percentage of these hardy men were found to be Roman Catholics.

Before towns were built, churches erected, and provided with resident pastors, the Catholics of mining centres would have been without pastoral aid in sickness or in extremity, were it not for the accessibility of the venerable apostle of the mission church at L'Anse.

But the impending departure of Father Baraga from La Pointe caused much sorrow among the Indians of that mission.

For nearly a decade he had been their consolation in their abject misery; he had taught them the sublime lesson of Jesus Christ, and the sorrows of the Mother of the Redeemer, the chosen one of her sex, who gave to the world a Saviour, whose suffering and whose death upon the cross were to consummate the Divine mission of man's redemption.

He had come among them as poor as themselves,¹ and they were, beyond a question, the most abject of the American Indian nations of the northwest. He not only had subsisted on their

¹ It will be remembered that Father Baraga had only three dollars when he arrived at La Pointe in 1835.

scanty food, but he had shivered and been nearly frozen during the rigors of the long Lake Superior winters.

When a runner or a messenger had come to his cabin during the frigid seasons, while the temperature was below zero, to beg his attendance at some distant cabin, where some poor Indian whom he had baptized was about to succumb to starvation or to cold, he had put on his snow-shoes, and regardless of time, or distance, or weather, he set out to bring the supreme consolation of religion to the soul of the dying Christian.

He had taught the women of this unfortunate race, upon whom the burden of the common misery rested most painfully, to offer their affliction to the Mother of Sorrows, as a powerful intermediary before the throne of Her Omnipotent Son. And, fully appreciating her virtues and her merits, when the Chippewa mother sent for him, when her child was menaced with death, and kneeling before him exclaimed in the expressive language of her people: "'Black gown,' speak to the mother of the 'Great Spirit,' that my child may be restored to health"; if it seemed good that the child, whom he had baptized, should be saved, this apostolic friend of probably the most miserable people on earth raised his eyes toward heaven and prayed.¹ There are some survivors of the Chippewas of La Pointe, domiciled at L'Anse, saved from expatriation by the forethought of Father Baraga, who tell us, that when the missionary, overcome by the sorrows of the Chippewa mother, appealed "to the mother of the Great Spirit," the expression of his face became transformed, as we might say, from the earthly to the heavenly, for its description would be impossible. But the child of the Chippewa squaw was saved!

The crucial experience of Father Baraga's apostolate during the first decade of his residence at the head waters of Lake Superior at La Pointe may never be known.

He was very reticent in all that related to his personal privations. Undoubtedly the Chippewas on this island were among the poorest of the people of this nation at the time; and perhaps on this account, the majority of them were converted to Christianity with less hard labor than they would have been, had they been living in a more comfortable condition. In the circuit of the adjacent islands including points on the main shores of Michigan and Wisconsin, comprising the field of Father Baraga's missionary work while at La Pointe, there were eighty distinct bands of Chippewas, having as many chiefs. When these chiefs came to the

¹ Related to us by the late Louis P. Trempe, one of the French merchants of the Sault.

council,¹ which we have referred to in a previous article, in the year 1826 at Fond du Lac, they, in the respective speeches of their tribal orators, had for their principal theme their great poverty, which was enlarged upon by each speaker.

According to Colonel McKinney, these chiefs comprised the greatest number of titled beggars among the American Indians he had ever seen gathered on any one occasion. It may be taken as a fact that at the time of Father Baraga's advent, the social condition of the people of these eighty bands had not improved. Poor and shiftless as they were, they had not given up their old-time vices, comprising debauchery and polygamy, while they still retained much of their race pride.

They were, moreover, generally full-blooded; few half-breeds were to be met with in the Chippewa villages. Whenever the missionary intended visiting for the first time a Chippewa village at any considerable distance from La Pointe, he usually sent one of his most intelligent converts a month at least before he expected to reach the scene of his intended mission,² whose duty it was to provide a cabin or a lodge, in which the missionary might live, and to construct near by a temporary chapel.

When he arrived at the village, if there had been no opposition on the part of its Pagan inhabitants, he sent for the chief of the band and informed the latter that he had an important communication to make to his tribe, asking that he assemble his people in council on a day named to hear the speech he would make them.

This was in accordance with Indian custom. All important business was transacted in such councils and they were usually attended by all the Indians present in the village at the time. Father Baraga addressed the assemblage and announced in fervent language the object of his coming to their village, requesting those present to consider his words and to assemble on the following day, that their chief might make known their willingness to listen to the instruction he had come to impart, or their refusal to be instructed in the religion of the "Great Spirit," whose minister he was.

This was in accordance with Indian etiquette. In fact he was not unknown to the Chippewas; his work at La Pointe, the saintly life he had led, and the power he was believed to possess to heal the sick, had become generally known, and it very rarely happened that his way to success had not been opened for him through the efforts of the faithful messenger whom he had sent to announce his coming, and that at the second council which assembled he

¹ "The Chippewas of Lake Superior," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xxi., April, 1896, pp. 366-7.

² Manuscript, Rev. W. Elliot, O.S.P.

was, if not welcomed, accorded permission to preach and to instruct. Father Baraga in his intercourse with the Chippewas was careful to follow their customs so far as these related to official intercourse with strangers coming to their tribes, and, by following the method we have attempted to outline, he gained his object without infringing upon their customs or wounding their pride.

When these formalities had been completed, and they sometimes required a week's time, the missionary gave notice that he would be pleased to have the men, women and children assemble on the ensuing Sunday, and witness the blessing and dedication of the little chapel and the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice. The sight of a "black gown" in his priestly robes, the solemn ceremony of the dedication of the mission chapel to some saint, the offering of the mass, the responses being made by his convert messenger, the singing of hymns by the latter in the Chippewa language, from the Chippewa prayer book of Father Baraga, all tended to prepare the minds of those present for the sermon which closed the exercises of the opening of the mission in that village. Again, in the afternoon vespers was chanted and another sermon preached. Invitation was given to all to attend the mass at six o'clock each morning, and to such as desired to be instructed, whether men or women, to remain after mass in the morning, when a class would be formed for daily instruction.

One by one these were drawn by the prayers of the missionary to seek the light of faith; and gradually the majority of the people, after being fully instructed, were baptized. Those only who were living in polygamy held back, but these were in time compelled by general opinion to abandon their evil ways. The evangelization of such Chippewa communities required generally about two months, according to the number of their people; but Father Baraga remained until his work was successfully ended. In the meantime some of the more intelligent among the men and women had been taught to read the Chippewa prayers; certain of these were appointed to read from the prayer book devotional exercises in the chapel on Sundays and to sing the hymns they had learned.

With the promise of a visit to the village at no distant day, Father Baraga returned to La Pointe, leaving a Christian community where he had found general unbelief.

Father Baraga's miraculous intervention on many occasions in behalf of the unfortunate constituents of his mission had become so widely known that he was credited by the Indians and half-breeds with sanctity, and venerated by this people as a saint; and as such he was almost worshipped by the copper-colored Christians, as well as by the greater majority of white people resident,

during the latter years of the missionary's life, in the Lake Superior region.

While contemplating his removal from La Pointe to L'Anse, Father Baraga brought to the former mission his fellow-countryman, the Franciscan, Father Skolla.¹

This holy priest became his successor at La Pointe. For fifty years the Indian missions there and in the vicinity have been almost continuously served by the venerable disciples of St. Francis, to the great spiritual advantage of the Chippewas, not only at La Pointe, but also on the islands and littoral of the headwaters of Lake Superior.

When Father Baraga came to L'Anse in 1843, he found the majority of the Indians dwelling upon the shores of the bay almost solidly Pagan.

It will be remembered that when Colonel McKenney, in 1826, accompanied General Cass to Fond du Lac, he mentioned in one of his letters that a Methodist mission was conducted at that time at L'Anse, under the auspices of Mr. Dingle, an agent of the American Fur Company.

After the exit of its patron, this mission had languished; it had but a feeble existence and a small following when Father Baraga planted the cross on the shores of the bay opposite its location.

Some of the Methodist Indians who knew of the missionary became much excited upon his coming and made threats of violence; but the venerable apostle had experienced similar opposition while fighting Paganism among the Ottawas in the Grand River reservation ten years previously, and he paid but slight attention to the menaces of those who opposed his coming.

Father Baraga built a church,² a mission house and a school, and commenced the work of evangelizing the Chippewas in the vicinity of his mission. Several Indian families from the vicinity of La Pointe, from Lac Vieux, Desert, Lac du Flambeau, etc., followed their venerated pastor and made their homes in the vicinity, on the shores of L'Anse. He had soon gathered around him a numerous following of Christian Chippewas. His missionary work proceeded with such success that debauchery was extirpated, sobriety succeeded, and then conversions and baptisms followed.

Father Baraga's experience in the Ottawa missions had taught him that the Indian's occupancy of the soil, under the American Government, was uncertain. He had seen the Ottawa tribes whom he had converted to Christianity deprived of their extensive lands by the *convenience* of Indian treaties, and his Christian com-

¹ Manuscript, Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

² The original mission church at L'Anse was dedicated to the Most Holy Name of Jesus.

munities expatriated to unknown territory west of the Mississippi. He could not contemplate such a result to his Chippewa constituents without grave solicitude. To prevent such a sad fate for those under his spiritual care, he bought in his own name, from the United States Government, a large tract of unoccupied land contiguous to his mission. This he divided into acre lots, upon which he had built small but comfortable dwellings, which he distributed among the heads of the Christian families surrounding his mission. No subsequent treaty could affect these Indians domiciled upon Father Baraga's own land; voluntary exile alone might cause their removal to the far-distant regions of the west. This is a paternal episode in the missionary career of Father Baraga; it speaks eloquently of the charitable instincts of his heart, while in the history of all missionary work during the nineteenth century, it will be difficult to find a parallel.

We do not assert as a fact, but from what we have learned, we are inclined to believe, that while Father Baraga was in Europe in 1837, he converted his patrimonial annual income of 750 Austrian florins into a cash capital, to enable him to carry on his missionary work and to provide funds for the publication of his works in the Chippewa language.

On a basis of 5 per cent., this conversion would have produced a cash capital of 15,000 Austrian florins, equivalent to about \$7500.

This sum, with the donations he had received while in Europe, provided funds for missionary work and enabled him to have printed his first editions of religious books in the Chippewa language, which were printed in Paris.

Although liberal allocations had been, in the meantime, made by the Propaganda of Lyons, and by the Leopoldine Society of Vienna, which latter had been organized through the efforts of the Very Rev. Dr. Résé, to provide funds especially intended for the promotion of missionary work among the Indians of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior, these allocations had to be paid to the ordinary of Detroit, and not direct to Father Baraga; it is doubtful if the venerable missionary up to the time of his inauguration of the mission at L'Anse, had received financial aid from either of these charitable organizations; and we are inclined to believe, he was deprived of such assistance in his beneficent work for several years later by adverse causes.

In writing an outline of such a history as is that of Father Baraga, the scenes of which are laid principally in our own State of Michigan, and the events of which have occurred during our own lifetime, it is exceedingly agreeable to be able to introduce some contemporary witness whose reliable testimony might confirm what we may write.

This is all the more satisfactory to us, for our subject is one which might tempt any writer to exaggerate the known facts of such a history.

But so many pass out of existence during a consecutive term of half a century, that but few contemporaries remain whose intelligence and whose memories would render them qualified to testify in regard to events in Father Baraga's career during the "forties" and "fifties," while documentary or printed detail is almost entirely unavailable. It is, unfortunately, our own experience that most of our commercial and professional correspondents who knew the venerable missionary, and who were witnesses of his works during the decades under consideration, and whose intelligence and veracity might throw additional light upon uncertain events, have passed from this life. And, as we have already stated, the man of all others who was best qualified to testify as to his ecclesiastical chief, the Very Rev. Edward Jacker, has long since been called to his eternal reward, leaving but a brief outline of the history needed, which would require volumes to elaborate, were the materials available.

But among our commercial correspondents in the Lake Superior region during the "fifties" a few still survive; one of the number is the Hon. Peter White, President of the First National Bank of Marquette, who for more than half a century has been identified with financial and mining operations in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, and who at times acted as the fiduciary of Frederick Baraga.

In response to our appeal for light upon the career of the missionary, Mr. White wrote to us under date of October 23, 1895. It might be proper before giving his letter to state that he is a prominent member of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Marquette and senior warden of that church.

"I first knew Bishop Baraga," he writes, "at the time Father Baraga, at L'Anse in 1850. His residence was a few miles distant from the location of the present town of Baraga.

"There was a population at the Roman Catholic mission of about 800 Chippewas, 100 or more half-breeds, and from 20 to 30 Frenchmen who had intermarried with Chippewa women.

"Father Baraga was the devoted friend of these people; they all loved him and almost worshipped him.

"He purchased from the government for the families of his mission a tract of land which he divided into large lots, on which he built houses for each family; he partly furnished these dwellings, and gave the heads of each a cooking stove, furniture, clothing and a supply of provisions to commence housekeeping in a civilized manner.

"He taught them to read, write, and to sing, and how to lead Christian lives. He instructed them as to the cultivation of the soil, providing them with seed and other requisites.

"He translated portions of the Bible into their language, prayers, and hymns,

compiled a grammar, speller, and reader for them, and had these separate works in the Chippewa language printed at his own expense.

"He provided and paid a teacher to instruct the Indians and their children.

"They gathered around him like a band of children, and listened to the words of wisdom he had always ready for them. Should any of them become sick, he provided a physician and medicine.

"He probably had lived among these Chippewas during twenty years, ministering to their spiritual and temporal welfare before he was created Bishop of Sault de Ste. Marie.

"Occasionally some 'sick call' would come to him from Houghton, Eagle River, Eagle Harbor, the Cliff Mine, the Old Albion Mine, or some other mining location on Keweenaw Point.

"I have known him to respond to these 'sick calls' in the dead of winter, alone and on snowshoes; very laborious journeys they were, full of peril and unlimited hardship and undertaken to administer the last rites to a dying Christian.

"There was no other priest for years in all that region.

"The houses Father Baraga caused to be built for the people of his mission were not large, but they were adequate to their condition and wants: most of them had been accustomed to live in wigwams.

"The houses were mostly one story or one and a half stories high, with good windows and doors, but enclosed with plain boards; each had a brick or stone chimney, and probably cost from \$500 to \$700, while the furniture cost not to exceed \$200 for each.

"I cannot give you the size of the lots, but they were from 200 to 300 feet square, and the grantees or their descendants still occupy them. The place is still called the "Roman Catholic Mission," but its population has dwindled down to about a third of its former number.

"On the opposite shore of the bay, where at a corresponding period there was a Methodist Mission, comprising many souls, not more than 150 remain. I have one of Bishop Baraga's grammars. The title reads:

"A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
GRAMMAR

OF THE OCHIPWE LANGUAGE.

Spoken by the Chippewa Indians, also by the Algonquin, Ottawa, and Pottawotomie Indians, with but little difference, etc.

By Frederick Baraga,

Missionary at L'Anse, Lake Superior.

Detroit.

Jabez Fox, Printer.

1850."

Mr. White concludes as follows:

"It is a great pleasure to me to be, even in a small way, of any assistance to you in such a noble task as you have undertaken, and I regret not being able to give you something better."

We regard such contemporary testimony as that of Mr. White as of great value.

While the venerable missionary thus labored for the moral and spiritual regeneration of the Chippewas, whom he sought to concentrate at L'Anse, and while he devoted his personal fortune to provide them homes at this mission, as the testimony of our correspondent, the Hon. Peter White proves, in order to lead this

people to a condition of civilized life, and to place them beyond the possibility of government removal, it was not the fate of the people of this unfortunate and miserable remnant of a once powerful nation to profit by such generous efforts to the general extent Father Baraga intended and desired. The fatalist tendencies of the average Chippewa, the miserable state in which he lived, the great love of kindred, added to the strong attachment maintained among all American Indians toward the soil wherein repose the remains of their departed ones, were peculiarities of race nature leading to callousness and disinclination to leave their homes, however wretched these may have been, or to separate from kindred who continued to lead Pagan lives.

This, in our opinion at least, may explain why a greater number of Christian converts did not come and take up their homes at the mission of L'Anse.

Few men of his time estimated more highly the work of saving a human soul than Father Baraga; this is evident from his letters to his sister, but confirmed more positively by his self-sacrificing efforts to win from a state of darkness the souls of the wretched people among whom the second decade of his sacerdotal life was exhaustively spent.

His mission at L'Anse had become a success as far as it was possible under the circumstances which we have attempted to explain. He was enjoying what to him was a life of comparative ease, if rising at three o'clock in the summer, and at four o'clock in the winter mornings each day, meditating an hour, and offering an early mass in his Church, so that the adult people could go to their work, supervising his school, and giving daily instruction, could be considered an easy life.¹ But such it was to Father Baraga; for each day had its enjoyment in his philological studies, which after his sacerdotal and missionary work had been performed, became his recreation and his great solace.

He was thus situated when, as we have stated, the irruption of a white population rapidly followed the discovery of great mineral wealth in the Lake Superior peninsula. This irruption came so rapidly that Father Baraga was confronted with a situation which soon overwhelmed him with priestly duties he had probably never contemplated, and which were destined to tax the physical powers he was endowed with, frail indeed as these were, to the uttermost extent. The mining towns were at first located in the Ontonagon the Keweenaw and the Marquette ranges of the Peninsula; and, as we have stated, their constituency comprised different races of hardy men, with different creeds, having a considerable percentage professing the Roman Catholic faith. It was during the initial

¹ It was the rule of life of Father Baraga to fast each day until noon.

years of the development of copper and of iron mining in the localities mentioned, that some of the hardest work accomplished during his career as a missionary was performed by Father Baraga. The fact that a saintly priest was located at L'Anse soon became well known to the Catholics in the respective mining communities; this knowledge was consoling to many, who were assured that a message would surely bring this priest promptly to the bedside of the sick among them, or to minister in his dying hours to the victims of accidents, which were not at the time of unfrequent occurrence..

This hopeful consolation was well founded. During the comparatively brief season of Lake Superior navigation, but in fair weather only, the shortest approach to most of the mining localities could be made by means of Father Baraga's small boat from so central a location as was L'Anse.

But during more than half the year a trip by such a little craft was impracticable.

No disciplined soldier could have been more prompt to obey the command of his superior than was Father Baraga to respond to "sick calls," come from whatever direction they might. If the journey could be made by his boat, so much time, always precious to him, could be saved; under any circumstances, he felt bound to bring the consolations of his sacred ministry to the bedside of those in danger of death, by the shortest method available.

Brave soldier of the Cross that he was, he did not hesitate to sling his knapsack on his back, and sometimes with an attendant, but often alone, on urgent occasions, this scion of a noble house, who had been reared in a castle in the fair climate of far-distant Carniola, set out upon journeys which were, as Mr. White describes them to have been, "full of hardship and often attended with peril."

During the frigid season the march had to be made on snowshoes; it was generally continuous, for there were no wayside inns, not even inhabited cabins, where food and shelter could be obtained. Fortunate did Father Baraga esteem the chance, if on some such journey a deserted cabin or an abandoned wigwam was met with in the solitude of the forest, which might afford shelter for the night or a temporary refuge during the worst raging of a Lake Superior storm; while usually during midwinter the temperature ranged below zero.¹

For years this kind of missionary life continued; it was only when churches had been built in the mining centres and resident pastors provided for them, that Father Baraga was relieved of

¹ On some of these journeys Father Baraga passed the night, wrapped in his blanket, in a snowdrift.

much of the hardest of such work. Had this venerable missionary been gifted with a robust frame, his great endurance would still be marvellous.

But his frail proportions, his delicately molded feet, his slender arms, his small, soft hands, his face more like that of a young girl than of a man, made up an ensemble apparently unfitted for the endurance of any kind of hardship. Such, however, are the cold historical facts of the status of Father Baraga and the method of his work during the decade under consideration.

We have not the faculty to draw a pen picture as real as we could wish. Our readers will remember the scene presented when, with the half-breed "Winzon," as his light boat was tossed upon the crest of the waves of a Lake Superior sea and was driven toward the rough coast; he rested on the bottom of his boat, reading his breviary, apparently all unmindful of the peril which crazed his attendant.¹

And again, when travelling with another attendant upon the ice, the great mass separated from its anchorage and was being driven rapidly out to sea, while he, unmoved by the danger, which caused his dark-hued attendant's face to turn white with fear, continued his daily meditation and prayer!

No wonder, then, that when, after two decades of toil such as had been his, we saw Frederick Baraga in his episcopal robes in Detroit in 1855, we were overcome with the evidence his personality but too plainly indicated, of the exhaustive missionary work he had performed on the Lake Superior Peninsula and on the shores of its adjacent waters.

Although at the time mentioned his slight form was unbent, the kindly gleam, which in former years had greeted his friends from his soft blue eyes, indicating the benevolence of his heart, was no longer bright, because those eyes had been partly seared by the snow-blasts and the sleet of Lake Superior storms, as hurtful to human vision as is the burning sand of an African simoon; while his face from constant exposure, as we have stated, had become tanned to the color of that of a half-breed.

In no country, probably, during the present century has the chase had a reality such as may be claimed for those localities included in the North American regions west of Lake Saint Clair. We may follow the hunter, whether he be an Indian or a white man, but in either case an ardent sportsman, as he courses through the forest in pursuit of the noblest of its wild animals, which is finally laid low by the bullet of his pursuer. This is the triumph of the latter. But if he be asked: Is the carcass of the wild beast

¹ "The Chippewas of Lake Superior." AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. xxi., pp. 371-373, April, 1896.

he has slain the reward of so much toil? If he be a true hunter, he will answer, No! The carcass represents the *game*.

The ideal prize, won after hours and days, perhaps, of excitement and fatigue.

We believe Father Baraga to have been one of the most intrepid and enduring hunters during the two decades of his sacerdotal life spent in the Lake Superior region, during the first half of the present century, if we may be permitted to make the parallel.

But his was not the *game* of the average hunter. No hunter who for days, perhaps, might chase and finally bring down the wild buck, could claim such a reward as Father Baraga was accustomed to win after an active effort, such as few, whether they were white or red men, could have endured.

His ideal *game*, if we may be permitted to use such a similitude, was the Immortal Soul—priceless in his eyes, and to be won or saved at any cost of personal endurance or self-sacrifice.

In the early history of copper mining in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, and during the "fifties," one of the principal lake ports during this period was Ontonagon. From this port was reached one of the richest mines. It was at the mouth of Ontonagon River; from its docks were transferred to the steamers the solid masses of pure copper and the ore taken from the mines in what was called the Ontonagon Range.

Here were also unladen the provisions, machinery, mining requisites, and other freight for mines. One of the richest in pure metal worked in this range was the "Minnesota."

We went down into the depths of this mine when visiting this region during the "fifties," and we saw in one of its chambers a solid wall, 20 or more feet square, of bright, pure copper, which had to be cut out by the hammer and chisel of the miner. The town of Ontonagon during Father Baraga's apostolate at L'Anse contained many Catholics; he was frequently called there to attend sick or disabled miners.

To reach there by his boat, he had to coast around Keweenaw Point and along the shore—a trip which was rarely made without more or less danger. But when such a journey by boat was impracticable, he had to traverse the great forest described in our previous article,¹ where neither human habitation nor living being could be seen.

From its position, Ontonagon became one of the most important outposts of Father Baraga's missionary work among white Christians during the earlier years of copper mining in the Lake Superior Peninsula.

¹ "The Chippewas of Lake Superior," AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1896, p. 359.

Here it became necessary to organize a congregation and to build a church sufficiently large, in which the people might assemble on Sundays and festivals, when the saintly missionary came to minister to their spiritual needs.

But the majority of the Ontonagon Catholics were of Irish birth or lineage; these contributed so liberally that in a brief time a half-square was purchased in Father Baraga's name, on which a spacious church was erected, which, in compliment to the zeal and liberality of its founders, was solemnly dedicated to St. Patrick.

If we are not mistaken, this was the first Christian Church intended for the use of white people dedicated in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. A century and a half previously, Ste. Anne's, the mother church of the northwest, had been dedicated by Father Delhalle at the post of Detroit.

Ste. Anne's, at Detroit, and St. Patrick's, at Ontonagon, are monumental landmarks, coincident with the foundation of civilization in the Lower and Upper Peninsulas of the State of Michigan.

At stated times Father Baraga announced his coming to the Catholics of Ontonagon; he usually remained in the town several weeks, during which he conducted missions for the English-speaking Catholics, the French and the German. To these he preached, and he also heard confessions in their respective languages, while for each special services were held and the Holy Sacrament administered.

In the meantime the great wealth of copper found in the Minnesota and in adjacent mines drew large numbers to the vicinity of the former; the town of Minnesota was organized; there were many Catholics in its constituency, which was not unlike that of Ontonagon. The same work of parochial organization was successful, while the preponderating element of Catholic population being of Irish birth and lineage, the spacious church subsequently built was, like that of Ontonagon, dedicated to the patron saint of Ireland.

To this central location Father Baraga came regularly and remained for weeks, giving retreats for the respective nationalities.

Probably the richest copper mines in the world remained to be developed between the Ontonagon Range and Point Keweenaw, on the Keweenaw Peninsula. These newly-developed mines had their respective centres at Copper Harbor, Eagle Harbor, Eagle River, and around the shores of Portage Lake.

These centres of mining wealth were rapidly filled by a population partaking very much of the elements combined at Ontonagon and Minnesota. They were in due time visited by Father Baraga, and where the number of Catholics in each permitted, congrega-

tions were organized, while temporary and permanent places for worship were liberally provided by the mining companies and gratuitously placed at the disposal of Father Baraga.¹

These, in their turn, were regularly visited by him, and the usual mission work already described ensued.

The copper mines had been fairly well developed before eastern capitalists became assured of the rich deposits of iron ore in the Marquette Range; they invested largely in opening the most prolific iron mines probably in the world.

This made Marquette a centre for iron mining in its vicinity, and the focus of a population somewhat different from that of the Ontonagon and Keweenaw Ranges; it was largely composed of Cornishmen and Swedes.

But Marquette was visited by Father Baraga, and the nucleus of its present Catholic population was organized.

This completed his missionary circuit in the Upper Peninsula among its white residents. What deserves mention in connection with the sacerdotal work of Father Baraga during this preliminary period in the history of this work among the white population which had come to the Lake Superior region, was the fact that this population was to a great extent composed of men. Comparatively speaking, there were very few women. Husbands could not provide suitable homes for their wives and children in the mining towns, and these were left where they could live more comfortably at less expense, and where they would not have to experience the rigors of a Lake Superior winter. Neither should the fact be overlooked that there was much self-denial and submission to the will of Divine Providence on the part of Father Baraga in this kind of missionary work among white people.

Since his advent into the missionary field among the red men of the Upper Lakes, he had lived with them, and he had at times partially starved on their uninviting, unsavory, and scanty food. As we have stated, when one of these unfortunates, the most miserable wretches probably living among the human race, was apparently about to yield to the inevitable, the "black gown" was sent for, to impart to the dying Indian the inestimable gift of immortal life. He did not hesitate when the messenger came to his cabin, whether it was day time or night time, whether the temperature was mild or many degrees below zero; the call upon which, perhaps, depended the future fate of an immortal soul was promptly responded to, and at times at the risk of his life, which we have

¹ The chief factor in these corporations was the managing official, usually termed "the clerk of the mine." He was the fiduciary of the capitalists interested in the enterprise. Generally speaking, he was shrewd enough to appreciate the influence which Father Baraga might exercise over his employees.

described, such as few mortals would, knowingly, have had the courage to face.

Father Baraga deeply sympathized with the unfortunate Chippewas; he knew their race instincts but too well, and while much of his time was devoted to their spiritual needs, as well as to the conversion of the more obdurate Pagans among them, his leisure hours were occupied with the study of their language, which, as we have explained, was his greatest recreation.

Nearly twenty years of his mature life had been spent among the Ottawas and Chippewas of the lakes. After he had evangelized the tribes of the former nationality, after he had succeeded in reforming their social condition, and partially restoring this fine race to the status of economic independence which had made them prominent among the nations of the red men of the West prior to the collapse of the grand scheme of their distinguished leader, Pontiac, to establish Indian control over all the territory west of the Ohio—the failure of which sent them demoralized and miserable to their former homes on the shores and islands of Michigan waters—Father Baraga was fated to see, as we have shown, the results of his most successful work among the Ottawas interfered with, and to a great extent nullified, by the expatriation of these tribes—Christian as most of their constituency were, but Christian and Pagan alike—to the distant regions west of the Mississippi. This result was a fatality common to most of the American Indian races who had been domiciled in the States whose territory had been encroached upon by white civilization. It may be said to have been inevitable; intelligent as Father Baraga was, while he may have deplored a result which he probably foresaw would be detrimental to the spiritual welfare of his Ottawa neophytes, he bowed to the will of God, satisfied with the part he had performed in the reformation of, perhaps, the finest of the Indian races of the West.

The advent of the whites, and in such numbers, into Chippewa territory, even while Father Baraga was absorbed in missionary work among the people of this nation, but not before he had secured a home for his spiritual followers at L'Anse, must have been an intimation to the venerable missionary that the same inevitable fate awaited the Chippewas of Lake Superior which had overtaken the Ottawas.

If Father Jacker had been spared, he might, perhaps, have shed some light upon the effect of this result upon the mind of Father Baraga; for he, above all others, had shared the confidence of his venerable chief. Interested as the great missionary was in the spiritual and temporal welfare of the Chippewas, such light might enable us to appreciate more fully his angelic nature in accepting

a situation which apparently either gave menace of a calamity or possibly a hope for the improvement of the temporal condition of the people of the Chippewa tribes.

As a result of his missionary experience, Indian life, with all its associations, including its phases of misery, had become, it may be said, a second nature; he had become accustomed to deal with a simple-minded and honest-hearted race of men and women, who, when they had been won from Paganism and baptized, became as docile as little children.

Such for nearly twenty years had been his daily experience; as he wrote to his sister, he was at home among the Indians, but among the whites, "he was like a fish thrown upon land."

With this changed status he was from necessity, and from the charity of his heart, not unwillingly called upon to exercise the functions of his sacred ministry, not among the guileless children of the forest, but among the white races represented by the adventurous advance guard, who had come to the Upper Peninsula in the pursuit of fortune with some, and of employment with most, ulcerated with God only knows how many of the prevailing vices of the times.

But he entered upon this work among the whites with a hearty zeal. His great sanctity inspired the men he addressed with reverence, and they listened to his gentle and apostolic admonitions with the consciousness that his sincerity was such as a holy priest only could possess.

While all this new work came to Father Baraga up in the Lake Superior region, his mind frequently reverted to such of the Indians as had been permitted to remain upon the islands and littoral of Lakes Huron and Michigan.

He found time to look after the spiritual welfare of his neophytes at the Sault and below, at Mackinac, St. Ignace, Cross Village, Cheboygan and Little Traverse, while he thus referred to his converts on Beaver Island: "The Indians of Beaver Island are very faithful and steady. Although they seldom see their missionary, they faithfully persevere in their religion, and meet every Sunday in their humble church to sing and pray until the missionary comes again to hear their confessions and announce to them the word of God, which they receive with thankfulness and spiritual joy."

When he did not go to his other Indian neophytes they came to him, and so it came about that he continued to control the spiritual welfare of all his Indian converts left within his reach.

But the white population kept pace with the development of the mineral wealth of the Lake Superior Peninsula. Increased numbers greeted Father Baraga at each succeeding visit he made

to the mining centres we have named; his work was extended, while the time required for his missionary exercises at each place became greater. He endeavored to obtain assistant priests from his own ordinary, but none were available, and he appealed for aid to Cincinnati.

It does not appear that he was successful. If any priests were sent to him by Archbishop Purcell, they did not remain long enough to become useful.

Few available priests could meet the requirements of Father Baraga. Few were qualified to hear confessions in the English, French and German languages, and to preach in these respective languages; besides, it was not a country where, especially during the winter season, an unacclimated European priest would care to live, and deny himself the use of wine at table and liquor as a stimulant against the rigors of the climate.

But upon this point Father Baraga was inexorable. He exacted from any priest associated with himself in missionary work the most rigid, practical adherence to the principle of total abstinence, which he had, as a rule of life, adhered to ever since that fearful night while in his missionary cabin at Grand Rapids, and menaced with death by the howling, drunken savages, and on his knees in prayer, he had made the vow to abstain from the use of intoxicants during his life.¹ It is certain, however, that Father Baraga ultimately succeeded in obtaining priestly assistance from his native province, where his renown as a missionary had inspired vocations in the hearts of some distinguished young priests, who communicated to him their wishes to associate themselves in his missionary work. Some of these young heroes came to him at L'Anse and were instructed in the Chippewa and the English languages; in the French and German they were already proficient. Two also came from the southern frontier of France, and were prepared, one especially for Indian missionary work, and the other for general work at Marquette. Under the approbation of the Archbishop of Cincinnati these accessions were made to the clerical force of the diocese of Detroit in the Upper Peninsula. One of the most prevalent evils which Father Baraga had to combat in the mining towns, such as Ontonagon, was intemperance; this evil among a *quasi* celibate population, unaccustomed to such a climate, was quite difficult to overcome.² The memory of Father

¹ "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xxi., January, 1896, p. 123.

² All unconscious of the fact, a great factor operating against the missionary work of Father Baraga in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was Samuel Nathan Pike, of Cincinnati.

This amiable, this generous-hearted, this liberal patron of the fine arts, as he was,

Matthew however, was still warm in the hearts of many who had taken the pledge, and who still retained the medal received from the hand of this apostle in their native land, and who had remained faithful to their vows of total abstinence from intoxicating drink ; these the missionary encouraged to organize in their respective localities into temperance leagues, to whose members he granted such spiritual reward as it was in his power to bestow.

He fostered these societies in every way ; he delivered lectures on interesting subjects to them at stated times, and all through his missionary career among the whites of the Lake Superior region he found these organizations one of the most effective aids in saving the men whose souls were menaced by this prevalent vice from the fatal consequences of its indulgence. He had won the Ottawas and most of the Chippewas from their propensity to

also, the promotor of beneficent work in the city in which he lived, had derived his great wealth from the profits of one of the largest distilleries of whiskey during his time in the United States, before " Bourbon's " reign had succeeded.

It has been accepted as a fact, that to the peculiar qualities of the water of the Liffey, in the brewing of " Guinness' Dublin Stout," was due the popularity of this beverage in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, by the sale of which, the colossal fortune of this Irish brewer was accumulated. It is to the credit of Mr. Guinness that he spent a large share of his fortune in restoring the cathedral of Dublin to its original architectural splendor ; while by other public-spirited liberality he prepared the way for his son, who was accorded a title and a seat in the peerage of Great Britain and Ireland. Whether it was due to the peculiar quality of the yellow water of the Ohio, that " Pike's Magnolia," became so popular, or to some secret method in its distillation, is a question we are not competent to answer ; the fact is, however, that this brand of whiskey during the " fifties," was very popular, and especially in the Lake Superior region, where it was almost universally drunk as a stimulant. While the average price of a barrel of " Pike's Magnolia " was \$50 to the dealer, or about \$1 per gallon, on the basis of 64 " nippers " to such measure, at 10 cents each, the profit on each barrel was about \$200 to the retailer.

At that time, the Bavarian " lager," which Liebig named *liquid bread*, had not been imitated in this country ; ale, so-called, of deleterious composition, was the milder beverage in use at the time in the Upper Peninsula.

During the period under consideration, some who enjoyed their vacation in a trip to the Upper Lakes will probably remember an agreeable, well-dressed, and well-mannered gentleman, who made his home during July, at the Chippewa House, at the Sault. An acceptable partner at the card table, always ready to join in an excursion to the interesting localities of the vicinity, and one of the few gentlemen at the hotel willing to join the ladies in their evening promenade on the long veranda of the " Chippewa," this gentleman from Cincinnati was in high favor ; for his deportment in company was perfect, his cigars were of the finest Havana, while at the dinner table the best bottle of champagne mine host Smith could produce from his store was placed beside his plate, and sent with " his compliments," by the waiter, to those he deemed worthy. This gentleman, for as such in most respects he was entitled to be called, was the Lake Superior agent of Mr. Pike. His salary was double that of a State judge at the time ; he was allowed \$5 per day for wine, and his travelling and hotel expenses were liberally provided for. He visited every locality in Lake Superior, and during the months of August and September each succeeding steamer brought hundreds of barrels to every port, on whose yellow ends could be seen in prominent letters " Pike's Magnolia." Mr. Pike's selection of his representatives was an evidence of his business shrewdness.

brutalize themselves and to make their families miserable by the too free use of the white man's "fire water"; but among the simple-minded red men this was comparatively easy work, while the reform effected was generally permanent. The Chippewas, however, at times yielded to temptation. While at L'Anse, Father Baraga sent one of his Indians to Portage Lake to purchase candles for Christmas solemnities; he got drunk and froze to death coming back.¹ Father Baraga wrote Mr. Douglass, proprietor of the store where the Indians had procured the whiskey: "You are guilty of that Indian's death!" We knew Mr. Douglass, who was a brother of Judge Douglass, of Detroit; he was an estimable gentleman, and probably had no knowledge of the affair, but he was so moved by Father Baraga's letter that he discontinued the sale of liquor. As we have explained, the whites of the mining centres were *quasi* celibates.

Instead of the family circle in the cottage, these men were domiciled in boarding-houses and hotels in their respective localities. The cost of a license was nominal, while in nearly all the places where these men had their homes, a barrel of "Pike's Magnolia" was usually "on tap." The crusade of Father Baraga against the use of intoxicants during the period under consideration was a difficult task. We consider the apostolate of temperance of Father Baraga among the Catholics thus domiciled in the mining centres of the Lake Superior region as among his most providential works, and his most successful efforts in behalf of the spiritual and temporal welfare of the new community to whom he had extended his paternal and sacerdotal ministrations.

Thus was the foundation laid of what now constitutes the diocese of Marquette, of the Upper Peninsula of the State of Michigan. In our outline of the missionary work of Father Baraga in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for January, 1896,² speaking of his labors in the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, we said: "Wheresoever the footprints of Father Richard and of his missionaries, and of Father Baraga and his assistants, had marked the advent of these saintly men on the mainland of the coast of Lake Michigan, the most wonderful transformations have taken place. Take, for example, Chicago, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Green Bay, Manistee, Muskegon, and many other cities on both shores of Lake Michigan." So, in like manner, the soil of the Lake Superior Peninsula traversed, during the "forties" and "fifties," by the saintly Baraga was destined to become the scene of changes in religion and in commercial enterprise unequaled, perhaps, in American history.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

¹ Manuscript, Rev. W. Elliott, C.S.P.

² Page 129.

MR. MALLOCK AS A DEFENDER OF NATURAL RELIGION.

Studies of Contemporary Superstition. By W. H. Mallock. London: Ward & Downey, Ltd. 1895.

Natural Religion. From the "Apologie des Christenthums" of Franz Hettinger, D.D., etc. Edited, with an introduction on Certainty, by Henry Sebastian Bowden, of the Oratory. (2d edition, 1892.) London: Burns & Oates, Ltd. 1890.

IN the earlier part of 1890 there appeared the first edition of Dr. Hettinger's "Natural Religion," edited by Fr. Bowden of the Oratory.¹ According to the opinion of the Catholic press, Fr. Bowden's work was "a judicious summary of the original," whose excellences "did not lie so much in strict science as in common sense." "In it," observed the "Dublin Review," "there are few arguments in which a clever reviewer could not pick holes; but, taking them altogether, they are valid and effective." The book has evidently proved a popular one, and is now running through its second edition.

Mr. Mallock, who, on the first appearance of the work, criticized it severely in the "Fortnightly Review,"² has this year published a volume of reprint essays called "Studies of Contemporary Superstition."³ The fifth of these studies is entitled "A Catholic Theologian on Natural Religion," and seems to represent his essay of 1890 in a somewhat modified form. Most of the views it contains are professedly not his own. They are a summary of the conclusions of modern agnosticism, which, he considers, Dr. Hettinger has failed to meet. With the correctness of Mr. Mallock's criticism, we have at present little concern. But having in view a totally different object, the nature of which will appear in the sequel, we must offer the reader a few specimens of the treatment Dr. Hettinger's book receives at the hands of his critic.

For the first twenty-two pages of his essay Mr. Mallock assumes the rôle of devil's advocate and counsel for modern science against natural religion.

¹ "Natural Religion," from the *Apologie des Christenthums* of Franz Hettinger, D.D., etc., edited, with an introduction on Certainty, by H. Seb. Bowden, of the Oratory. London: Burns & Oates, Ltd. 1890.

² "Reason Alone," *Fort. Rev.*, Nov. 1890.

³ *Studies of Contemporary Superstition*, by W. H. Mallock. London: Ward & Downey, Ltd. 1895.

"Let us," he says, "suppose ourselves to be doubters, who desire the comfort of faith, and ask ourselves how far, in the existing conditions of thought, such reasoning is calculated to be any help to us. To me it seems that this book, in a most deplorable and startling way, illustrates, little as he thinks it does, the following utterance of its editor: 'A defence of religion,' says Father Sebastian, 'based on arguments unsound or inconclusive, or ignoring the sceptical objections of the day, may only suggest new doubt and do more harm than good.' He adds that the present work he believes 'to be safe from this peril.' To any independent reader it will, I believe, seem to be full of it. It has every one of the faults that have just been mentioned. Most of it is inconclusive, much of it is unsound and the principal objections that require combating are ignored throughout the whole of it" (p. 184).

After charging Dr. Hettinger with seeming "utterly unaware of the extraordinary change which modern science has accomplished in the position of the human mind" (p. 184), he goes on to speak of the three arguments for the existence of God, drawn from the inertia of matter, the perfection of design and the benevolence of design. Mr. Mallock tells us how modern science disposes of them :

"To all such arguments," he says, "what science does is as follows: It does not destroy them as logical structures; but it blows away the bases on which they rest, like so many pieces of thistledown" (p. 187).

Then, after passing over the first argument and epitomizing the other two, he comes to Dr. Hettinger's assertion that, "if the world is not the work of God, but self-created; as the less cannot produce the greater, it must have been the work of man" and apparently missing the point which underlies this somewhat clumsily-expressed argument, Mr. Mallock explodes into the following remark :

"The deepest feeling which these lamentable puerilities call forth in us is astonishment that any serious man should in these days have recourse to them. But," he continues, "it will still be well to notice a few details of their ineptitude, for they give us the key to the fundamental unsoundness of the writer's entire position" (p. 189).

He proceeds to do this, observing in one place that :

"Dr. Hettinger seems to know nothing of that stupendous and overwhelming revelation which science has forced on man, of nature's unfathomable magnitude. . . . Had Dr. Hettinger realized this, he would have seen all his arguments which take man as the centre of things and assume for him some destiny that is obviously eminent and significant—he would have seen all these arguments perishing on each side of him, like helpless sailors washed overboard in a storm" (p. 190).

A little later touching on the "evolution" of free will :

"Here again we see that he has not the smallest idea what the scientific theory of the universe is. According to that theory nothing would have happened of the kind he mentions. What is free would not have been evolved out of what is not free ;

because, according to that theory no such thing as freedom is in existence. What we call freedom is a mere subjective delusion ; and Dr. Hettinger, in assuming it to be a reality, attempts to answer science on its own grounds, by starting with the principal proposition which science declares itself to have disproved " (p. 191).

" Indeed," concludes Mr. Mallock, " This Catholic defence of natural religion, regarded as an answer to the arguments of scientific agnosticism, is no answer at all. . . . Whatever difficulties such arguments [as those of Dr. Hettinger] may meet, there are other difficulties which not only are not met, but which it seems the writer has not even conceived of. These difficulties consist, one and all of them, of certain broad generalizations, the truth of which modern science is daily branding deeper into the consciousness of civilization. They may be summed up as follows :

" The material universe is infinite and eternal, all its changes being the result of all-pervading and eternally unchanging laws.

" Life and consciousness, whatever may be their nature, are inseparable from this material universe : they follow its laws and are the result of its laws. They are another aspect of the same machine.

" Such life and consciousness as we see exhibited in man is a fleeting and infinitesimal phenomenon in the eternity and the infinity of this All.

" No purpose that to human reason seems rational can be discovered of human reason in man's circumstances and history—certainly not any benevolent purpose ; and as to the universe as a whole, no meaning or purpose in it is even conjecturable " (p. 196).

The conclusion, then, of the whole matter is as follows : If by natural religion is meant a belief in God, based on the application of man's logical faculties to the facts of his own intellect and of the sensible universe, there is no such thing as natural religion at all (p. 196).

So far for the critical tone of Mr. Mallock's essay. With the truth or validity of the criticism itself we have no concern. It would require a volume to deal adequately with the subject—besides which, we have not the least inclination to undertake the defence either of Dr. Hettinger's original work nor of Father Bowden's synopsis of it. The occasion merely calls for the remark that Mr. Mallock has, in this case, and we think contrary to his wont, exhibited a fit of peevishness and unfairness which is not calculated to enhance his reputation. In the first place, he treats the book itself as if it were *ex professo* an answer to scientific agnosticism ; whereas, in fact, not even the name of agnosticism occurs throughout its pages. Dr. Hettinger certainly does not attempt to cope with a school of thought whose first principles make everything unthinkable ; but confines his attention to materialism, pantheism, rationalism, and the theory of evolution. Secondly, if Dr. Hettinger does not enter into the full treatment of primary principles, this is only in accordance with the professed purpose of the book, which is (to quote his own words) " to make the matter, as far as possible, intelligible and interesting to the general reader " (Preface, xxxvii.)—and that *not* the agnostic reader, but the Catholic laity before whom the lectures were originally delivered. Mr. Mallock has certainly suggested a false impression of the drift of the book, and treated it precisely as if it were what it explicitly professes *not to be*.

We come at length to the particular point at issue in this essay.

After twenty-two pages of destructive criticism, Mr. Mallock feels it incumbent on him to explain his purpose in making so vigorous an attack on the claims of natural religion.

"It is not," he says, "to show that there is no such thing as natural religion, but that if there is such a thing, it founds itself, and must defend itself, on quite other grounds than those put forward by writers like Dr. Hettinger. What, as it appears to me, these grounds are, I will try to explain briefly.

"In the first place, it must be recognized with absolute clearness, that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of the intellect, give us any proof of the existence of a personal Creator.

"In the second place it must be recognized that if we mean by Creator a Creator infinitely benevolent to man, and add as a corollary to this man's moral responsibility to this Creator, then such a Creator and such a responsibility are not only not discovered by observation and by the intellect, but the very idea of them, the more we contemplate it, becomes more and more preposterous. The proposition that God is infinitely good, and that man's will is free, must be recognized as unthinkable as the proposition that two straight lines can enclose a space.

"But the matter does not end here. There is a third truth to be recognized, which is this—that not only are a good God and a free human will unthinkable, but that everything else, if we try to think it out, ends in being unthinkable also. Time, space and eternity, we know that they exist, and yet the more we contemplate their existence, the more and more do we see that some impossibility is involved in it. We know that the universe exists, but we can neither conceive of it as being infinite, nor as having any confine. Our conception is incomplete, and in trying to make it complete we tear it to pieces. And with all conceptions it may be shown that the case is really the same. In all there is sleeping a germ of the inconceivable. The mind has only to realize all that is really implied in them, and, like Faust's poodle, each of them swells and swells to a monster, till the logical girdle of thought is no more able to contain it than a woman's sash is able to go round the equator. Out of the reason there are ever ready to spring wild horses, which, if we allow them, will tear reason to pieces. In other words, all thought is founded on assumptions which involve the negation of the laws of thought" (pp. 197-8).

These, then, are the concessions which must be made to agnosticism before we can advance one step towards founding a natural religion. Mr. Mallock is not blind to the position in which these concessions place us at the outset. He continues:

"Now if this fact is once realized, the mere idea of God's existence and goodness, and of man's freedom and responsibility, will not present to us any insuperable difficulties, on the grounds of their logical impossibility. It must be remembered, however, that the argument that has just been urged does not go to show that every impossibility is true, but merely that every impossibility is not necessarily untrue. It merely gives us, as it were, a kind of permissive bill to construct a natural religion if we can. It assures us that reason shall not interfere with us; but it does not promise that at starting reason shall do anything to assist us. That is to say, it leaves us to take the first step independently of reason. We have to start not with something proved, but with something assumed" (p. 198-9).

This being the only remaining position in which a natural religion is capable of being established, we are naturally anxious to see how the process of its establishment is to be carried out. Mr.

Mallock satisfies our curiosity in the last page of his essay, which shall form the conclusion of this somewhat lengthy series of quotations :

"Now what," asks Mr. Mallock, "is that something? Is it God and man's freedom? Is the first step we speak of the direct assumption that these are realities? Before answering we must consider the following point—that though natural religion must, as we say, be based on an assumption, and though we have no proof which will show it to be true, still we must have some motive for wishing to believe it to be true. Now what motive can man have for wishing to believe in the two propositions in question—that God exists, and that man is free, and responsible to God? They are propositions which are not only scientifically superfluous, and which also multiply and deepen the difficulties of the intellect, but they involve many consequences which are practically terrifying and disagreeable. The only motive then that can make us wish to assent to them does not lie in themselves. These primary doctrines of natural religion are not its primary assumptions; or to speak more correctly, they are not assumptions at all. They are logical deductions from some assumptions already made; and the assumption is the assumption of the value, the dignity and the significance of man's life. In other words, putting the question of a revelation aside, a belief in God can only logically be defended by assuming first a certain belief in life—a certain spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind, and a certain meaning in certain spiritual fears and hopes, and a certain authority, beyond that of tribal instinct, in the voice of conscience. Now as far as proof is concerned, all this is mere assumption. What faculty is there in man which is to urge him to assume it? It is difficult to suggest for it any better name than faith; and its formula put briefly comes to be as follows: 'I do believe in the spiritual value and the eternal meaning of life, because my nature is such that I abhor the belief that is the alternative.' This step once taken, natural reason steps in and works in the ordinary way; proving, just as it might prove any other theorem, that, given to life the sort of value in question, the existence of God and of man's freedom are its necessary logical consequences, and that it cannot be explained, or even expressed, without having recourse to them" (p. 199-200).

So far for Mr. Mallock's contention. Taking it in its general bearing, as an argument for the truths of natural religion, we have personally no word to say against it. It is in fact far from being a novel suggestion. It has been familiar to Catholic philosophers for several centuries, and will be found stated in nearly every scholastic text-book under some such name as the "*Argumentum Eudæmonologicum*." Its value was thrashed out long before we were born. But a far different matter at present exercises our mind. Putting aside altogether the question whether Catholic arguments in general are equal to meeting the difficulties of modern times, we are interested to know whether this particular one is more apt than its fellows. Mr. Mallock seems to think not only that it is, but that it is the only one that remains fit for use; trusting to it, he has been most drastic in condemning all beside it; and the question is, whether according to the modern world of thought he has gone far enough. Modern science will heartily agree that the arguments of Dr. Hettinger are not worth a straw; but modern science, it seems to me, must, in consistency with itself, consign Mr. Mallock's cherished argument to the same cate-

gory, and apply exactly the same destructive criticism to Mr. Mallock's reconstruction, which Mr. Mallock has applied to Dr. Hettinger's construction. It seems to us that Mr. Mallock, in the all-absorbing eagerness with which he has worried Dr. Hettinger, has remained in ignorance of the imminent danger threatening him in the rear. The following pages ought to show how real the danger is to which Mr. Mallock has so blindly exposed himself.

Let us then for a moment assume towards Mr. Mallock's argument the attitude which Mr. Mallock has assumed towards Dr. Hettinger's arguments: "Let me suppose myself to be a doubter, who desires the comfort of faith, and ask myself how far, in the existing condition of thought, such reasoning is calculated to be of any help to me" (p. 184). At the outset we find ourselves "left to take the first step independently of reason, and have to start not with something proved, but with something assumed" (p. 198-9).

This may mean one of two things. If "reason" means "reasoning" and nothing more; and if by an "assumption" is meant some self-evident primary truth, which for that very reason neither requires nor admits of proof, the introduction to natural religion so far presents no difficulty; for the obvious reason, that all human knowledge *must* begin in this way from what is ultimate and self-evident, and because demonstration itself is impossible without some ultimate self-evident premiss from which originally to start. But this can hardly be the meaning of the proposition. For Mr. Mallock has just told us that "all thought is founded on assumptions which involve the negation of the laws of thought" (p. 198). Now, surely one of the laws of thought is that self-evident propositions are certainly true. And it is absurd to suppose that a self-evident proposition should involve the negation of the laws of thought. Either then the assumption we are called on to make is self-evident, or it is not. If it is self-evident, it cannot be assumed independently of reason, for reason tells us that it must be assumed because of its self-evidency. If it is not self-evident, then reason tells us that we can only assume it as a mere working hypothesis; and we shall only be acting independently of reason if we assume it as though it were certainly true when it is only probably so. Nor are we yet out of the difficulty. If, as we are told, "everything we try to think out ends in being unthinkable," and even in case of existing things, "the more we contemplate their existence, the more and more we see some impossibility is involved in it" (p. 198), there is but little hope that an assumption of whose objective truth we have as yet no guarantee will fare better in the process. Whichever way, therefore, we take the word "reason," whether as signifying "reasoning," or as a synonym for "in-

tellest," the difficulty will remain. In the former sense, "reasoning" itself must be "based on an assumption which involves the negation of the laws of reasoning." In the latter sense, if we take reason to mean "rationality," or the intellectual faculty in general, we are involved in a contradiction in terms. For if we must take the first step independent of reason, it may be an unreasonable step and therefore ought not to be taken. "Reasoning," moreover, is a process which may be dispensed with in the case of self-evident truths. But "reason" is the law of our nature. No man can be commended for taking a step which he cannot recognize as in accordance with his rational nature. Whatever the assumption therefore is, it must be seen as a reasonable one. But this is as much as to say that it is either self evident or can be proved, and in neither case can the step be taken independently of reason.

Mr. Mallock next tells us that "Tho' we have no proof that natural religion is true, still we must have some motive for believing that it is true" (p. 199). Now, "motive" is some force which moves or urges us in a certain direction. And granted that we can accept the assumption in question, that assumption may turn out to be the very motive which we require to urge us on to a belief in natural religion. But what is to move us to accept the assumption itself? We want a further motive to urge us on to that. If the assumption itself attracts us, that can only be because its truth is apparent, or because it is highly desirable as something convenient or useful or good. In either case a difficulty arises. Either we are forced to assent to it, or we are not. But modern science has condemned the doctrine of free will as "a mere subjective delusion" (p. 191). Therefore we are forced to accept this assumption as soon as it is proposed; in which case all plans for the establishment of natural religion are both futile and unnecessary, and Mr. Mallock's scheme is so much waste paper. Yet we are face to face with the phenomenon of thousands of our fellow-beings conversant with this assumption and yet persistently refusing to accept it, and giving reasons for their refusal.

But if the assumption itself does not force us to accept it, what is there ulterior to the assumption which can urge us towards it? Mr. Mallock makes an attempt to answer this question, and I will therefore postpone its consideration for a while.

Supposing these preliminary difficulties solved in some way, we come face to face with the assumption itself:

"A certain belief in the value, dignity and significance of man's life—a certain spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind and a certain meaning in certain spiritual fears and hopes, and a certain authority, beyond that of a tribal instinct, in the voice of conscience" (p. 199).

Now, how this assumption can possibly be made independent of reason, even if "reason" be taken in the sense of "reasoning," we utterly fail to see. It is certainly not a self-evident proposition. The fact that we *live* is self-evident; so is the fact that life is made up of pleasures and pains, and that we naturally shrink from the one and embrace the other. But from this to a knowledge of the *value* of life there is a considerable process of reasoning required. To accept the assumption without this process, or to accept it without recognizing its truth—at least without seeing that it is reasonable to accept it—can be no more Mr. Mallock's wish than my own. Let me then examine the proposition in all its parts and see what, "in the existing conditions of thought," can be made out about it—not forgetting that whatever we make out will be the result of reasoning—and therefore not "independent of reason."

We are asked then to believe in "a certain spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind" (p. 199). But in the face of modern science how can I do this? Modern psychology denies altogether the existence of spirit and of the spiritual and reduces man's so-called spiritual life to the highly complex structure of material molecules. "Here we see that [Mr. Mallock] has not the smallest idea of what the scientific theory [of man's mental constitution] is. . . . According to that theory no such theory as [spirituality] is in existence. What we call [spirituality] is a mere subjective delusion, and [Mr. Mallock] in assuming it to be a reality attempts to answer science on its own grounds by starting with the principal proposition which science declares itself to have disproved" (p. 191).

Omitting then the word "spiritual," we are asked to recognize the "importance and dignity of certain acts and moods of mind" (p. 199). Importance of what kind, since spiritual importance is not to be admitted? It can only be importance in relation to this life, and we have the verdict of the whole hedonistic school that nothing is of importance except in so far as it contributes to our present or future material pleasure and well-being—and of the altruistic school that nothing is of importance except so far as it contributes to the well-being of the greatest number. Granting for argument's sake the value and importance of such moods and acts on this ground, it is difficult to see how such a concession could lead us very far towards the establishment of natural religion.

But what about the dignity? Dignity means either some kind of worth, and so coincides with "importance," or means "worthy of respect and reverence." Now Mr. Mallock has spent much of his literary energy in showing that modern thought, to be consistent with itself, must deny altogether the existence of any such

dignity in these acts or moods of mind ; and therefore, so long as we remain in "the existing condition of thought," we must "feel astonishment that any serious man should have recourse to such lamentable puerilities," and only go on "to notice a few details of their inaptitude, because they give us the key to the fundamental unsoundness of the writer's entire position " (p. 189).

We are not only asked, in the teeth of modern science, to believe in "the spiritual importance and dignity of certain acts and moods of mind," but also required to accept "a certain meaning in certain spiritual fears and hopes" (p. 199). Pray why, unless there is a future life before us, and a retributive judgment to be passed on the acts of our present life, what meaning can these spiritual hopes and fears have for us ? And if belief in the spiritual is repudiated by modern science, and if these hopes and fears are the outcome of superstition, nightmare, shadows, echoes, and such like natural phenomena ill understood, as not a few modern scientists have maintained ; then, far from recognizing "a certain meaning in these hopes and fears," we shall see nothing in them but the morbid product of a diseased imagination.

But Mr. Mallock does not rest here. We are also called upon to recognize "a certain authority beyond that of a tribal instinct, in the voice of conscience" (p. 199). How in the "present condition of thought" we can do this, we again fail entirely to see. Here is a proposition "not only scientifically superfluous, and which also multiplies and deepens the difficulties of the intellect, but it involves many consequences which are practically terrifying and disagreeable" (p. 199). Consequently, "The only motive which can make us assent to it does not lie in itself" (*Ib.*). For if the conscience possesses such authority, we must, before recognizing it, know something of the nature and source of that authority;¹ which we can only do by accepting the doctrine of a supreme legislator whose existence this very assumption is supposed to be the only means of proving, which is a shameless begging of the question. Moreover, in accepting this assumption, we must abandon modern science. For not only is the whole camp of pantheism, materialism, hedonism, utilitarianism and humanitarianism against us, but scientific agnosticism is "daily branding into the consciousness of civilized man," the truth, that "life and consciousness (and therefore conscience) follow and are the results of the laws of the material universe, and merely another aspect of the same machine" (p. 195); and finally, the whole contention of modern evolution is to show that conscience

¹ In his *New Republic*, Mr. Mallock embodies the pertinent question, "How can you decide between right and wrong, if you do not know *for whom* anything is right and for whom anything is wrong ?"

is precisely that product of tribal instinct which we are asked to assume that it is not.

Hence not only, "as far as proof is concerned" are all these postulates about the value of life "mere assumption," but they are assumptions for which modern science clamorously demands proofs before "a doubter who desires the comfort of faith," can, "in the present condition of thought," find in this course of procedure "anything to help him" (pp. 183-4).

The question then remains: Can any argument be brought forward by Mr. Mallock to give any coloring to his doctrine that life has any value at all? Some years ago he wrote a whole book to prove that, without a belief in the supernatural, life was not worth living. Must we suppose that he has changed his mind? Does he now believe that the value of life can be recognized independently of supernatural belief? His present contention seems to involve this. He appears to hold that the value of life can be recognized first, and that afterwards the supernatural must be accepted in order to explain its value. To use his own words:

"Given to life the sort of value in question, the existence of God and of man's freedom are its necessary logical consequences, and it cannot be explained or even expressed without having recourse to them" (p. 200).

Nevertheless, before this can come about, the aforesaid value must be given; *i.e.*, it must be recognized *as a fact* that life has the value claimed for it. How, then, is it to be recognized, if not by looking at the facts of life, and deducing, as a conclusion from them, the "assumption" required—which, however, if deduced from facts, can hardly be called "assumed."

Yet, looked at in itself, the value of life is by no means capable of demonstration. It is not to be denied that the whole of the pessimist school look upon life, at least intellectually, as a failure and an evil, and place its value below zero; and, on the supposition that there is no future life, all must hold with the materialistic school, that life's value is the sum of its temporal pleasures minus the sum of its temporal pains. But looked at from a temporal point of view, the value of life is almost nothing—at least to the majority of the human race. Without assuming an eternal destiny for man, we cannot believe in the value of his temporal life. But to assume it is to beg the whole question. An appeal to the facts of consciousness, the aspirations, the deep-seated moral sense, the feelings of the infinite, would tempt us to reply as Mr. Mallock replied to Dr. Hettinger on the question of free-will, "that according to the scientific theory [such aspirations, etc.] are mere subjective delusions" (p. 191). As for the "spiritual value of life" Mr. Mallock seems "utterly unaware of the change which

modern science has accomplished in the psychological doctrine of the human mind " (p. 184). As for the " eternal meaning of life," we should reply that the eternal meaning of the *material universe* may, indeed, be a fact, since " the material universe is infinite and eternal, all its changes being the result of all-pervading and eternally unchanging laws " (p. 195). But to speak of the eternal meaning of *life* is too absurd, since " such life and consciousness as we see exhibited in man is a fleeting and infinitesimal phenomenon in the eternity and the infinity of this all " (p. 196).

If Mr. Mallock points to the universality of this belief—the value of life—we reply that " since the introduction of the theory of evolution," this universality, such as it is, is accounted for on easier grounds—and hence " the force of this argument has disappeared (F. R., November, 1890, p. 166).

Again, we should point to the " millions born into the world, not only surrounded by circumstances that are inexorably brutalizing, but with brutal passions ingrained into their whole system and forced upon them by the formation of their skulls " (p. 193), whose existence in Mr. Mallock's mind forms so insuperable an obstacle to belief in the goodness of God, and ask how much " spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind," how much " authority in the voice of conscience," and how much " spiritual value and eternal meaning " these millions could be expected to recognize in life? And adding to these an equal or greater number of millions, whose whole life is one checkered career of misery, failure, want and misfortune, we should ask, what would be the estimate formed by *these* of the value of the present life ; unless they first assumed, *not* that value itself, but the existence of God and a future life, from which alone such value can be derived? Finally, we should ask, what force there could be in a theory based on the subjective peculiarities and fanciful aspiration of a " cultured few," whose pleasures in life happen to have predominated over their pains, resulting from the exercise of a vague faculty called " faith," and incited by " a wish to believe," and this after all other arguments for " man's pre-eminent and significant destiny have perished on all sides like helpless sailors washed overboard in a storm " (p. 190). " To all such arguments " we should conclude, " what science does is as follows: It does not destroy them as logical structures; but it blows away the bases on which they rest like so many pieces of thistledown " (p. 187).

This, then, is our conclusion as to the reasonableness of assuming the value of life as a basis for natural religion. All the value which life possesses depends on the truth of natural religion; " without this, it cannot be explained, nor even expressed " (p. 200). If then, " it must be recognized with absolute clearness,

that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of the intellect, give us any proof of the existence of a personal Creator" (p. 197); *a pari* it must be recognized, after what we have just said, that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of intellect give us any proof of the "spiritual value and eternal meaning of life" (p. 200).

In short, that if an assumption "independent of reason" has to be made at all, we might as well, and can as easily, assume the truth of natural religion, and from it deduce the value of life, as assume the value of life, and from it deduce the truth of natural religion—with this difference, that the truth of natural religion does not presuppose the value of life, whereas the value of life does presuppose the truth of natural religion; and therefore the former alternative would avoid the *petitio principii* involved in the order of procedure which Mr. Mallock maintains.

There is still, however, one loop-hole by which Mr. Mallock may try to escape, *i.e.*, by providing a special faculty, by which we are enabled to make the latter assumption, and by which we are unable to make the former.

Consequently, after expounding the great assumption of the value of life, he asks, "What faculty is there in man which is to urge him to assume it?" (p. 200). And gives his answer as follows:

"It is difficult to suggest any better name for it than faith; and its formula put briefly comes to be as follows: 'I do believe in the spiritual value and the eternal meaning of life, because my nature is such that I abhor the belief that is the alternative'" (p. 200).

Now if "Faith" is the best name that can be found for this "faculty," it must correspond, in some approximate way at least, to the definition of faith. Faith ought properly to be distinguished from knowledge as "a belief on the testimony of another," whether that other be a different person or a different faculty in the same person. It is difficult to mean anything else by the term, without hopeless distortion of words; from which charge the peculiar modern usage can hardly claim to be free. Either "faith" means this, or it is a blind instinct. Mr. Mallock can hardly maintain that it is a blind instinct, since not only does he exert himself to propagate his views on the subject, with the evident hope of convincing somebody, but, after formulating the act of faith which his proselytes are asked to make, he adds a reason or motive why that act of faith is made. Whether this reason be coercive or persuasive makes no difference. If blindly coercive, the reason is superfluous, and the assent is given independently of reason; but in this case it is no longer "faith," and our belief

cannot be said to be the result of a motive or the consequence of a "wish to believe." If it is *intelligently* coercive, that can only be because its truth and its consequences are both self-evident, and therefore it is not by "faith," but by "knowledge"—not "independently of reason," but *because* of reason that we assent. If it is only persuasive, then we can assent or not assent, and man's free-will is established—a conclusion dead against the scientific theory, which calls free-will "a subjective delusion."

If, then, the formula of faith means anything, it means this: My nature abhors the belief that life has no spiritual value or eternal meaning, etc. I believe my nature to be a true and trustworthy thing; on the testimony of my nature I therefore accept the belief that life has a spiritual and eternal value, because I can trust my nature in this its most fundamental utterance. Here are the witness or authority, the testimony, and the acceptance of it from that authority; in short, all that is involved in an exercise of faith, and this explanation is the only reasonable account which can be given of the case.

But let us look at the consequences of this position. The belief in the value of life is no longer the first step towards the construction of a natural religion, but the second; or if it is called the first step, it is neither an assumption nor taken independently of reason. On the contrary, it is a conclusion deduced from a previous premiss, and therefore taken in dependence on and aided by reason even taking reason in the sense of "reasoning."

Now whether my assent to the value of life is free or not free, and whether we assent to it as certain or probable, it still remains true that our intimate abhorrence of the contrary is alone the motive which impels me to this assent and the justification of the reasonableness of that assent. Moreover, the force of the motive is such that, despite the verdict of the modern science—despite all the decisions of the pantheistic, pessimistic, hedonistic, utilitarian, materialist, evolutionist and agnostic schools of thought—and despite the difficulties against this position which have been raised from facts and from principles in the foregoing pages—despite all these obstacles in our way, we are expected, under the influence of this verdict of our nature, to give an assent, which, in establishing the truths of natural religion, will cause modern thought to hide its diminished head and confess itself ignominiously mistaken in nine-tenths of its most prominent and telling conclusions. No wonder, then, if the doubter looks closer into this proposition and tests its genuineness before accepting either it or its consequences.

"My nature abhors the belief which is the alternative." However lively our "faith," and however incapable our reason, we can hardly believe this as a fact unless we see it to be at least probably

true. Our faith hardly extends to its acceptance on Mr. Mallock's *ipse dixit*. Does our nature really abhor the belief that life has no spiritual value and no eternal meaning? We do not care to dispute this point, simply because, even if true, it proves very little. Suppose we *do* find ourselves clinging to spiritual values and eternal meanings, how can we be assured that we *ought* to do so? There are many clings found in a man which are at least doubtfully right and desirable. According to common experience, the nature of the libertine abhors restraint; the nature of the lazy man abhors the necessity of labor; the nature of the selfish man abhors the altruistic principle; the nature of the rationalist abhors assumptions. Now, if these repugnances are condemned as "individual peculiarities" and "distortions of the human character," why should the abhorrence which we feel for the spiritual worthlessness and eternal insignificance of life be anything else? Why should not such an abhorrence be the product of a "subjective delusion," something on a par with the abhorrence which the licentious man feels towards social and religious restrictions? or the empty-headed and self-sufficient coxcomb feels with regard to being convicted of his ignorance?

Let us suppose this question solved satisfactorily. Let us imagine a test provided by which we can discern between the true and the fictitious dictates of "my nature," and that the aforesaid dictate is truly what Mr. Mallock claims it to be. Even on this supposition a considerable difficulty still remains before we can make use of anything which follows from its recognition.

This difficulty is expressed in the following question: Is it a certain truth that whatever nature (taken in its true and adequate sense) abhors is false? In other words, given that man is constituted according to a definite mode of being, tendency and mode of action which we call his "nature," and given that this nature is understood by man himself, is the dictate of that nature, as revealed in the consciousness of the individual, to be recognized as a criterion of truth? So that if our nature, truly understood, declares that a materialistic view of life is repugnant to our very essential character, can we recognize as certainly true that the "spiritual and eternal significance" view of life is the correct one?

On this question and its answer turns the whole fate of Mr. Mallock's proposal. Unfortunately, whatever answer he may give will only go to determine which horn of a dilemma he prefers to be impaled upon.

If he answers that the abhorrence of nature to a given proposition merely provides an inducement toward making the assumption of the value of life, if a man is willing to do so, then he has not only incidentally acknowledged the existence of free-will (a

doctrine repudiated by modern thought), but he has acknowledged that there is no vouch for the objective reality of the value of life, and therefore, that all attempts to explain that value by the introduction of natural religion is merely to assume several hypotheses in order to prove one hypothesis; and *not* modern science, but the inexorable logic of facts "blows away the bases on which his scheme rests like so many pieces of thistledown" (p. 187): his whole theory vanishes away like the Cheshire cat in wonderland, leaving nothing but a smile behind.

On the other hand, if Mr. Mallock asserts that the abhorrence of nature (properly understood, as already supposed—the case before us) is a satisfactory and conclusive evidence of the truth of the contrary belief—then he is reduced to the following ignominious position: He must admit that the belief in "the spiritual value and eternal meaning of life" is an ascertained truth, built on, or deduced immediately from, a self-evident or demonstrated proposition—viz., that "the clear dictates of nature are the criteria of truth, or that "the essential tendency of a given nature is a true one, and represents the objective truth in the order of things," or in other words, that "if nature dictates an eternal destiny for man, that eternal destiny is a fact, and is known as such."

But as a result of this admission, it is apparent that the scheme suggested for the instauration of natural religion is no longer, as Mr. Mallock alleged, a "logical process based on an assumption made of faith," but a logical process based on a certain truth perceived by intellect.

As a consequence, he will be obliged to retract the following concessions and statements in his essay:

1. "If by natural religion is meant a belief in God based on the application of man's logical faculties to the facts of his own intellect and of the sensible universe, there is no such thing as natural religion at all" (p. 196).

2. "It must be recognized with absolute clearness, that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of the intellect, give us any proof of the existence of a personal Creator" (p. 197).

3. "It leaves us to take the first step independently of reason" (p. 198).
and

"Natural religion must, as we say, be based on an assumption" (p. 199).

If, however, he prefers the other alternative, and refuses to make these corrections, he must patiently submit to the retorsion of his scathing condemnation of Dr. Hettinger's book in the following terms:

"A defense of religion based on arguments unsound or inconclusive, or ignorant of the sceptical objections of the day, may only suggest new doubt and do more harm than good. Mr. Mallock's endeavor is not free from this peril. To the independent reader it will, I believe, seem to be full of it. It has every one of the faults that have

just been mentioned. Most of it is inconclusive, much of it unsound, and the principal objections that require combating are ignored throughout the whole of it" (p. 184.

In short, the whole essay might be described as "a literary endeavor in which the author begins by misunderstanding the drift of his opponent's argument, and ends by misunderstanding the drift of his own."

If, then, Mr. Mallock's position can be held as reasonable at all, his arguments must be put forward on a totally different understanding from that on which Mr. Mallock has advanced it. That understanding must be that it is based on a certain truth, known as such at the outset, and not on an "assumption of faith," which hereafter may or may not be discovered to be true.

All that remains to us is to indicate how in this case the argument must run, and in doing so, we beg to make Mr. Mallock welcome to the suggestion.

1. With this, as with every other argument that has any meaning, we must begin at the very first and fundamental truths of consciousness, viz., that we exist, that we possess a natural faculty for knowing truth, that we know the validity of our direct intellectual processes and that the principle of contradiction and other principles of an equally metaphysical character are true. These truths we hold, not as assumptions, but as self-evident fundamental truths which no one can explicitly deny without implicitly asserting them—in short, we must begin by acknowledging that certitude is prior to doubt. If there be in existence such a curiosity as a universal sceptic, of course he will disagree with us at the outset, and in doing so will implicitly show that he agrees with us. However, if he is obstinate, we must beg him to withdraw, and continue our argument with those who admit the foregoing truths as self-evident. The methodical and philosophical doubters, and perhaps the majority of modern agnostics, may also follow the example of the sceptic.

2. It is essential to our argument that human nature should be recognized as a permanent type of being. No matter how much that type may contain that is common with the brutes, it must be held as a certain truth that human nature is essentially superior to brute nature, and this by virtue of an essential mode of being, tendency and mode of action proper to man and not possible to the brutes. Whoever, therefore, is then among the "doubters desirous of the comfort of faith," who clings to the evolutionary notion that man is merely a developed specimen of animal life in which nature has

"Let the ape and tiger die,"

by a process of natural selection, or who maintains with the

materialists that man is but "a more complex composition 'of molecules," must at this point give up all hope of attaining faith and go away sorrowful. For unless man is the embodiment of an essential type superior in kind to the brute, it is ludicrous to attribute any "spiritual value or eternal meaning" to his life.

3. If there is to be recognized any value in Mr. Mallock's argument, we must admit as certainly true the axiom that "*Natura nil facit frustra*," "Nature does nothing in vain." This means that wherever we find a general tendency belonging to the essential nature of any type of being, we recognize that that type of being is designed (no matter by whom) to attain the goal of its tendency, and will in the main (allowing for accidents) do so. From this we can ascertain two truths: (1) from the presence of a natural tendency we can infer the certain existence of the object to which it tends; *e.g.*, If matter tends to fall to a certain centre, we know the real existence of the centre to which it will fall; and (2) from the presence of this tendency we can infer that that goal will or can be reached by the type which tends to it; *e.g.*, If matter tends to a certain centre, this matter can and will (except for accidents) attain that centre.

Now, we really doubt whether Mr. Mallock himself would admit this proposition. Yet it needs but a few remarks to show that it is precisely this proposition which underlies his assent to the "value of life," because "nature abhors the contrary belief." In a repugnance to one thing is involved a tendency to its contrary. Nature only abhors the materialistic view of life, because it naturally desires the spiritualistic view. But unless the tendencies of nature are believed to have their corresponding goal in the order of reality, we cannot be led to accept the value of life merely because nature tends to accept it and abhor the contrary. Consequently, Mr. Mallock's formula, whether he likes it or not, must be written in the form of the following syllogism:

1. Nature does nothing in vain. But nature has implanted in man a spiritual view of life, therefore the spiritual view of life is not vain.

2. But unless this spiritual view of life is true, it is worse than vain, it is delusive. Therefore, the spiritual view of life is the true one.

3. But it can only be the true one if there is objectively a real spiritual destiny before man to which he can and (except for accidents) will attain. Therefore, the spiritual destiny is real and attainable.

4. But this spiritual destiny involves the mortality of the soul, the freedom of will and a state of final beatitude in the knowledge and enjoyment of infinite goodness and truth, which is only possi-

ble in a personal God. Therefore, these essential doctrines of natural religion are demonstrated as true.

It is no part of my work to deal with this argument in its later developments. Our argument has simply been to investigate its foundations. If what we have stated above be correct, the following important conclusion ought to be drawn from it; viz., if it be true "that the fundamental difference between the philosophy of Catholicism and the philosophy of the modern world is, that according to Catholic doctrine certainty is prior to doubt and that according to modern agnosticism doubt is prior to certainty" (p. 176), nothing can be gained by attempting to build up a natural religion on what is left after striking our colors to agnostic first principles, as Mr. Mallock has tried to do by laying its foundations on an assumption made by a dubious faculty called "faith." Such an endeavor can only serve to give an appearance of weakness to the cause of religion, which in truth does not belong to it, and end in the failure of the endeavor itself. The real work to be done is in the battle field of the first principles. Till some common ground is established between the two camps, the argument of Catholicism against agnosticism will appear as futile and invalid to agnostics as the arguments of agnosticism against Catholicism appear to Catholics. But this does not mean that the ground principles on which either side is based are to be abandoned merely in the hope of producing an argument which may be more in accord with the opposite line of thought. Such attempts, as a rule, meet with but poor success; and of all such attempts we could hardly imagine one more futile, or one attended with a more dismal failure, than that in which Mr. Mallock, after doing his utmost to cast ignominy on Dr. Hettinger's defence of natural religion, attempts to reconstruct on the débris which he criticises as strown an argument which shall be free from the faults he has just condemned. By the preliminary concession he makes to agnosticism, he undermines his whole position; and not only does his argument as it stands bristle with the most glaring contradictions, but, after boasting that it is the one remaining ground on which religion can found and defend itself, he shows conclusively (so far as the statement of his argument is correct) how that one remaining ground is the most unstable ground of all. We have, we hope, succeeded in rescuing his argument from its disgrace and shown that when rightly stated it is a valid one—always supposing its first principles are conceded. But we are convinced that, with agnosticism, nothing can be profitably done until it is clearly recognized on both sides, not that assumption is the basis of thought, but that certitude is the foundation of all our knowledge and that certitude is a real possession of the mind. E. R. HULL, S. J.

GEORGE WASHINGTON IN HIS RELATIONS WITH
CATHOLICS.

IN another article we delineated the religious character of Washington and his broad and liberal views, as exhibited in the leading part he took in framing the Constitution with its noble enactments in favor of religious liberty. Non-sectarian himself, he venerated the true Christian character wherever he found it. That he should have found it in such grand proportions in such men as Archbishop Carroll, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Daniel Carroll, James Fitzsimmons and numerous Catholic patriots and Christians whom I shall have occasion to mention, was a circumstance to win his respect and admiration for the Catholic religion and for the Catholic body in the colonies struggling for independence and in the United States after they had achieved it. So many Catholic patriots and so many noble acts of Catholics in support of the cause of liberty, such splendid services rendered to our country under Washington as commander-in-chief and as first president, brought him in contact with Catholics and gave him occasions to know them as Christians and as citizens. Though reared in the Episcopal Church, he was no sectarian; he arose above all the prejudices of his earliest education. While Catholics were the smallest religious body in the land and the objects of popular prejudice and unjust constitutions and laws, he respected and favored them; availed himself of many opportunities of testifying to their loyalty and patriotism, their Christian virtues, intelligence and love of freedom; defended them from oppression; assisted in winning for them equality under the Constitution. His relations with Catholics were interesting. We claim no exceptional favoritism for the Catholic body in the colonies or States, but that his relations with Catholics were friendly and intimate in many particular instances; always just and sympathetic, characterized by many decided marks of approval and admiration and by a particular leaning towards them. They were also characterized by many instances of public and official intercourse, of public praise and of warm personal and intimate friendships.

The ancestry of Washington were an ancient English family, belonging to the higher and aristocratic class, and many knights and esquires figure among them. They were of course Catholics; many of the family are registered as having been rectors of old Catholic Churches in England. No doubt they were represented by gallant knights in the Crusades, and the Manor of Wassington

or Wessington in England was held by his ancestors in fief from a Catholic bishop, the Lord Bishop of Durham, and they took part, with acknowledged valor, in the neighboring and border Scottish wars. Washington Irving quotes from an old inedited poem on the siege of Carlavarock some verses commemorative of the feudal services rendered by the Washingtons to the Lord Bishop of Durham in the Scottish border wars :

“ Their valor bowed before the rood and book,
And kneeling knighthood served a prelate lord,
Yet little deigned he on such a train to look,
Or glance of ruth or pity to afford,

“ Their time has heard the peal rung out at night,
Has seen from every tower the cressets stream,
When the red bale fire on yon western height
Had roused the warder from his fitful dream.

“ Has seen old Durham’s lion banner float
O’er the proud bulwark, that with giant pride
And feet deep plunged amidst the circling moat,
The efforts of the roving Scot defied.”

The Washingtons rendered to the Bishop of Durham for the Palatine or Manor of Washington, which they held of him in fief, “ four pounds, and doing service, therefore, in the great chase of the Lord Bishop with two grey hounds, and also paying one mark to the palatine aid, when such tax should be raised.” It was thus they served their feudal lord in the chase and in the wars, facts affording food for reflection on such a form of the union of Church and State.

At the so-called Reformation of the sixteenth century, the Washingtons, with most of the English people, became members of the Church of Henry VIII., or Anglican Church, and I have seen instances recorded in old documents where some of the family received from the crown and held estates and abbeys that were wrested from the Catholic Church by the king. During the protectorate the ancient families, that had adhered to the house of Stuart, drew upon them the vengeance of Cromwell, and many emigrated from England, and of these were John and Andrew Washington, who came to Virginia in 1657, John being the great-grandfather of our Washington. Another brother, James Washington, went to Holland the same year that John and Andrew came to Virginia, and settled at Rotterdam, where he became a Catholic; his descendants, who still bear the name of Washington, are Catholics now. Washington was reared in the Anglican or Episcopal Church, Virginia having been a favorite resort of the English cavaliers fleeing from the bigotry of the Covenanters and Roundheads. His first contact with the Catholics was during the French and Indian War,

when his adversaries were French Catholics. At Fort Du Quesne, now Pittsburg, then a French post, there was an ancient Catholic Shrine, which has been beautifully described by Father Lambing and is still commemorated in our history. It ought to be the scene of Catholic pilgrimages. No doubt in this war he saw the French chaplain administering the sacraments of the Catholic Church to dying soldiers on the field or in the hospital. Washington had never been abroad and had never seen Catholicity in Europe. Lossing says he was a communicant in the Episcopal Church and had pews in the churches at Pohick, near Mount Vernon, and at Alexandria. We have ourselves seen his pew in the church at Alexandria, where it is shown to visitors. It is a double square pew, with seats on both lengths or sides facing each other, and has thus reverently been preserved in its original shape, size and condition just as Washington sat in it, while all the other pews in the church have been altered or modernized by division of each pew into two. We doubt about his having been a communicant in the Episcopal Church in the latter part of his life, from the following anecdote related of him while he was residing in Philadelphia as president. At this time he went regularly to the Episcopal Church of that city with Martha Washington. She received communion on the regular days of communion, which however was always administered at the end of the regular services, and by a singular custom in that church, the non-communicant gentlemen of the congregation usually arose at that moment, at the end of the regular service, and retired from the edifice, leaving their wives inside to receive the communion. No doubt they lingered in the church yard to discuss the politics of the day. Washington followed this practice with the other male members of the congregation. The minister became displeased at the strange custom, as well he might, and on one day, while Washington was present with Martha Washington in their pew, the minister denounced the practice in unmeasured terms. He should have stopped here, but he went further and said (what he might better have omitted, for it was a personal allusion to the president), that it was "a practice which the countenance of the most eminent citizen could not make proper." Washington never afterwards entered that church. No doubt he attended service afterwards, while living at Mount Vernon, at Pohick and Alexandria, but we have no certain information of his being thereafter a communicant, and he had no minister with him at his death bed, unless there be truth in a dim and unauthenticated tradition, which we shall presently mention, that he was attended at that extreme moment by a Catholic priest. Lossing, in a letter addressed to Mr. Martin I. J. Griffin, of Philadelphia, in 1884, described Washington's religious sentiments, and

answered "no" to the question, "Was Washington a Catholic?" as follows: "Washington had a Catholic spirit, which embraced in its goodness *all his fellow-men*; but he was not a member of the Roman Catholic Church."

Washington's respect and friendship for Catholics grew out of his Catholic spirit, out of his natural sense of justice, out of his utter superiority to all prejudice, out of the loyalty to the struggling colonies which the Catholics of the Revolution manifested throughout the contest, out of the services rendered to the cause of independence by prominent Catholics whom he knew, out of the good fighting done under his own command by the Catholic soldiers, chiefly from Maryland and partly from Pennsylvania, out of the transcendent aid so generously given to our cause by two Catholic nations, France and Spain, out of his personal intercourse and friendship with the Catholic officers who commanded in the French armies and navies sent to our relief, some of whom were accomplished, learned and pious chaplains, out of the pleasure and edification he experienced from attending not unfrequently the impressive and devout services of the Catholic Church, and out of his clear insight into her doctrines, history, practices and discipline, the force of which he readily understood, in requiring all Catholic citizens, while fervently acknowledging their spiritual allegiance to the Pope, to feel, profess and practice a true and unswerving loyalty and patriotism to the country and nation of which they might be citizens. Such an example as this should, in our day and forever, banish all bigotry from the minds and education of Americans. Why should we hear even now the utterances of bigotry impugning the loyalty of Catholics when Washington trampled such sentiments and utterances under his feet?

Washington was reared in the same educational influences and prejudices against Catholics as were others of his time and country. Education, tradition, social discriminations were there to affect his character, if possible, with prejudice against Catholics as others were prejudiced. The bigotry which had refused to the Catholic Lord Baltimore a shelter from the elements on the shores of Virginia a century and a half before still existed. There were few if any Catholics living in his State. I have already mentioned in my paper on Washington in the April number of this REVIEW that under our national and State constitutions there was nothing to prevent the States themselves from persecuting conscience and religion and legislating against Catholics before 1776, and that many of the States were then doing it. Washington's own State had been one of these, and although Catholic Maryland had founded her government on the basis of religious liberty, in actual practice in 1634 and by statute in 1649, many of the

States prior to and at the Revolution persecuted Catholics for conscience' sake.

I promised just now to give some account of these proscriptive State Constitutions or laws. In New Hampshire, though its old proscriptive code passed away in 1776, Catholics were excluded from office and the Protestant religion was virtually established by the Constitution of 1792. In Massachusetts, 1779-80, Congregationalism was effectually erected into the State religion, and taxes on all were levied for its support. In New York, 1777, under the leadership of John Jay, Catholics were called upon to abjure their religious allegiance to the head of their Church or forfeit the privilege of naturalization and the rights of citizenship, and they forfeited them. An oath of office was presented to them, which no Catholic could take, and no Catholic could become naturalized. In New Jersey, 1776, Catholics were excluded from office. In Pennsylvania, 1776, no religious test was required except a belief in God, a place of future rewards and punishments and in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. The provisions of the Constitution of Delaware, 1776, were substantially like those of Pennsylvania. While the old laws in Maryland, enacted during the Protestant ascendancy, had become obsolete or repealed, the Constitution of 1776 forbade any minister from receiving lands except for a church or cemetery, and all citizens were requested to subscribe a declaration of belief in the Christian religion. The Constitution of North Carolina, 1776, while containing a formal or general declaration of religious liberty, enacted that "no person who shall deny the truth of the Protestant religion shall be capable of holding office or place of trust or profit in the civil government within this State." In South Carolina, 1778, the Protestant religion was established by the Constitution, and Catholics were excluded from office. Rhode Island had a law against Catholics, but had repealed it now. Connecticut had a law establishing Congregationalism, and hence needed no express provision in her Constitution. Virginia, Washington's own State, both in 1776 and again in 1786, proclaimed religious liberty and freedom of worship to be the "natural rights of mankind." Who is there that does not see in these noble declarations of Virginia the reflex of the liberal and just sentiments of Washington? Then and thenceforth one by one the old thirteen States removed all religious intolerance from their Constitutions and statutes, New Hampshire being the last to retain a vestige of it. The new States coming into the Union since then have Constitutional provisions in favor of religious liberty. So that now we may say that the nation and all the States of the Union rest their honor, their happiness and their glory in the guarantee of perfect religious

equality, liberty and freedom of religious worship. This excellent result is due, more than to any other one man, to the well-known sentiments and commanding influence of the commander-in-chief, the President of the Constitutional Convention, the first President of the United States, the Father of his Country.

The Catholic body at the Revolution was small mostly, and, with few exceptions, destitute of wealth and social influence, the subject of traditional and educational prejudices, proscribed by the laws, and, though mostly congregated in one State, unable to control a single State. In New York the Sons of Liberty ran up a flag bearing the legend, "No Popery." In the Mohawk valley, already consecrated by the martyr-blood of Father Jogues and his companions, a colony of Scotch Catholics had been driven over the border into Canada. Theirs was not the fashionable religion or church of the day, and, though statutes against them were repealed, popular prejudices survived to annoy Catholics then, and even in our own day finding expression in the burning of churches and convents, in anti-popery riots and the lynching of a holy priest. These unfavorable circumstances and surroundings, continuing more or less towards the close of the eighteenth century, enhanced the grandeur of Washington's liberality displayed a century ago. The Revolution also brought out the true character of Catholics, and whenever Washington saw them or met them, his justice and magnanimity saw overwhelming proofs of their loyalty and patriotism. He saw the Catholics of Maryland and Pennsylvania joining heartily and unitedly in the Revolution. Archbishop Carroll, in defending Catholics against unjust aspersions, said they were more unanimous on the side of independence than any other religious body in the land, and had shed their blood more liberally in proportion than their fellow-citizens of any other creed. Washington, too, saw the Declaration of Independence signed by Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the Constitution signed by Thomas Fitzsimmons and Daniel Carroll, who were among its founders; he saw John Carroll go to Canada with Dr. Franklin, Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll of Carrollton to endeavor to remove from Canadian minds the resentment caused by the declarations of the American Congress against the Quebec Act, which gave Canadians religious liberty, and by its aspersions uttered against the Catholic religion. He saw the famous Maryland Line fight by his side until they became his favorite soldiers; he saw by his side his devoted aides-de-camp, General Stephen Moylan of Philadelphia and Colonel John Fitzgerald of Virginia, during the whole war; and besides these he beheld distinguished in the service of the patriot army or rendering aid to the cause such Catholic officers as Doyle, McGuire, Charlevoix, Gosselin,

Guillot, La Balme, Loiseau and the Catholic Indian chief, Orono, who bore a Continental commission, leading his Catholic tribes to the field of battle. He saw Commodore Barry carry the Stars and Stripes in triumph over the seas, until he became the recognized founder of the American navy, and survived to receive a naval commission from the first president himself. It was a Catholic priest to whose exertions and services we owe the raising of the American flag over the cities of the great west, thus gaining the great northwest, now teeming with powerful States, to the cause of independence—this was Father Peter Gibault, the patriot-priest of Vincennes, who blessed the Catholic company of Kaskaskia as they filed into the Continental army of the northwest. The Catholic officer, Francis Vigo, and the Catholic priest, Peter Gibault, by the aid they rendered to the American general, Clark, saved an empire of States to the Union. In 1790 Washington's own State of Virginia acknowledged Father Gibault's services by a public resolution of its legislature. Catholic Indians, as well as Catholic white men, were led into the patriot cause by Father Gibault, and it is admitted in our histories that he saved the northwestern States to the American Union. The first chaplain's commission issued by the Continental Congress was given to a Catholic priest, the Franciscan Father Lotbinière.

The two Catholic regiments from Canada and St. Regis, officered by such men as Louis, Guillot, Loiseau and Menard, won the title of "Congress's Own," and did not retire to their homes until Cornwallis surrendered his sword to Washington at Yorktown. Their descendants are now living upon lands in northern N w York, given them by Congress for their military services. Do you suppose that Washington's heart did not feel the thrill when the brave and gallant Captain La Balme, the hero of Detroit, fell in 1780 before that city, when struggling, at the head of Catholic soldiers, to wrest it from the English? Did he not witness the patriotic efforts rendered throughout the struggle for independence by the Right Rev. John Carroll? Did he not read the triumphant reply of Charles Carroll of Carrollton in defence of Catholics and advocating religious liberty to Daniel Dulany, the tory champion of England? Did he not know that, even before the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed, the Catholic nations of Europe befriended us, while a Protestant nation was struggling to enslave us. Not only France, but also Spain and Italy, gave either substantial aid or ardent sympathy. And even in Protestant Germany, whence England was enlisting Hessians for our subjugation, it was the Catholic princes of the empire that opposed and stopped the wicked enrollment. Before Catholic France sent her armies and fleets to fight for American liberties many Catholic officers of military and

scientific accomplishments, such as Lafayette, Duponceau, Conway, Dugan, Arundel, Pulaski, Arnaud, De Fleury, Du Portail, Du Condray and many others, embracing, as you perceive from the names, officers of the French-Irish brigade, came to aid in the American struggle, and Washington found them of great service in instructing, training, drilling and organizing the Continental troops and in planning brilliant military operations. What shall we say of our only avowed ally in the Revolution, Catholic France, whose fleets and armies rendered such services that historians deem the achievement of American independence an impossibility without them. Catholic Spain drew the Continental nations of Europe into an armed neutrality, thus defeating the machinations of England, and finally she drew the sword in our behalf at the South.

From these varied and numerous associations with Catholics Washington formed many intimate, personal and private friendships, which lasted during his life. His friendship with Lafayette, D'Estang, Luzerne, De Grasse and other French and Catholic officers was the complement of those he formed with the Catholic patriotic Carrolls, with General Moylan, Colonel Thomas Fitzsimons, Colonel Fitzgerald, Commodore Barry and many others. Thomas Fitzsimons rendered important aid to the financial success of the new government under Washington's administration. It is unquestionably true that the ardent support which Catholics, at home and abroad, rendered to the cause of American independence won the heart of Washington, made him their friend, led to many private friendships, called forth encomiums from him and established between him and Catholics special and interesting relations honorable at once to Washington and his Catholic fellow-citizens.

The personal and devoted friendship between Washington and Lafayette was at once beautiful, manly and tender ; it was characteristic of them both. Lafayette loved liberty, but opposed licentiousness, and when in the French Revolution liberty was sunk in licentiousness, it was also Lafayette's downfall ; he would have given France what Washington gave America, as he himself said, "a new Constitutional government." These two illustrious men would make the subject of a lecture. As evidences of their friendship, I will only cite three out of countless instances. In 1784, Mr. Irving informs us that Lafayette gladdened the heart of Washington by a two weeks' visit to Mount Vernon, where he was "a loved and honored guest." In 1790, Lafayette sent to Washington the key of the Bastile, which Washington hung in the main hall at Mount Vernon, where, in my youth, I saw it hanging just as Washington placed it, no other hand, from reverence, having

ever touched or moved it since Washington placed it there. Lafayette's letter sending the key of the Bastile to Washington concludes thus : " I make you homage, also, of the principal key of the fortress of despotism. It is a tribute which I owe you, as son to my adopted father, as aide-de-camp to my general, as missionary of liberty to its patriareh." Washington and Lafayette sickened at the regicide of the gentle king, who had assisted both in achieving our independence. When Lafayette fell before the French Revolution, " Washington," as Mr. Irving writes, " looked with a sadder eye on this catastrophe of Lafayette's high-hearted and gallant aspirations, and mourned over the adverse fortunes of his friend." This noble friendship was the type of many others, not quite so intimate, but equally sincere, between Washington and many Catholic officers and soldiers of the Revolution.

Washington's friendship for the three Carrolls is clearly shown by the history of the times. Mr. Brent, in his biography of Archbishop Carroll, shows how intimately that prelate was acquainted with and admired the life and character of Washington, while Mr. Irving relates how Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, was a favorite visitor at Mount Vernon ; and how, when he aspired to the hand of Nelly Custis, the granddaughter of Martha Washington, and adopted daughter of the General, his suit was seconded by Martha Washington, and no doubt with the General's concurrence, in preference to that of Colonel Lawrence Lewis ; while the young lady herself was won by the gallant Lewis. In the Constitutional Convention, Daniel Carroll and Thomas Fitzsimons had constant and sympathetic intercourse with Washington, who was President of that august body, and it is well known that Washington, Carroll and Fitzsimons united in sustaining all propositions in the Convention favoring Religious Liberty. General Stephen Moylan, of Philadelphia, commenced his service under Washington in Boston, 1775, and ended it only on the surrender of Cornwallis. Washington must have loved Moylan, whose very face and manner so attracted the Chief that he took him from the commissariat at Boston to his own staff as aide-de-camp ; and it was at Washington's request that Congress made him quartermaster-general in 1776. Raising a regiment of cavalry, in 1778-9, Moylan returned to Washington's side, and served with them in the trying campaign of Valley Forge in 1779. He won by his gallantry and services the rank of brigadier-general. We shall see again these two noble friends associated intimately in Philadelphia, the one as President of the United States, and the other as the President of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick.

Washington had no more devoted friend or one whom he esteemed more highly than Colonel John Fitzgerald, of Alexandria,

It was Colonel John Fitzgerald, who in 1774 first introduced Moylan to George Washington at Mount Vernon, where they were both welcome guests, even before the war. Again we find Fitzgerald a guest at Mount Vernon with Dr. Diggs, a Catholic gentleman of Maryland, and again with Daniel Carroll, and on the latter occasion Fitzgerald offered his services to the newly-appointed commander-in-chief, and they were accepted on the spot. Appointed an aide-de-camp to Washington, Fitzgerald served him gallantly to the end. He was the intermediary and medium of communication and information between the general in the field and Martha Washington at Mount Vernon, and was thus the confidential friend and aide of Washington.

At Trenton, when Washington rode his horse before his troops in the face of the enemy, determined to win or die, the most exposed soldier in the field, and while calling on his troops to turn the adverse tide of war to victory, and seemed to all doomed to a certain and immediate death, then Fitzgerald covered his eyes that he might not see his commander fall. But in an instant the American army rushed to the rescue of the exposed chief, who led them on to the charge. Fitzgerald was in the foremost of the fight, and when the day was won and he saw Washington alive and victorious, he rode frantically to the General's side and exclaimed, "Thank God, your Excellency is safe!" Fitzgerald, afterwards describing the scene, said, "I wept, for joy, like a child!" It was he that carried the first news of the victories of Trenton and of Princeton to Martha Washington at Mount Vernon. When a cabal was formed to displace Washington and to put General Gates in command, it was Fitzgerald that penetrated the secrets of the conspirators, faced them with their perfidy, and communicated the information to the calm and unruffled chieftain. It is recorded that "the part that Fitzgerald took in this affair endeared him more than ever to the great commander." After the war, Washington and Fitzgerald were fast friends and neighbors in Virginia, exchanging visits and hospitality with each other. In 1788, Washington was a guest at Fitzgerald's dinner table on St. Patrick's Day, and Washington recorded the event in his diary. We have other accounts of Colonel Fitzgerald's visiting and dining at Mount Vernon; the last occasion being only six months before the General's death. I will also mention here that Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Philadelphia, and Washington were personal friends. At a grand banquet given to General and Mrs. Washington at Philadelphia, on March 4, 1798, on his going out of the presidency, Thomas Fitzsimmons was one of the two presiding officers of the occasion.

Washington had the highest regard for Commodore Barry. It

was Barry that carried the flag of the youngest of nations in triumph over the sea, and saw the flag of the oldest strike before his gallantry. Many are his naval victories, and Washington knew and praised them. On one occasion, when hailed by a British squadron, and asked who he was, his ship's name, etc., he characteristically answered, "The United States' Ship Alliance, saucy Jack Barry, half Irishman, half Yankee—who are you?" In 1778 Washington wrote him a letter complimenting him on his gallantry and address in a recent victory he had achieved, on the glory he had won, and wishing him a suitable recompense for his bravery. The first president afterwards commissioned the gallant captain in the United States navy.

In McSherry's "History of Maryland" are given the officers of the various regiments and companies of the old Maryland Line who fought under Washington and were his favorite soldiers, and it is with pride we can recount such numbers of Catholic names: the Neales, the Boarmans, the Stones, the Fords, the Thomases, the Semmes, the Clarkes, the Boones, the Simms, the Brents, the Mattinglys, the Brookes, the Kiltys, the Thompsons, the Campbells, the Miles, the Contees, the Dyers, the Lowes, the Morgans, and countless other Catholic names. Amongst these names is found that of my own grandfather, William Clarke, an officer under Washington in the Revolution, who was himself a lineal descendant of Robert Clarke, who, in the Maryland Assembly of 1649, voted for the first and then the only true bill of rights in America, the Maryland Act of Religious Liberty. Washington knew and praised all these for their patriotism and valor. While the regiments known as "Congress's Own" were composed chiefly of Catholics, so too Washington's favorite Continental regiments, the old Maryland Line, were greatly composed of Catholics; and these latter were the descendants of the English Catholic colonists, who, in 1634 and 1649, made Maryland "the Land of the Sanctuary," the home of religious liberty.

There was another Catholic patriot of the Revolution, a civilian, a friend of Washington, who rendered invaluable aid to the commander-in-chief and his patriot army in critical periods of the war, and who has scarcely been mentioned, and that only quite lately. This was Patrick Colvin, of New Jersey, the ferryman near Trenton, who, in 1776, ferried Washington and his army across the Delaware, and thus enabled them to circumvent the enemy's movements, and win the glorious victories of Trenton and Princeton. The great national painting in the rotunda of the capitol at Washington represents Washington and his army crossing the Delaware—who has ever known or seen, in that anxious group of patriots there, that a Catholic ferried them across the

historic river? Again in the summer of that year, when Washington, abandoning his first plan of confronting the British at New York, suddenly turned southward from New Jersey to join and relieve Lafayette in Virginia, it was Patrick Colvin who ferried the chief and his army across the Delaware at night. Still, again, in 1789, when Washington was on his way to New York to take the oath as first president of the United States, his journey was one grand ovation from a grateful nation. Now he crossed the Delaware in glory to win the victories and triumphs of peace—who can imagine the joy with which the old ferryman, Patrick Colvin, took personal charge of the presidential party, and ferried them across in his own boat. It is also quite probable, on circumstantial evidence, that Patrick Colvin carried across the Delaware the famous Jesuit missionary of the Revolution, Father Farmer, in his missions of grace and mercy, coming from Maryland or Pennsylvania to the few scattered Catholics in New Jersey and New York during the Revolution. No trace of Patrick Colvin's descendants can be found.

I could give many other instances of Washington's personal and friendly relations with Catholics, but I must proceed to notice now his more public relations with them, and with the Catholic body generally.

I have already alluded to one of Washington's official acts in favor of Catholics, and I promised further details; they are interesting. You know the history of Guy Fawke's conspiracy, in which a few misguided Catholics in England, driven to despair by the persecutions they suffered under the penal laws against their religion, undertook to blow up with gunpowder King James I. and the English Parliament. The celebration of the deliverance of the country from this catastrophe was observed as a legal holy-day in England until comparatively recent years. The Puritans of New England brought with them many such English customs and observances; but how could they hold holy-days in execration of Guy Fawkes for canvassing the life of King James I., when they themselves had actually been guilty of cutting off the head of his son, King Charles I.? What were they to do? Now, as they hated something worse than a king, and that was the Pope, the Pope was made to take the place of Guy Fawkes. So they turned Guy Fawkes' day into Pope day, and celebrated it on the same day, the fifth of November. The day was ushered in amid reports of firearms and fire-crackers, and loud huzzas, and by a motley procession singing the same verses that ushered in the Guy Fawkes' day of old in England:

"Let's always remember
The fifth of November."

The celebration was conducted by a disorderly procession carrying in an open wagon an effigy of the Pope, accompanied usually by an effigy of the devil, or sometimes even of some additional well-known but obnoxious public personage of the day. Thus on November 5, 1774, in one of our cities, the procession was distinguished by the presence of the effigies of the Pope, the devil, of Lord North and Governor Hutchinson, and on another occasion, it was the Pope, the devil and the Pretender. In classic Boston this unseemly custom was sacredly observed, and the procession, after parading through the streets, traversed the Common, and their distinguished guests were ignominiously burned on the Common or on Copp's Hill. These processions were made up of the rabble, boys, drunken men, and the dregs of the slums of cities, and as they proceeded through the principal streets, persons were stopped and houses visited, and demands made on the quiet denizens for money, and all had to comply with the impudent demand to save their windows from being broken. The procession was led by one of the most reckless of the gang, who carried a bell, which he incessantly rang, while he shouted:

"Don't you hear my little bell
Go chink, chink, chink?
Please give me a little money,
To buy my pope some drink."

In New London the celebration seems to have blended the features of the English Guy Fawkes' day and the colonial Pope day, if we may judge from the crude verses chanted there:

"Guy Fawkes and the fifth of November,
The Pope and the Gunpowder Plot
Shall never be forgot,"

Before the colonies had reached the time when religious liberty was to be proclaimed by them, ancient bigotry and prejudice caused great exception to be taken to the celebrated Quebec Act, by which England granted Canadians freedom of religion in order to keep them loyal to her. This gave new vigor and zest to Pope day celebrations in the revolting colonies. We could entertain you with accounts of this grotesque celebration in various colonies of the old thirteen. But we must come at once to Pope day at Boston, November 5, 1775. Washington with his patriot army, in which were many Catholics from Maryland and Pennsylvania, had occupied Boston for the defence of the town. It came to the commander's ears on that day that preparations were making in his army to celebrate Pope day with the usual processions and the usual effigies of the Pope and the devil. Washington was indig-

nant at such an insult to the Catholic soldiers of the patriot army, and he resolved to prevent it. On the very day the preparations had been made, but before the procession could be formed, Washington issued from his headquarters and had posted through the camp the following military order :

“ NOVEMBER 5th.

“ As the commander-in-chief has been apprised of a design formed for observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there should be officers and soldiers in this army so void of common sense as not to see the impropriety of such a step at this juncture, at a time when we are soliciting and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of the people of Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same cause—the defence of the liberty of America. At this juncture and under such circumstances to be insulting their religion is so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused ; indeed, instead of offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks to these our brethren, as to them we are indebted for every late happy success over the common enemy in Canada,”

It is needless to say that Pope day was not celebrated in Boston on that day, nor ever afterwards. Washington had sounded its death-knell. This absurd celebration of Pope day, which before the revolution had become the cause of riot and disorder, so much so as to have been forbidden and punished by local magistrates, as was done in New London in 1768, was revived but feebly after the war, and soon ceased altogether. In our neighboring city of New London the last vestige of it was when Arnold, the traitor, was substituted for the Pope, and the sixth of September for the fifth of November. The ditty now sung in the procession was also changed to suit the purpose, and ran as follows :

“ Don't you remember the sixth of September,
When Arnold burnt the town ?
He took the buildings one by one,
And burnt them to the ground.
And here you see the crooked sticks
For him to stand upon,
And when we take him down from them
We'll burn him to the ground,
We'll burn him to the ground,

“ Hark ! my little bell goes chink, chink, chink,
Give me some money to buy me some drink,
We'll take him down and cut off his head,
And then we'll say the traitor is dead.
And burn him to the ground,
And burn him to the ground.”

The prejudices of those early days have not entirely passed away, for we remember as a boy, in the presidential campaign between Henry Clay and Theodore Freelinghuysen for president and

vice-president, in 1844, the same year that the Know Nothings burned the Catholic Churches in Philadelphia, it was supposed that Mr. Freelinghuysen represented the anti-Catholic sentiments of the day, and the Know Nothings gave his ticket their support. One of the ribald ditties of the campaign was :

“Hurrah for Clay and Freelinghuysen !
Down with the Pope and Kyrie Eleison !”

In the Empire State we now hear the echo of the songs in opposition of the Evangelical Alliance and its allies to a Freedom of Worship bill.

Washington, on his way to Wall Street, where Congress sat, to be inaugurated as first President, on March 3, 1789, stopped at St. Paul's Episcopal Church, in Broadway, and joined in religious services held for that occasion. The Catholics of the United States delivered an address to General Washington, congratulating him and expressing their delight at his being chosen as the President of the nation he had saved.

The address of the Catholics of the United States to General Washington, on the occasion of his election as President of the United States, and the first President's answer to their address, have never been presented in the pages of this REVIEW, and we here present them to our readers :

Address of the Catholics of the United States to General Washington.

“*Sir* : We have been long impatient to testify our joy and unbounded confidence in your being called, by an unanimous vote, to the first station of a country in which that unanimity could not have been attained without the previous merit of unexampled services, of eminent wisdom and unblemished virtue. Our congratulations have not reached you sooner because our scattered situation prevented our communication and the collecting of those sentiments which warmed every breast. But the delay has furnished us with the opportunity not merely of presaging the happiness to be expected under your administration, but of bearing testimony to that which we experience already. It is your peculiar talent, in war and in peace, to afford security to those who commit their protection into your hands. In war you shield them from the ravages of armed hostility; in peace you establish public tranquillity by the justice and moderation, no less than by the rigor, of your government. By example, as well as by vigilance, you extend the influence of laws on the manners of our fellow-citizens. You encourage respect for religion, and inculcate by words and actions that principle on which the welfare of nations so much depends, that a superintending Providence governs the events of the world and watches over the conduct of men. Your exalted maxims and unwearied attention to the moral and physical improvement of our country have produced already the happiest effects. Under your administration America is animated with zeal for the attainment and encouragement of useful literature. She improves her agriculture, extends her commerce, and acquires with foreign nations a dignity unknown to her before. From these happy events, from which none can feel a warmer interest than ourselves, we derive additional pleasure by recollecting that you, *sir*, have been the principal instrument to effect so

rapid a change in our political situation. This prospect of national prosperity is peculiarly pleasing to us on another account; because, whilst our country preserves her freedom and independence, we shall have a well-founded title to claim from her justice, the equal rights of citizenship, as the price of our blood spilt under your eyes, of our common exertions for her defence, under your auspicious conduct—rights rendered more dear to us by the remembrance of former hardships. When we pray for the preservation of them, where they have been granted—and expect the full extension of them from the justice of those States which still restrict them—when we solicit the protection of Heaven over our common country, we neither omit nor can omit recommending your preservation to the singular care of Divine Providence; because we conceive that no human means are so available to promote the welfare of the United States as the prolongation of your life and health, in which are included the energy of your example, the wisdom of your counsels, and the persuasive eloquence of your virtues.”

This admirable and patriotic address was signed, on behalf of the Catholic clergy of the United States, by the Right Rev. John Carroll, the newly-chosen bishop-elect, and, in behalf of the Catholic laity, by Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, and Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, Dominick Lynch, of New York, and Thomas Fitzsimons, of Pennsylvania. In reply to it, the Catholics of America received the following:

Address of General Washington.

“TO THE ROMAN CATHOLICS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

“*Gentlemen*: While I now receive with much satisfaction your congratulations on my being called, by an unanimous vote, to the first station in my country, I cannot but duly notice your politeness in offering an apology for the unavoidable delay. As that delay has given you an opportunity of realizing, instead of anticipating, the benefits of the general Government, you will do me the justice to believe that your testimony of the increase of the public prosperity enhances the pleasure which I should otherwise have experienced from your affectionate address.

“I feel that my conduct, in war and in peace, has met with more general approbation than could reasonably have been expected, and I find myself disposed to consider that fortunate circumstance, in a great degree, resulting from the able support and extraordinary candor of my fellow-citizens of all denominations.

“The prospect of national prosperity now before us is truly animating, and ought to excite the exertions of all good men to establish and secure the happiness of their country in the permanent duration of its freedom and independence. America, under the smiles of a Divine Providence, the protection of a good government, and the cultivation of manners, morals and piety, cannot fail of attaining an uncommon degree of eminence in literature, commerce, agriculture, improvements at home and respectability abroad.

“As mankind become more liberal, they will be more apt to allow that all those who conduct themselves as worthy members of the community are equally entitled to the protection of civil government. I hope ever to see America among the foremost nations in examples of justice and liberality. And I presume that your fellow-citizens will not forget the patriotic part which you took in the accomplishment of their Revolution and the establishment of your Government, or the important assistance which they received from a nation in which the Roman Catholic faith is professed.

“I thank you, gentlemen, for your kind concern for me. While my life and my health shall continue, in whatever situation I may be, it shall be my constant endeavor to justify the favorable sentiments which you are pleased to express of my conduct,

And may the members of your society in America, animated alone by the pure spirit of Christianity, and still conducting themselves as the faithful subjects of our free Government, enjoy every temporal and spiritual felicity.

‘ GEO. WASHINGTON.

“March 12, 1790.”

During his residence in Philadelphia as President he not unfrequently attended religious services at the old Catholic Chapel of the Jesuits, and, according to tradition, visited sociably the Jesuit Fathers in charge of it. On one occasion he carried John Adams with him to Vespers. I will not discuss the question involved in the tradition among the Jesuits of St. Joseph’s Church, Philadelphia, that Washington attended a *Te Deum* celebrated there on December 3, 1781, to commemorate the victory of the American and French armies over Cornwallis at Yorktown, a tradition which has found its way into the Woodstock Papers and is countenanced by other authorities, though strenuously denied by others. The published controversy on this subject can be consulted by such persons as may desire to investigate it further. The members of the Continental Congress attended two *Te Deums* in Philadelphia, one was on July 4, 1779, in celebration of the anniversary of our Independence, and the other on November 4, 1781, in thanksgiving for the American victory at Yorktown; and two Requiem Masses, one on September 17, 1777, for General Du Coudray, a French officer, who lost his life in crossing the Delaware, and the other on May 4, 1780, for Don Juan de Mirales, the Spanish agent to the colonies. Washington also is known to have attended a Catholic burial service on April 29, 1780, over the remains of Don Juan de Mirales, at Morristown, New Jersey, where he died in Washington’s army. Such was the impression these events and the alliance with Catholic France had made and such the use the British endeavored to make of them, that the Tories, disseminated the strange charge that Congress had become “Papist,” and that “the success of the American Revolutionary cause would mean the triumph of Popery.” Arnold, the traitor, even gives the alliance of the colonies with Catholic France as the cause and justification of his treason. From the early days when an American Congress went out of its way to denounce the Quebec Act and the religion of the Canadians, there was certainly a great change when we see that same body attending funeral services and *Te Deums* in a “popish chapel.” In 1785, we see Boston preparing to burn the Pope’s effigy on Guy Fawkes’ Day; “what a change,” Dr. Shea well exclaimed, “to see the selectmen of Boston or the magistrates of Newport following a crucifix through the streets!”

Another pleasing relation which Washington held with Cath-

olics was his acceptance of membership in the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, which was composed mostly of Catholics. This occurred on December 18, 1781, when Washington was unanimously *adopted* as a Friendly Son of St. Patrick; it was the only instance of *adoption* in the annals of the society, and we have the full official list, where the name of Washington is printed as an *adopted member*. On January 1, 1782, the society gave a special and brilliant dinner at the City Tavern, Philadelphia, in honor of Washington, and he attended, together with his staff and the most distinguished generals of the allied army of America and France, foreign ambassadors, civil officials, and all the distinguished men in Philadelphia. On March 18th following, when St. Patrick's Day was celebrated, Washington attended the regular meeting of the society. When a committee of the society presented him with the medal of the Society, on his election as an adopted member, Washington wrote to them: "I accept with singular pleasure the ensign of so worthy a fraternity as that of the Sons of St. Patrick in this city—a society distinguished for the firm adherence of its members to the glorious cause in which we are embarked." General Washington dined with his old friend, Colonel Fitzgerald, at Alexandria, in 1788, on St. Patrick's Day, and in 1798 Colonel Fitzgerald dined at the Spring Garden, Alexandria, on July 12th, with General Washington.

The next incident I will mention is the interchange of visits between Georgetown College and the Sage of Mount Vernon. On July 10, 1798, the President of Georgetown College, Rev. Richard V. Dubourg, afterwards bishop of New Orleans, and a professor and two of the students, Garrett Barry and John Law, with whose parents Washington was acquainted, paid a visit to the retired chief at Mount Vernon, and were his guests for a day and a night. Washington recorded the event in his diary. Among the students of Georgetown College were two Washingtons, Augustin and Bushrod, sons of Judge Bushrod Washington, grandsons of John Augustin Washington, brother of the general's father and grand-nephews of the general. The visit of the president of the college was returned by General Washington by appointment, and preparations were made at the college to receive him, but the time of his coming was not known. The original college building, which is still standing, was surrounded by a paling fence, which had been newly whitewashed. The general came unannounced and unattended in true republican style, riding his favorite horse, which, on dismounting, he tied to the white fence. He was received by Professor Rev. William Matthews, whom we knew well, for he was afterwards for over fifty years pastor of St. Patrick's Church, in Washington, where we worshipped.

I often visited and dined with this venerable priest and friend of my youth, who had known Washington, and often heard him relate such historical events, including the visit of Washington to Georgetown College. Washington is described as "alighting with grace and ease; he entered the humble enclosure with a benevolent serenity of countenance, and the placid look of confidence, for a cordial reception." Robert Walsh, of Philadelphia, a student, delivered a poetical address to the chief. We remember reading it; it was a fine literary production, full of ardent patriotism; we are sure the equanimity of Washington was not disturbed by the youthful poet's composing an epitaph for the general. From that day visits of presidents of the United States to Georgetown College have become traditional; for every president, since Washington visited the college, and many, if not all of them, have conferred the academic honors on the students. Near the same spot where Washington stood I have myself received the college honors from the hands of his successors.

We can now recall, with edification, that venerable priest, Father Matthews, the same that welcomed Washington to Georgetown College, reading every Sunday, at High Mass, that beautiful prayer which Archbishop Carroll composed a hundred years ago, invoking Heaven's blessings on the President, the Congress, and civil officers of the national and State governments, and on our country—a prayer then in general use on Sundays in this country, and which is still recited in the Baltimore Cathedral, whose corner-stone was laid by Archbishop Carroll, and in some other churches—a prayer which Cardinal Gibbons, in his recent article in the "*North American Review*" on Patriotism and Politics, pronounced "a masterpiece of liturgical literature." We should rejoice to see this noble prayer again recited in our churches. It is a model of Christian charity, devotion and patriotism.

Not only did Washington occasionally attend divine service at the Catholic chapel in Philadelphia, he was also a liberal contributor to the erection of the church of St. Augustine, in Philadelphia, whose corner-stone was laid by the Augustian Father, Matthew Carr. So industriously have all sources of information concerning Washington's relations with Catholics been searched, that we know that the first president and his family, at Philadelphia, were indebted to a Catholic for the music of the presidential mansion, for the president bought his piano from worthy Mr. Taws, a Catholic dealer in musical instruments. We think we have seen this attenuated and old-fashioned piano in one of the national museums in Washington. It presents a sorry appearance beside the modern Chickering or Steinway.

There are certain vague traditions, not yet traced to sources of

historical reliability, that Washington had always hanging in his bed-room, while president at Philadelphia, a full-length picture of the Blessed Virgin, the Immaculate Conception; and that when Rev. Dr. Maréchal, afterwards Archbishop of Baltimore, visited the general, and expressed a pleasant surprise at seeing the picture, the general answered: "How can I know the Son without honoring the Mother?" Another tradition, which we barely mention in passing, relates, that an old servant of the general, named Juba, used to relate and imitate the signs, how Washington at his meals made on himself the sign of the cross. There is still another tradition, that Washington sent over to Maryland in his last illness for a Catholic priest, and that the Jesuit Father, Francis Neale, a relative and connection of our own family, spent four hours with the expiring chief. It has been reported, too, that he had abjured Masonry. For these reasons, the question, "Was Washington a Catholic?" has been gravely discussed in some Catholic journals.

I have read and considered all that has been collected on this curious subject. I cannot find any sufficient, or even slight, evidence tending to prove that Washington ever became a Catholic. Washington was certainly catholic, as Mr. Lossing expressed it, though he never became a Catholic. One of the arguments used to prove that Washington received the light of the Catholic Faith was because he deserved this grace of his great natural virtues and good deeds. This question is not for man to determine. It rests only with God. It is not for us to know, though we may indulge in affectionate and grateful hopes, what graces and lights from Heaven beamed into his soul when he was about to go to his great reward.

The religious sentiments which he so often and so fervently expressed, and which I quoted in an article in the April number of this REVIEW, and the following passage from Washington's Farewell Address, go far to support this grateful view. I now quote from the Farewell Address:

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation *desert* the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure—reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

"'Tis substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundations of the fabric?"

From his religious character, and from his exemplary virtues, his numerous writings in advocacy of religion, morality and virtue, his aspirations after virtue and truth, may we not indulge the hope that, though Washington at his death did not belong to the body of the Catholic, he may have belonged to the soul of the Church, and that had he lived longer, and but for his untimely death, he would have joined the Church. I have heard Catholic divines express this view, and such seems to have been the view of Archbishop Carroll, who knew him well and long. This is inferrible from the eulogies he pronounced on Washington's exalted virtues in that noble funeral oration he pronounced on the death of Washington, and still more from the circular which he issued immediately thereafter, on December 29, 1799, directing the Catholic pastors of the whole United States, for such was his diocese, to hold services in their respective churches on February 22, 1800, in commemoration of Washington, and to pronounce eulogies on his life and virtues. In this circular he seems clearly to throw out the view, as St. Ambrose did in his funeral oration on the good and noble young Roman Emperor, Valentinian, that had he lived he would have joined the Catholic Church. Archbishop Carroll compares Washington to that just and virtuous ruler, "who," he says, as St. Ambrose said of Valentinian, "was deprived of life before his initiation into our Church."

Leaving this question in the hands of his Eternal Judge and our own, we, as true Americans, clinging to our country and its Constitution forever, accept from our fathers, with gratitude and love the inheritance of the services, the achievements and the virtues of our greatest, best and dearest Washington!

RICHARD H. CLARKE, LL.D.

Book Notices.

STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY. By *Rev. Reuben Parsons, D.D.* Vol. III. combines XV. and XVI. Royal 8vo., pp. 603. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co.

When, a few years ago, the first volume of Dr. Parson's work came from the press, it was warmly welcomed by all honest readers of history, because it gave to them what was badly needed, a work in the English language treating exhaustively and nearly exclusively of controverted points. Until that time no such work existed. The English reading student had an abundance of church history manuals, of various shapes and sizes, and of different degrees of merit, but no manual of general church history can satisfy the earnest student on the great controverted questions. A manual that attempted to do so would soon grow too big for its purpose. Satisfactory treatment of such subjects must be looked for by the general reader in a work like this, and, therefore, its first appearance was an important event for historical students. Nor were they slow to appreciate it, for already a second edition of the first volume has been issued.

Those who read the book when it first came from the press acknowledged that Dr. Parsons had done the first part of his work well. In the selection of subjects, in the statement of questions, in the selection and quotation of authorities, and, most of all, in summing up, he showed himself to be a scholar, a historian, and a philosopher. This did not surprise those who knew the reverend author, because he had already established his reputation by historical contributions to Catholic magazines, and by his book entitled "Some Errors and Lies of History." In his new work, however, the field was so much broadened that the qualifications of the historian were displayed to much better advantage.

The first volume was very interesting, for it contained the history of all the great controverted questions of the first eight centuries. The second volume followed promptly, bringing the work down to the close of the fourteenth century. It was evident at once that the author was working fully up to the high standard which he had set for himself in the beginning, and that he was in every way admirably fitted for such a work.

If any lingering doubt remained in the minds of anyone as to the ultimate success of the work as a whole, it must be entirely dispelled by the appearance of the third volume.

Although in every age of the church questions have arisen which have furnished ground for controversy, the period embraced in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries may not inaptly be called the controversial age. A larger book is required to clear away the clouds of ignorance, error, falsehood, and misrepresentation that darken the events of these two centuries, than was required to clear the sky of the first eight centuries or of the six succeeding ones. He who tries at any time to separate truth from falsehood in connection with a fact of history hundreds of years after it has transpired, must bring to the work many qualifications, without which he will only add to the general confusion; but he who undertakes to separate truth from falsehood in regard to the great controverted points of church history during the

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, must possess the qualifications of the good historian in a supereminent degree. A glance at the names of leading persons and events in the third volume of Dr. Parson's history will convince any one of the truth of this assertion.

The fifteenth century had not completed its first decade when the Bohemian heresiarch, John Huss, appeared upon the scene. In 1409 he was rector of the University of Prague, and had become distinguished for eloquence, subtlety, and love of novelty, when the works of Wycliffe attracted his attention. He soon became tainted with the false teachings of the English innovator, and when Pope Alexander V. forbade the preachers of Bohemia to mention these doctrines, Huss refused to obey, and openly defended them. He was excommunicated in 1411. In 1415 the Council of Constance, after carefully examining his writings, summed up his false teachings in thirty articles, and said of them, "Many were erroneous, some scandalous, some offensive to pious ears, some rash and seditious, others notoriously heretical, and already condemned by the holy fathers and General Councils." As to the person of Huss, the Council declared him a heretic, degraded him from his priestly dignity, delivered him to the secular judgment, and by that power he was burned at the stake.

He was not a Protestant in the modern sense, because to the end he believed in transubstantiation, the necessity of confession, the seven sacraments, the existence of purgatory and the duty of prayers for the dead, and the veneration of the saints. Surely there is no room for such a man in the ranks of modern Protestantism, nor can it increase its antiquity by placing his name on its calendar of saints.

What a transition from John Huss to Joan of Arc! In the very year in which he was excommunicated she was born in the little village of Domremy, on the confines of Champagne, Burgundy, and Lorraine. She was only a peasant child who, until her womanhood, could not handle a sword or mount a horse, and yet were it not for her, England's sovereign would probably be wearing to-day the crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Ireland and France. At the age of thirteen she began to have visions of angels and saints who delivered to her messages from God. When she was eighteen years old she went to Charles VII. and told him that she had been appointed by Divine Providence to deliver him and his kingdom from the English. She knew the king when she first met him, although he was disguised in the midst of his courtiers. She dressed as a soldier, and, armed with a sword which was found buried in some old ruins, as she had foretold, she raised the siege of Orleans, riding at the head of the French forces, and bearing aloft her white banner covered with lilies. After leading the French troops victoriously through several other battles, she fell into the hands of the English, who after falsely accusing her, and inducing her by trickery to sign confessions which she had never made, burned her to death. On May 30, 1431, the Maid of Orleans died with these words upon her lips: "Jesus! Jesus! Jesus!" At the commencement of this century more than four hundred works had treated of her career. Some of these have aimed at her canonization, others have claimed for her the pedestal of a national heroine, while a few have held her up to ridicule. "But France awaits with confidence the moment when her sons will use, with propriety, the words which the ascendancy of truth compelled Shakespeare to put on the lips of Charles VII.: 'Joan la Pucelle shall be France's saint.'"

On the first day of the year 1431, which was to witness the close of the eventful life of the great heroine of history, Joan of Arc, a man-child opened his eyes for the first time at Xativa, in the diocese of Valencia, in Spain, who was to play an important part on the stage of the world. Roderick Llancol was the nephew of Alfonso Borgia, who in 1455, was elevated to the Papacy under the name of Calixtus III. From that time the Llancol family assumed the names and arms of the Borgias, by which they are known in history.

Young Roderick was noted for his talent. He studied for the bar, he entered the army, and finally was called by his uncle to Rome, where he was made successively commendatory archbishop of Valencia, cardinal-deacon and vice-chancellor of the Roman Church. At that time his conduct was exemplary and his ability unquestioned. In 1492, after five days of deliberation, twenty-three cardinals in conclave selected Roderick Borgia to succeed Innocent VIII., deceased, under the title of Alexander VI.

"It is an almost general opinion that Pope Alexander VI. had neither the virtues which befit the Supreme Pontificate of Christendom, nor those of any ordinary man. His name is seldom mentioned without thoughts of simony, treachery, lust, avarice and sacrilege. Other memories, long condemned and even accursed, have been rehabilitated; but that of Alexander VI. remains, as yet, foul and detestable to a large number of Christians. Are we, therefore, to take for granted all that has been alleged against this Pontiff? Even Roscoe, the Protestant historian of Leo X., contends that, whatever have been his crimes, there can be no doubt but that they have been highly overcharged. . . . The vices of Alexander were accompanied, although not compensated, by many great qualities which, in the consideration of his character, ought not to be passed over in silence."

The student of history must remember, that most of the information which blackens the character of Alexander VI. is attributed to Burkhard, master of ceremonies at the Papal Court, who was not in a position to get the information which is attributed to him. Moreover, it is not at all certain that we possess the authentic work of Burkhard. The charge that his election was simoniacal rests on weak grounds, while the assertion that he tried to poison several cardinals, and was himself poisoned, has no foundation in fact. Even Voltaire is very firm in attributing Alexander's death to natural causes. The fact is that the Pope was attacked on August 10, 1503, with the tertian fever prevalent in Rome at that time, and he died on the night of August 18th. On the broad general principle of justice that a man should be considered innocent until his guilt is proved, Alexander VI. was not guilty of the horrible crimes that were laid at his door while he occupied the Papal throne.

One of the most striking figures of the reign of Alexander VI. was the Dominican monk Savonarola. Born at Ferrara in 1452, and strangled to death by the civil authorities at Florence on May 23, 1498, his life was most eventful. He was ordained priest in 1482, and his first sermon was so badly preached that when it was finished only twenty persons remained in the church. He then devoted himself to Biblical studies for several years until in 1489 he was appointed professor of Scripture to the young religious of the Convent of St. Mark in Florence. He soon appeared in the pulpit again, and began to denounce, by divine command he claimed, the vices of voluptuous

Florence. He did not confine his efforts to the reformation of the State, but from the very beginning proclaimed the necessity of purifying the sanctuary. He was particularly severe on Alexander VI., and his auditors soon divided themselves into two factions. His followers were called "friarites" or "weepers," while those who were opposed to his vehement denunciations of church and State because they feared that evil would follow from them, were called *tepidi* or "lukewarm." At this time the "worst accusation against Savonarola was that of being more of a tribune and demagogue than of an ecclesiastic and a friar. The charge of heresy made against him was unfounded. As for his political notions, he was a thorough republican, and carried his principles to their utmost logical conclusion. He was a firm advocate of universal suffrage." For a time he was lord and governor of Florence, but he soon came in conflict with his ecclesiastical superiors, the people began to mistrust him, and his influence waned.

The Pope forbade him to preach, but, after a short submission, he rebelled against this prohibition and ascended the pulpit. When a sentence of excommunication was pronounced against him, he denied that the Pope could exercise such a power.

The end came in a very peculiar manner. One day a Franciscan friar, named Francis of Puglia, while preaching in the Church of Santa Croce, declared that Savonarola was an imposter, and challenged him to the "ordeal by fire." A follower of Savonarola, named Dominic, took up the challenge, and the civil magistrates appointed a lay-brother to meet him in the place of the Franciscan challenger. Certain propositions were made by Dominic, and their truth or falsity was to be decided by this curious method. The propositions were: "The Church needs reformation; she will be chastised; she will be renovated; Florence will be punished, but she will afterwards prosper; the infidels will be converted; all these things will soon happen; the excommunication of Savonarola is null."

The preparations were quickly made; the platform was erected; the necessary attendants and officers were appointed; and on April 7, 1498, the participants, with their friends, appeared in the Square of the Magistrates, now known as the Square of the Grand Duke. An immense multitude was present, and even the housetops were crowded. When the time arrived for the Dominican to step upon the platform, where the flames would soon leap about him, Savonarola handed to him a pyx containing the Holy Eucharist. The crowd saw the action, and objected because they believed that the flames would respect the Blessed Sacrament; but Savonarola persisted, and finally the ordeal was abandoned.

There is not much more to tell. Savonarola was seized by the civil authorities, tried and convicted of schism, heresy, persecution of the Church and seduction of the people. On May 23, 1498, he and two companions were strangled to death and their bodies were burned. It is a sad page of history.

Christophe, in his "History of the Papacy in the Fifteenth Century," says: "Some make a fanatic, a sectarian, an imposter, of Savonarola. The fact is, there is something of all these in the Dominican. If we open the door of his cell in St. Mark's, and there contemplate him at the foot of the crucifix, attenuated by fasting and flooded in an ecstasy of prayer; if we follow him to Santa Maria del Fiore and hear him reproaching voluptuous Florence with her vices, Savonarola is a saint, an apostle. But if we turn to the other side, and behold the tribune who

mixes politics with religion, the declaimer who inveighs against the existing powers, the seer who opposes a divine mission to the authority of the head of the Church, Savonarola is very like a fanatic, a sectarian, an imposter."

Luther and other Protestants have claimed Savonarola as the precursor of the "Reformation," but his works were declared orthodox by the proper authorities after some alterations in some of his sermons, and it is a remarkable fact that not one of his followers became a disciple of Luther or a betrayer of his country's liberty.

Cantu, in his work entitled "Heretics of Italy," speaks thus of the Dominican friar: "The fame of Savonarola remained suspended between heaven and hell, but his end was deplored by all, and perhaps first by those who caused it. In the churches of Santa Maria Novella and San Marco he is depicted as a saint, and Raphael placed him in the *Loggie* of the Vatican, among the Doctors of the Church. . . . It is said that Clement VIII. swore, in 1598, that if he succeeded in acquiring possession of Ferrara, he would canonize Savonarola. . . . Saints Philip Neri and Catharine de Ricci venerated him as blessed, and Benedict XIV. deemed him worthy of canonization."

It is a sad page of history.

We have glanced at a few of the interesting chapters of this book that the reader may have some understanding of its importance. What remains is not less interesting and important. Here is the history of "The Commencement of Protestantism," "Martin Luther," "Erasmus," "Leo X.," "The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day," "The Divorce of Henry VIII.," "Anglican Orders," "The Council of Trent," "Giordano Bruno," and many other well-known but not rightly-understood subjects. Indeed, this is a valuable book.

J. P. T.

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY; THE TRUTH OF THOUGHT OR MATERIAL LOGIC. A Short Treatise on the Initial Philosophy the Groundwork Necessary for the Consistent Pursuit of Knowledge. By *William Poland, S. J.* Pp. 208. New York, Boston and Chicago: Silver, Burdett & Co. 1896.

Father Poland, professor of philosophy in St. Louis University, has already given students of philosophy two sections of what he evidently contemplates constructing—a complete system of fundamental science. These two parts are especially designed as class-books, and in this relation, as well as in a wider sphere, have done good service in the cause of truth. We doubt whether there exist any better manuals of logic and ethics for the use of classes in colleges and convents than those by Father Poland. The Stonyhurst series are excellent in their order, but they appeal to the general reader and to the student who has already completed a course of philosophy. They are highly serviceable as collateral reading for students of philosophy, but are not intended nor adapted for text-books. One takes up, therefore, the present section of the author's rational philosophy anticipating the pleasure and the profit that came to the reader of the two preceding parts. Nor are we disappointed. Excellent as was the beginning of the work, the sequel is still better. This is doubtless largely due to the special subject-matter here discussed. Apart from ethics, which has a practical interest all its own, material logic has a winsomeness invincible for the speculative mind. We here leave aside the form, the shell of thought, and probe into its inmost heart and kernel, and that not on its subjective side as psychic movement, but as to its objective content. The question is as

to the meaning of thought as constituting knowledge. "Is there, indeed, such a thing as knowledge? Can we really rely upon thought as being at any time knowledge in the strict sense—that is, as having an objective value, as being representative of something which is or was or may be independently of the thought which we possess? Can we possess knowledge in such a way as to rest secure that the content of the thought has an object, a corresponding something which is not the thought itself? In other words, can we have certitude? If so, what is the basis of this certitude? What is the last reason we can give that the thought is indeed a knowledge-thought, that its content answers, as representative, in the way of thought to something which is not the thought? What, in other words, is the criterion of knowledge of logical truth?" (p. 14).

Questions such as these were not put at all by the scholastic philosophers, or if put it was but now and again, obiter, here and there. "They did not think it any more necessary to write special treatises on the fact of knowledge and the reality of the object of thought than upon the fact of hunger appeased by a real object called food" (p. 16). Nevertheless, though material logic as a criticism of thought is largely the outcome of modern scepticism, the result has been, on the whole, to the advantage of sound philosophy, necessitating as it has a more thorough search into the process and range of knowledge, and so making us better acquainted with the nature, value, limitations of our cognitive acts and the methods of building systems of scientific truth.

But aside from the attractiveness of this search for "the ultimate reasons of knowing" and the importance of the result from the point of view, both of mental discipline and of positive information, the author's mode of presenting his subject gives a peculiar charm to his work. The matter comprised within its covers is little else than what the student is wont to find in Latin manuals of Catholic philosophy; but the way in which it is all set before the mind is uniquely bright and fresh. The author has the rare gift of presenting old truths in new light, of fitting out the abstract with image and illustration that cause it to live in the consciousness, in a word, of making logic almost easy—easy not by mutilating its content, but by giving it the readiest ingress to the intellect. In this respect, while the work appeals to the lay academic student and the average seeker for liberal mental culture, it will prove of good service in filling in the tissue of knowledge gleaned by the clerical student in our seminaries from the Latin text-book and lecture. F. P. S.

CATHOLIC SUMMER AND WINTER SCHOOL LIBRARY: SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. By Rev. J. A. Zahm, Ph.D., C.S.C.
 PREHISTORIC AMERICANS. By the Marquis de Nadaillac.
 SUMMER SCHOOL ESSAYS. Vol. I.—II. Chicago: D. C. McBride & Co. 1896.
 Pr. 50c. each.

The managers of the Columbian Catholic Summer School have undertaken the laudable project of publishing in a series of handy volumes the lectures delivered at its opening session last year at Madison, Wisconsin. Both they and the publishers deserve the congratulations of all lovers of good books—books excellent as to matter and to form. The series of booklets thus far issued opens with the lectures delivered by Dr. Zahm before the Summer Schools at Madison and Plattsburg and the Winter School at New Orleans. These lectures are here presented as originally delivered, together with a well-written preface containing a reply to those who had animadverted, somewhat severely it seems, on the views regarding evolution defended by the lecturer before the Summer Schools.

The second volume contains the papers prepared by the Marquis de Nadaillac and translated and read at Madison. The writer is one of the most prominent European anthropologists, and probably no other living scholar is better entitled to tell what is known of the story of "The Mound Builders" and "The Cliff Dwellers" of the archaic age in our country, his great work on "Prehistoric America" having won for him an international reputation among anthropologists.

The third volume opens with a paper on "Buddhism and Christianity," by Mgr. D'Harlez, than whom there are few if any who speak with graver authority on the religion of Gautama. The same manual contains an essay by Dr. T. P. Hart on "Christian Science and Faith Cure." "The Growth of Reading Circles" is described by Rev. T. McMillan, C.S.P., and "Reading Circle Work" is discussed by Rev. R. Fuhr, O.S.F. Miss Katharine Conway's paper on "Catholic Literary Societies," though brief, is worthy of its theme. The volume fittingly closes with an essay on "Historical Criticism," by the illustrious Bollandist, Rev. P. C. DeSmidt, S.J.

The fourth volume contains a paper by Rev. P. F. Nugent on the "Spanish Inquisition;" on "Savonarola," by Mr. Condé B. Pallen, Ph.D.; on "Joan of Arc," by Mr. J. W. Wilstach; on "Magna Charta," by Prof. J. G. Ewing, and on the "Missionary Explorers of the Northwest," by Judge W. L. Kelly.

A fifth volume, announced as in preparation, will embrace seven other essays on timely topics, by writers of established authority.

The foregoing outline of the contents of the present Summer and Winter School Library will give some idea of the work done at the institutions in which the essays were given as lectures. Bearing in mind the fact that the library sums up the work of but one session, and that the very first, one cannot fail to recognize that these institutions are deserving of highest praise and encouragement. Whilst, however, it is of some profit that the best thought of European scholars should be placed within the reach of our people, papers produced abroad and translated and read here by substitutes for the writers, only very imperfectly realize the intellectual aim of a summer school.

One of the most pronounced palpable advantages of such institutions is, that they bring inquiring minds into personal contact with lecturers who present *visà voce* the results of their matured thought and labor and who being full of their subjects are in a condition to give of their abundance and to solve the questions of their hearers.

We trust that the managers of the Summer School will continue the work so happily begun and publish the lectures of each future session of their institution. The project goes far to create the kind of literature needed and demanded by Catholics in this country.

Probably the work would serve its end still more efficiently if the bibliographical feature were more pronounced.

Without encumbering and disfiguring the pages with foot-notes, each essay would add to its power for good if its author appended a brief list of works in which it would be profitable for readers to seek for further information.

The dress that has been selected for these manuals is of the prettiest and most becoming. They are the daintiest of booklets. Convenient in size, neat in binding, excellent in paper, with large, clear letter-press, they are ideal books, especially for summer—books such as a lover of the beautiful in this line delights to take up and fondle—books to read now and again at spare moments, to put into one's pocket for his trolley ride into town of mornings, or into his grip for his summer holiday, or

to carry about with him on his stroll into the country. Let us have more of them.

SYNOPSIS THEOLOGICÆ DOGMATICÆ FUNDAMENTALIS AD MENTEM S. THOMÆ AQ., hodiernis moribus accomodata. Pp. viii., 688. Tornaci (Belg.) Desclee, Neo-Eboraci: Benziger Bros.

Amongst the number of serviceable books of divinity studies recently published the present work by Father Tanquary, professor in St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, deserves a prominent place. The first two volumes of his work have been noticed in a former number of this REVIEW. The present, the third, though in logical order the first, brings the work to completion. Its subject-matter, fundamental theology, is, if there be degrees of importance in a science all of whose parts seem to be superlatively important, the most vital portion of the science of dogmatic truth, the very web of the entire system of theology, comprising, as it does, the questions regarding the true religion, the constitution of the Church and the sources of theological argument. Eminently important at all times in the scientific structure of theology, these subjects have in our day taken on an independent pre-eminence of their own, constituting as they do the matter of the special science of apologetics. They call, therefore, strongly for thorough, all-around treatment. The old truths of faith, and their theological inferences, must be adjusted again and again to the varying phases of the new learning and to the hydra-headed forms of error. This is particularly true of the opening questions of the work before us—those namely that concern the supernatural religion, the divinity of Christianity and the divine origin of the Church. Never, probably, before has the subject of Christian evidence been so thoroughly investigated as it is to-day. The wonders of physical science, though making nothing against the fact and the discernibility of true miracles, present new facts and demand new focusing of the light from the old principles. The higher criticism, far from weakening, rather strengthens the traditional arguments for the genuinity and integrity of the inspired record. But it calls for a broader and a deeper knowledge of the sacred text, of the circumstances under which it was written and the development of its history on the part of the Catholic theologian.

The study, too, of the nature and divine origin of Christianity necessitates some closer acquaintance with so-called cognate religions, especially of those mystic cults of the far-east which have of late obtained some strange power over the minds of those who have forsworn their allegiance to Christianity. A work, therefore, on Christian evidences must have at least two well-marked features to be of service to the Catholic student. First, it must present distinctly and thoroughly the arguments from reason and revelation for the divine origin of Christianity and of that organism in which it is fully preserved—the Catholic Church. Secondly, it must present these arguments in their bearing on the present status of scientific and historical research. These two characteristics are well pronounced in Father Tanquary's theology. His aim in this, as in the preceding volumes, has been to so form the mind of the young cleric that it may grasp the systematized aggregate of dogmatic truths in its relation to the mental environment of the times. This aim can, of course, be but imperfectly realized by a text-book, even when supplemented by the lectures of the professor. The student can only by his own reading and thought, and after experience, grasp the true inwardness, and we might say the outwardness of theology.

To this end he must be acquainted, not alone with the writings of the older theology, though a *thorough* knowledge of St. Thomas would leave little necessarily to be added, but with the best productions of the modern mind in that and related sciences. And it is in this line that Father Tanquary's present volume is particularly useful. He presents the truths and arguments of theology clearly and succinctly, but around it all he has gathered a wealth of literary citation and references, by the aid of which the student sees the truths under various lights and with the eyes and from the points of view of many a friend and foe.

With such a timely, well-ordered, handsomely printed text-book within easy reach, it were a shame, and something like an injustice, that any dry-as-dust, ill-printed, badly-congested compilation as had once to do service for lack of something better should still survive in any of our institutions of theology to clog and stunt the mind of young men eager to assimilate and utilize the saving truths of the Church's theology.

EVOLUTION AND DOGMA. By Rev. J. A. Zahm, Ph.D., C.S.C. Chicago: McBride & Co. 1896. Pp. xxx., 461.

A little, and Dr. Zahm would persuade us to become evolutionists. He pleads strongly, even eloquently at times, for the theory of transformism. It was doubtless the strength and eloquence of this pleading that drew upon it some criticism when it was made from the lecture platform last summer at Madison and Plattsburgh. His critics would probably have preferred that he had presented his views through the present bookish medium, rather than from the lecture hall of the Summer Schools. Not that they regarded it as inexpedient "to discuss Evolution before the audiences that gather at such institutions." It is, of course, as Dr. Zahm remarks, quoting Bishop Messmer, the president of the Columbian Summer School, "simply silly to maintain that such questions [as that of Evolution] are the exclusive prerogative of the secret circles of specialists and savants, since they are, day after day, brought before the general public by all manner of press products—newspapers, monthlies, books, and brochures—and are reasoned about by the masses." The *pièce de resistance*, however, seized on by those who censured Dr. Zahm's lectures, seems to have been, not the discussion of Evolution, but his making the young institutions at Madison and Plattsburgh the media of certain "advanced" views, as he there advocated.

The subject of evolution has been sifted and re-sifted on every side by the most eminent Catholic savants, philosophers, and theologians of the present and past generations; and while all recognize the plausibility of a number of analogies whereon the theory of transformism is based, all, with rare exceptions, refuse to assume its advocacy, even when the theory is restricted to the sublunar orders of animated nature. But when the doctrine is extended to the genesis of Adam's body, the number of Catholic thinkers who can see their way to adopting such a view is exceedingly small. In view of this attitude of Catholic science, it seemed, to those who differ from Dr. Zahn's opinion, hardly opportune that the infant summer schools should put forth a plea for evolution of so latitudinarian a character.

Be all this as it may, none will find fault with the author of this volume in using the liberty not denied him by Catholic dogmatic definition of expressing his opinion regarding this popular subject. On the contrary, they will accord the work the high measure of praise it deserves, for there are apparent in its every page proofs of wide reading, patient research, careful sifting of arguments, and, especially, marked

candor and fairness to his opponents. One rarely finds the objections against evolution so fully and forcibly expressed as they are in this book. Indeed, the counter-difficulties seem stronger than the positive argument.

Those of our readers who are familiar with the large Catholic literature on this subject in the various European languages, will find nothing new in Dr. Zahm's book, but they will find brought here compactly together a mass of information clearly and attractively set forth, which they could glean elsewhere only by much and long labor. Those, on the other hand, who have not access to such foreign literature, will meet with no other work in English by a Catholic scholar, covering the same ground, and covering it so ably and fully; none that safeguards so completely the limits of reason and faith, the dignity of man, and the attributes of God.

May it be fair, in conclusion, to remark that Aristotle does not figure, as the author tells us, in the works of St. Thomas as the "magister, the master." This title was reserved for the Lombard. The Stagyrte was reverentially styled "philosophus, the philosopher." A mere bagatelle, a *lapsus pennæ*, which, however, should have been erased by one so familiar as is Dr. Zahm with the writings of the angelic doctor. F. P. S.

DISPUTATIONES THEOLOGICÆ SEU COMMENTARIA IN SUMMAM THEOL. D. THOMÆ, V. I., De Deo Uno Trino, 1895. V. II., De Creatione, 1893. Quebeci: Demers Fratres.

There are those who have small regard for the manner in which that grandest of sciences, dogmatic theology, is taught in some of the highest European institutions of divinity. They claim that too little appreciable advantage comes from a learned professor's soaring in the empyrean of speculative theology before a class of young men whose native powers and acquired strength are unable to lift them in so high a flight. They plead for the bringing of sacred knowledge into closer touch with the questions that agitate the human mind of to-day—a fuller, deeper, sifting of the problems raised by physical science, philosophy, and history—and the leaving of the recondite and soaringly speculative subjects to the taste and leisure of individuals. This, it may be, is taking too utilitarian a view of an eminently contemplative branch of knowledge, and gives insufficient credit to the influence of such knowledge in deepening not only the intellectual but the whole spiritual side of the student. Whatever may be said for or against the opinion that advocates the so-called "practical" view of theology, much is gained for the claimants of its deeper speculative side, when the professors of that side can be shown to have sent forth from their classes minds sufficiently familiar with theology in itself and its bearings to produce a work like the one before us. Dr. Paquet declares it his glory to have sat at the feet of Cardinal Satolli in the days when His Eminence expounded St. Thomas in the Urban College at Rome—quemque ex cathedra Urbani Collegii de Propaganda fide mira eloquentia docentem ac disputantem nos per tres annos audiisse perpetuo gloriabimur [et qui] potentia ingenii, eruditionis laude, maxime autem notitia plenire ferventique amore doctrinarum adeo excelluit ut per eum gloriosiores scientiæ scholasticæ dies reflorescere quodammodo videantur" (p. 7).

It is no small testimony to the worth of the master to have formed so apt a pupil, and to have indirectly caused the present work. Causa causæ est causa causati.

Dr. Paquet soars a middle flight. Taking the "Summa" of St. Thomas for his basis, he rather seeks to present the genuine thought of the angelic

doctor than to expand it by much profound speculation of his own. Whilst having an eye to the theories of modern science, especially in the volume on Creation, his aim has been rather to inform the minds of his pupils with the theological habit, and so to endow them with power to meet the adversary than to engross them over much with opposing tactics. Though he calls his work "Commentaria," it is not a comment on the text of the Summa "à la Cajetano." He has taken the thought and largely the phrasing of St. Thomas, and cast it in the accepted modern mould—retaining the "questions" and "articles" under the "disputations," but arranging the "articles" after the familiar plan of contemporary Catholic theology.

The work is, therefore, a modification of the "Summa" accommodated to the needs of the modern student.

The present volumes furnish about one-third of the prospective work. Four more are promised to complete the entire course of theology.

CONSCIENCE AND LAW, OR PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN CONDUCT. By *William Humphrey, S. J.* London: Thomas Baker. New York: Benziger Bros. 1896. Pp. xiii., 226. Price, \$1.60.

Those of our readers who are fairly well acquainted with the moral philosophy and theology taught in our Catholic seminaries and universities will find this work covering familiar ground and on quite familiar lines. The first chapter, on human responsibility, deals with the nature and principles of human acts; the second, with moral conscience; the third, with the nature and kinds of law; the fourth, with dispensations and privileges; the fifth, with the notions of justice and right; the sixth, and last, with the subject of restitution.

The first five of these chapters are reprinted in revised form from the *Month*, the sixth has been added to give a certain completeness to the matter.

The details of these subjects are wrought out with great terseness and precision, the phrasing of definition and distinction being almost as rigid as one finds it in scholastic Latin. We do not know of any other book of its species by a Catholic writer in English. It will, therefore, be found particularly well adapted for the use of students of law who are not sufficiently at home in scholastic Latin to be able to avail themselves of the treasures of legal knowledge systematized in the writings of the theologians and canonists of the Church. At the same time students of theology themselves may derive advantage from the presentation in a neat-fitting English dress of ideas with which they have become acquainted only in the antique garb of Latin.

The book, whose subject matter is not overpoweringly attractive, has been made to win for itself at least a reading—perhaps even a studying; nothing else will profit here—by its material make-up. Paper, letterpress and arrangement of matter are what they should be in works of this kind.

LIFE OF REVEREND MOTHER MARY OF ST. EUPHRASIA PELLETIER. First Superior-General of the Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd of Angers. By *A. M. Clarke.* 12mo. Pp. 410. London: Burns & Oates, New York: Benziger Brothers.

Rose Pelletier was born on July 31, 1796, on the island of Noirmoutiers. In 1834 she became the first Superior-General of the Order of Our Lady of Charity, which had been instituted some time before by the venerable servant of God, John Eudes, who was one of the most

distinguished priests among the French clergy during the first and middle parts of the seventeenth century. She governed the order successfully until her death, on the 24th of April, 1868. As Cardinal Vaughan very well says, in a preface to this work: "God is often pleased to bestow upon the first superiors of religious orders that are destined to fill the Church with the perfume of their virtues, and to enrich it by the conversion of innumerable souls, signal and extraordinary graces. It is as though the efficacy and healing of the leaves were to be found in greater abundance in the root of the tree which He has planted. So it would seem to be in the present instance. The Order of the Good Shepherd, instituted for reclaiming sinners, was founded by the venerable John Eudes, whose beatification is in hand, and its first superior-general was a woman who died in our own time in the odor of sanctity, and whose process was actually commenced in 1887, within twenty-one years after her death."

The life of such a servant of God cannot be written too soon. It is the history of the Order of the Good Shepherd which she governed so well for so many years. It will encourage her children of the Good Shepherd to fidelity and perseverance. It will furnish all religious with a good model, and it will edify all good Christians.

If those who have charge of the education and direction of young women would put into their hands such books as this we should not be shocked so frequently at the sight of women devoting their lives to pursuits for which they are not fitted, while they neglect those works for which heaven has destined them.

In the work before us the biographer, Miss A. M. Clarke, has done her work well, and the publishers have done their duty by furnishing good type and paper.

RETREATS GIVEN BY FATHER DIGNAM OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS, with Letters and Notes of Spiritual Direction, and of Conferences and Sermons, with a Preface. By *Father Gretton, S.J.* 12 mo., pp. 409. London: Burns & Oates, New York: Benziger Brothers.

From a memoir of Augustus Dignam, published in the beginning of this year, we learn the following facts of his life:

He was born in 1833, and was educated as a day scholar in the City of London School. In 1857 he entered the Jesuit novitiate, at Beaumont, and was ordained priest in 1867. He was afflicted with constant ill-health, but this did not prevent him from entering upon the active work of the ministry. He was continually occupied with the exercises of St. Ignatius, and became unusually successful in conducting retreats, and in moving sinners to penance. The later years of his life were devoted especially to the "Apostleship of Prayer," and the "Messenger of the Sacred Heart." He was the Central Director until a short time before his death, when sickness forced him to resign the work to others.

His devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus was extraordinary. On a certain occasion he said to a friend: "The idea of the Sacred Heart pleading for us is a *great revelation*, and it has to be made known." The friend answered that it had been made known, and very widely already. "Only to a handful," he said, "in comparison to all who might know it, and ought to know it, if one could only get them to listen." This thought was always uppermost in his mind, and in the Retreats and Conferences contained in this book, his constant effort was to draw hearts to the knowledge of this Revelation. It is this which gives to them a special attraction and value.

The Retreats have not been printed from original manuscript, but from notes taken down by different persons at different times as the words fell from Father Dignam's lips or immediately afterwards. It should be added that these meditations will be almost useless unless to those who are well acquainted with the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius, and it will be necessary for readers of them to have a copy of the exercises, as well as of the Holy Gospels in their hands. The primary object of the book is to provide matter for the use chiefly of religious who wish to make private Retreats.

JESUS; HIS LIFE IN THE VERY WORDS OF THE FOUR GOSPELS. A Diatessaron. By *Henry Beaucherk, Priest of the Society of Jesus*. 12mo., pp. 234. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Benziger Brothers.

"Diatessaron, or through the Four, was the title given by the Syrian writer, Tatian, in the second century, to his 'Life of Jesus Christ,' compiled from the four Gospels. The present work embodies the same idea. It professes to set forth the life of our Lord in one connected uniform narrative, from which no event, discourse or detail occurring in any of the four Gospels has been omitted, nevertheless the whole narrative being made up entirely of the words of the inspired writers."

At first sight such a work might seem impossible, but a reference to the four indexes at the end of the volume shows that either in the text or in the margin every single verse of the four Gospels has been accounted for.

The question of the chronology of the event of the Gospels is a difficult one, but the author has not shunned it for that, as so many others have done. On the contrary, he says: "Although the chronology of events as herein set down may be in many cases at fault, I have at least spared no pains, by a diligent study of the best authorities, Catholic as well as Protestant, to guide myself to that order which seemed most satisfactory. It must be borne in mind, however, that with the Scriptural materials at our command absolute certainty on some points is out of the question."

The author has carried out the design of the work very carefully. By using abbreviations of the names of the Evangelists he assigns every word to its proper writer. This book has been an unusually difficult undertaking for publisher as well as for author, because of the references, not only in the margin but in the text, and because of footnotes. It has been done so very well that the publishers are worthy of special commendation.

PLAIN FACTS FOR FAIR MINDS: An Appeal to Candor and Common Sense. By *George M. Searle, Priest of the Congregation of St. Paul the Apostle*. 12mo., pp. 360. New York: Catholic Book Exchange, 120 W. 60th Street.

This book has been written, not with a view of controversy, but of simply stating the Catholic doctrine. There seems at the present time to be a better disposition than formerly on the part of those outside to listen to our own statement about our faith, rather than to those coming from second-hand sources. In these pages the truth of the Christian religion is practically assumed. It is addressed principally to what are commonly called Bible Christians, who form the majority of our Protestant population. It may be added, in further explanation of the work, that though, as has been said, it is not intended as an attack on distinctively Protestant doctrines, it has seemed best at the outset to compare the Catholic idea of Christianity with the usual Protestant theory basing religion on the Bible alone. The creed of the Catholic Church is then

set forth point by point; the order here followed is that of the profession of faith made by converts. In conclusion, other charges against the Church not suggested by the profession, but often made by those who do not know us, are discussed and shown to rest on prejudice or misunderstanding.

Father Searle is a convert to the Catholic faith; he is an astronomer whose reputation is not confined to this country, and he is professor of mathematics and astronomy in the Catholic University of America. It is not surprising that so good a subject, skilfully handled by so able an author, should appear in so good a book. Already, many thousand copies have been sold, and the demand has not yet been satisfied. No better book can be found for fair-minded Protestants, or for any Protestant who can be induced to listen to the Church pleading her own cause. It is brief, compact, clear, and it is cheap.

THE COMEDY OF ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM, IN THREE ACTS. By *A. F. Marshall, B.A.*, Oxon. New revised edition. 12mo., pp. 238. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This satire is so well known that only a passing notice is necessary to recall its excellent qualities. The book has been widely read, quoted, and commended. Now this new, revised edition is placed before the public, and it is high commendation to say of it, that it has lost nothing by revision. Catholics believe that all men should be children of the Catholic Church. If the truth be properly placed before them, by the grace of God, all men will become members of the Catholic Church. There are various ways of placing the truth before men; all cannot be treated alike. A method which may attract one, may repel another. The way followed by Mr. Marshall in this book, is very amusing, and should be in many instances effective, but not in all. It is not always best to tell a man that he is in error; sometimes it is better to let him find that out by showing to him the truth. But for that very large number of persons who can be moved by this method Mr. Marshall's book is excellent. It should be read especially by church-unionists.

SERMONS ON THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. By *Very Rev. D. I. McDermott*, Rector of St. Mary's Church, Philadelphia, Pa. 12 mo., pp. 183. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This book contains eight sermons on the Blessed Virgin, with the following titles; "The Shadow of the Cross, or the Sorrows of Mary;" "The Testimony of Mary, Queen of Prophets;" "The Spiritual Motherhood of Mary, Our Lady of Mercy;" "The Immaculate Conception"—three sermons; "The Solemnity of the Most Holy Rosary;" "The Holy Name of Mary."

They were prepared by the author for special occasions, beginning in 1868 and ending in 1891, and they were published first in 1892. Father McDermott has the reputation of being one of the best preachers in the archdiocese of Philadelphia, and although the ability to speak the word does not always go hand in hand with the ability to write it, he is an exception. He not only speaks well, but he writes well. These sermons bear the mark of the student, the theologian, the priest. They have merited the highest words of praise from able critics, and they are worthy of the attention of all who are interested in such publications.

ÆTHIOPUM SERVUS; a study in Christian Altruism. By *M. D. Petré*. 12 mo., pp. 226. London: Osgood, McDowell & Co. Received from Benziger Brothers.

The text of this work is, "Blessed are they who mourn." The author

shows that suffering is a man's lot in this world, and that the true philanthropist is not he who teaches others that they can obtain true happiness in this life, but he who tells them that crosses are unavoidable, and shows them how to carry them. This truth is illustrated by the life of St. Peter Claver who called himself "the slave of slaves," and who wore himself out in the service of the negro slaves who were brought to Carthage in South America in the early part of the seventeenth century.

As a biographical work the book is meagre in detail. It deals more with slaves and slavery than with the life of the saint. From a literary point of view it is very well done, and in this respect it is an exception to most books of its kind,

The book is a credit to the publishers as well as to the author, for in paper, type and binding good taste is displayed. This is also exceptional.

GRAY'S SCHOOL AND FIELD BOOK OF BOTANY. American Book Co. Revised Edition.

It is late in the day to recommend any of Asa Gray's series of botanical works. They have been so long and extensively employed by school and college that they have proved beyond question their excellence and usefulness as media of instruction. The present edition contains the well-known "Elements," together with the "Field, Forest, and Garden Botany," which introduces the student to our common wild and cultivated plants. The latter portion has been revised by being brought down to date. Though intended, primarily, as a school-book, its simplicity of method and exposition adapt it as an excellent help to self-instruction, and as an introduction to the larger "Botanical Text-Book" in two volumes, and the more exhaustive "Manual," by the same author.

A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES. By *Henry Charles Lea*, LL.D. Volumes I. and II. Philadelphia: Lea Brothers & Co. 1896.

These two octavo volumes of over one thousand pages complete Part I. on Confession and Absolution. They give evidence of great research, extensive reading, and the use of an excellent library by the author. Almost every page bristles with quotations from and references to the Fathers, the schoolmen and theologians of every age down to the present day. There is certainly an abundance of erudition displayed. Nevertheless, the author's want of logical power, or rather his fixed mental attitude of predetermined hostility to an institution which he abominates, so perverts his vision and warps his exigesis that with all his learning he succeeds in giving us an exposition of his own views and theories rather than a history of the subject treated. We shall return to this work later.

HUNOLT'S SERMONS. Volumes XI. and XII. The Christian's Model, or Sermons on the Life and Death of Christ, the Example and Virtues of Mary, and of other chosen Saints of God. By *Rev. Francis Hunolt, S.J.*, translated from the German by Rev. J. Allen, D.D. 8vo. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This work has been reviewed in the *QUARTERLY* as the volumes came from the press. Every two volumes contain a series of seventy-four sermons, adapted to the Sundays and Holy-days of the year. The last volume contains, in addition to the index of sermons and subjects in Volumes XI. and XII., an index of sermons and subjects for the twelve volumes. All who have examined the work, or who have read the words

of praise spoken of it by reviewers and churchmen of prominence, know that in this extensive work the preacher has an almost exhaustless storehouse of good things for the pulpit. A full description of the work and tables of contents may be had from the publishers.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE AT THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By *Joannes Janssen*. Translated from the German by M. A. Mitchell and A. M. Christie. In two volumes. Vols. I. and II. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 17 South Broadway. Price for both volumes, \$6.25.

Exspectate venis! At long length, the great work of the immortal Janssen appears in an English garb. Or, to speak more truly, we seem to be within measurable distance of seeing him in our native dress; for only his preliminary volume is before us; and time only can decide whether the English-speaking races are willing to encourage the further publication of one of the greatest monuments of Catholic erudition since the days of Baronius. We confine ourselves to a simple announcement of the work in the present number, reserving a fuller appreciation of it till October. Meanwhile we exhort every reader of the REVIEW to purchase his copy without delay.

INSTITUTIONES THEOLOGICÆ DOGMATICÆ. TRACT. DE GRATIA DIVINA. Auctore *Petro Einig, D.D., Ph.D.* Pp. viii., 210. Treviris ex off. ad S. Paulinum. 1896. Price, 2,80 marks.

This is the first volume of a course in dogmatic theology by Dr. Einig, professor in the ecclesiastical seminary of Treves. Like the tract on the B. Eucharist, published by the author about eight years ago, the present treatise on Grace is excellently adapted as a text for classes of theology. Brevity, without sacrifice of comprehensiveness of material, clearness of expression, solidity of demonstration, admirable order in the arrangement of parts—these perfections of the work will greatly assist the pupil in mastering a subject so beset with difficulties as that of Grace.

A CHRISTIAN APOLOGY. By *Paul Schanz, D.D., Ph.D.*, Professor of Theology in the University of Tübingen. Translated by Rev. Michael F. Glancey and Rev. Victor J. Schobel, D.D., in three volumes. 8vo. Second revised edition. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co.

This work was reviewed at length in Volumes XVI. and XVIII. of the QUARTERLY, and it is sufficient to say here that all that was said in praise of the work then, is endorsed now. Since its first appearance the book has been considered the most learned and best work of the kind in the English language, and it holds that place yet. It is the very best book to answer modern objections against religion.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE DIALOGUE OF THE SERAPHIC VIRGIN CATHARINE OF SIENA. Dictated by her, while in a state of ecstasy, to her secretaries, and completed in the year of our Lord 1370. Translated from the original Italian, with an introduction on the study of Mysticism, by *Algar Thorold*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price \$3.00 net.

THE GREAT COMMENTARY OF CORNELIUS A LAPIDE. First Epistle to the Corinthians. Translated and edited by W. F. Cobb, D.D. London: John Hodges. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price net \$3.00.

VOLTAIRE ET LE VOLTAIRIANISME. Par *Nourisson*, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: P. Lethiellieux, Libraire-Editeur. Price, fr. 7.50.

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TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

